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Foreword 
P
ROJECTS to amend the Constitution of the United 
States have poured in an almost unceasing stream upon 
the nation ever since the beginning of our national 
history. Most of these have had slight intrinsic importance, 
and for that reason and because backed by little popular ap-
proval nor by strong pressure groups, they have not been 
given official life by Congress or the States. Only twenty-one 
of these proposals have been adopted in the century and a 
half of our life as a nation. But the acutely transitional char-
acter of the last quarter of a century has stimulated more 
general discussion and more intensive study of our constitu-
tional system than had heretofore taken place since the decade 
or two following the adoption of the Articles of Confedera-
tion. The shattering impact of World War Number One and 
its aftermath, and the even more profound dislocations 
caused by the present war have inevitably induced intense 
study of the organic features of our constitutional scheme as 
well as of such other provisions as those relating to civil 
liberties. From these changes in the conditions of life of the 
nation and possibly still more from changed and changing 
theories as to the objectives of government, has come the 
tendency to revise and modify our constitutional arrange-
ment, which is fairly certain to produce many definite pro-
posals to amend the Constitution in the near future. 
There has been much less study of the Amending Clause 
of the Constitution than of any other of its important provi-
sions. Consequently, there is comparatively little material of 
an official sort relating to the process of amending. There 
have been strangely few amendments. It is apparent from a 
study of the debates in the Constitutional Convention and con-
temporary discussion in the States, that our much publicized 
vii 
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"founding fathers" anticipated that the Amending Clause 
would be employed far more often than has proved to be the 
case. While most of the twenty-one amendments which are 
now part of our Constitution have been frequently involved 
in litigation in both Federal and State Supreme Courts, that 
litigation has been concerned chiefly with the content of the 
amendments and not with the manner of their adoption. 
During the last five years, questions regarding the validity 
of the methods actually adopted have come with greater 
frequency than at any prior time in our history. That frequent 
amendment of the Constitution has been avoided, whatever 
the reasons therefor, is probably a most fortunate circum-
stance for the country. To have amended the Constitution 
frequently during the first century of our national existence 
might have resulted in the addition of some hastily conceived 
and unwise changes creating new problems and defects and 
tending to reduce our whole constitutional structure to the 
level of ordinary legislation. 
Nevertheless, the pressure from recent changes in our na-
tionallife and others which will inevitably develop, would 
seem likely to increase the demand for constitutional amend-
ments, particularly when the present world-wide and revolu-
tionary war has wreaked its complete vengeance upon society. 
If present governmental tendencies in this country continue 
to advance in the direction they are now taking, it is reasonably 
certain that bills will be introduced in Congress, the purpose of 
which is to create new boards, commissions or other offices, 
granting new authority and still further extending govern-
. mental regulatory power or control, especially in the fields of 
commerce, industrial relations, agriculture and taxation. Al-
ready there has been an enormous extension of governmental 
administration into fields which had heretofore been regarded 
as strictly private and insulated from governmental interfer-
ence by the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Four-
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teenth Amendments. But with the decision of Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U. S. I 13, the old strictly limited category of public 
utilities and other businesses subject to public regulation was 
demonstrated to be utterly inadequate and illogical. The con-
cept of businesses charged with a public interest, which had 
lain relatively dormant since Sir Mathew Hale's time, was re-
vived and became the justification for an extension of govern-
mental activity which shocked and frightened a great many 
people whose sincere beliefs concerning political and economic 
matters, or whose selfish interest, had made them the partisans 
of an extreme laissez faire theory of government. And recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court, especially several since the 
First World War, have opened the way for repeated and 
successful attacks upon the economic and political theories 
of John Stewart Mill and his followers in this country. It is 
not easy to find any logical and permanent limit beyond which 
the doctrines with regard to businesses charged with public 
interest may not be carried to sustain public regulation and 
perhaps control. 
For a half century at least, the United States and the sev-
eral States have been greatly enlarging the field of adminis-
trative law and action. Until recently Congress has been 
restrained by a rigid and historically unsound conception of 
due process of law, which has now been greatly modified if 
indeed not wholly rejected by the Supreme Court. 
Important decisions of the Court during the last five years 
have all but destroyed the heretofore prevailing view that ad-
ministrative proceedings must be conducted in accordance 
with certain implicit requirements, not unlike those which 
dictate judicial procedure. The same decisions have come 
near to establishing the power of administrative commissions 
and officers to exercise so-called quasi-judicial functions 
without review by the courts, but complete finality of deter-
mination by administrative functionaries has not been de-
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dared by the courts, and agitation for constitutional amend-
ment to bring about that finality is not improbable. 
Theories and even sentimental notions about state sover-
eignty and the Reserved Powers Clause of the Tenth Amend-
ment had imposed other restrictions upon the exercise of the 
police power of the States and unduly restrained the exercise 
of the so-called implied powers of Congress. There had been 
a gradual invasion of the supposed field of reserved rights 
through a slowly enlarging conception of the scope of the 
interstate commerce power of Congress. Recent decisions of 
the Court have practically discarded the old and very un-
satisfactory test of the direct or indirect effect upon interstate 
commerce by the application and enforcement of both state 
and congressional legislation concerned with industrial and 
business functioning. This, of course, has opened the door 
wider for both state and federal regulation of business. But 
the door is not yet as wide open as some think it should be, 
and it is far too wide open to accord with the views and opin-
ions of a probably small minority at the present time. That 
minority, however, may after a time develop new strength 
and find new opportunity, say from an increasing popular 
fear of totalitarian government, to impose restraints, with the 
probable result of a demand for constitutional amendment. 
As to the scope of the commerce power of Congress, opin-
ions continue to differ greatly. And so, the vexing question 
whether state legislation interferes with or usurps the 
power given to Congress, and the converse of that question 
whether Congressional legislation is in reality regulation 
of interstate commerce, or whether it goes beyond such 
regulation and affects the exercise of state police powers, and 
interferes with legal intra-state commerce, are bound to arise 
and to be vigorously debated. So it is with respect to some 
areas in the field of taxation. 
The specific grants of authority have left the extent of 
the President's power far from clear. Thus the bitter con-
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troversy raging about our relationship to the present war 
has made it painfully clear that the clause making the 
President the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, 
those conferring the power over foreign relations, and the 
general grant of executive power, make it entirely possible 
for the President to make war in effect or bring on war, 
even though the power to declare war is given to Congress ex-
clusively. If a President, however wisely, were so to exercise 
his clearly granted power as to bring us into war, and if the 
Congress were opposed to his policy and refused to make 
adequate appropriations and other arrangements for carry-
ing on the war, the consequences obviously might be dis-
astrous. 
There are many other unsettled areas of national power 
concerning the executive and other departments, and, while 
probably it is fortunate that the Constitution makers refrained 
from making many specific grants, and from making any 
disposition of some areas of power not falling clearly within 
any of the three great departments of government, it seems 
probable that there may be a demand for making, clarifying 
or re-arranging some of the distributions of power in this and 
other fields. How many are the possibilities of clash of views, 
how many important matters are still undetermined, are 
made very clear by Professor E. S. Corwin's book recently 
published, entitled "The President, Office and Powers." This 
book is based upon an exhaustive, analytical and historical 
study of the Presidency, and is one of the most important con-
tributions to the understanding of American government 
made in many years. It gives expression to a few interpreta-
tions and some views with which the writer, at least, does 
not wholly agree, but the book as a whole is thoroughly sound 
and penetrating. 
Doubtless the stream of criticism of our judicial depart-
ment will continue. Criticism of our courts is inevitable, and, 
if it is not accompanied by maladroit efforts to weaken the 
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foundations of the judicial system, criticism is healthful. 
Already many proposals to amend Article Two of the Con-
stitution have been made and doubtless many more will be 
made in the future. 
By no means all of the possible defects or deficiencies in-
dicated in the foregoing pages are likely to require or be ac-
corded constitutional amendment. They have been suggested 
merely as illustrative of the fact that at any time we may have 
the beginning of a more determined and systematic attempt 
to amend the Constitution; and this makes Professor Orfield's 
book particularly timely. Professor Orfield has made an 
exhaustive study of all of the materials available for consider-
ation of his subject. His book presents a comprehensive 
picture of constitutional amendment as provided for and de-
veloped during the century and a half of our national exist-
ence. The author presents a statement of what has happened 
and of judicial and other official opinions relating to the 
Amending Clause. He has said comparatively little by way 
of argument for any particular theory relating to the various 
steps in procedure. To have restricted his treatment of the 
subject in this manner, seems to the writer a wise decision. The 
important thing at the present time is to have an accurate, 
fair and wholly non-partisan presentation of the subject. 
Various steps in procedure can best be investigated and the 
existing ones perhaps improved upon by separate studies of 
each step, or of groups of related steps. A reader of Professor 
Orfield's book would do well to examine Everett S. Brown's 
book "The Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States," and also Professor 
Brown's article on the same subject in the "American Po-
litical Science Review" XXIX (Dec. 1935) 1005-1017. 
Professor Orfield has made a valuable contribution to a 
most important subject. 
HENRY M. BATES 
Preface 
M
OST treatises on constitutional law dispose of the 
federal amending clause in summary fashion. The 
commentators have thought fit to stress chiefly 
the division of authority between the federal government and 
the states. They have attached a high degree of significance to 
the dogma of separation of powers. A great deal of attention 
has been devoted to the doctrines of judicial review, the 
supremacy of the Federal Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. 
The taxation and the commerce clauses have come in for their 
full share of consideration. In recent years extensive studies 
have been made of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a result, the amendment clause has almost 
been lost sight of. No monograph on Article Five has been 
published prior to the present book. Yet when one stops to 
realize that the subjects just referred to have to do only with 
the existing distribution of powers, and that the operation of 
the amending power may bring about a complete reshuflling 
of the Constitution, it becomes obvious that one is dealing 
with a power of a higher grade and of more potential im-
portance than any other power provided for in the Constitu-
tion. As John W. Burgess says: 
"A complete constitution may be said to consist of three 
fundamental parts. The first is the organization of the state 
for the accomplishment of future changes in the constitution. 
This is usually called the amending clause, and the power 
which it describes and regulates is called the amending power. 
This is the most important part of a constitution. Upon its 
existence and truthfulness, i.e., its correspondence with real 
and natural conditions, depends the question as to whether the 
state shall develop with peaceful continuity or shall suffer 
alternations of stagnation, retrogression and revolution. A 
XIll 
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constitution, which may be imperfect and erroneous in its 
other parts, can be easily supplemented and corrected, if only 
the state be truthfully organized in the constitution; but if 
this be not accomplished, error will accumulate until nothing 
short of revolution can save the life of a state." 1 
One may approach the study of the amending clause from 
at least three different points of view: from that of constitu-
tional law, from that of jurisprudence and legal philosophy, 
and from that of political science and legislation. From the 
standpoint of constitutional law the genesis and justiciability 
of the power may be considered; the procedure of amend-
ment may be examined in detail; and the scope of the amend-
ing power may be analyzed. From the point of jurisprudence, 
the relation of the amending power to the concept of sover-
eignty may be developed. Finally, from the standpoint of 
political science and legislation, the reform of the amending 
process itself may be made the basis of investigation. 
The writer has experienced considerable difficulty and 
hesitation with respect to the use of the expression "federal 
amending power." Closely analyzed, "power" admits of 
several meanings. It may mean the capacity to amend, the 
composite body which does the amending, or even the process 
of amending. Ambiguity at least as to title has been sought 
to be avoided by calling this book "The Amending of the 
Federal Constitution." The writer is indebted to Dean 
E. Blythe Stason of the University of Michigan Law School 
for valuable suggestions with respect to the problem of 
terminology. 
This book was begun by the writer as the holder of a Re-
search Fellowship in the University of Michigan Law School 
during the year 1928-1929. The writer there was fortunate 
in having the advice and assistance of Dean Henry M. Bates. 
1 
1 BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1891) 137· 
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Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, now Dean of the School of 
Jurisprudence of the University of California, offered some 
suggestions as to the topic of sovereignty. Full responsibility 
is assumed by the writer, however, for all statements and 
conclusions. The writer first became interested in the federal 
amending process as a student in the classes of Professor 
Henry Rottschaefer of the University of Minnesota Law 
School. 
All but one of the chapters were published in I930, I93I 
and I932 in various law reviews, all of which have graciously 
consented to the reprinting. These reviews were the Illinois 
Law Review, Iowa Law Review, Michigan Law Review, 
Minnesota Law Review, Nebraska Law Bulletin, and the 
North Carolina Law Review. All of these articles have since 
been revised and brought up to date and a new chapter has 
been added. Special attention has been given to the far-
reaching I939 decisions by the Supreme Court of the United 
States and to recent suggestions for changing the amending 
process. 
Gratitude is due to the University of Minnesota Law School 
for the use of its library during the summer of I939, and to 
the University of Southern California Law School for similar 
use in the summer of I 940. Sincere appreciation is felt to 
Miss Katherine Kempfer for editing the manuscript in its 
latest form. It would be impossible to overrate the value of 
suggestions made by her. She has given freely of her time 
and first rate ability at analysis. The writer is deeply indebted 
to Dean Emeritus Henry M. Bates for writing the introduc-
tion, as well as for encouragement in the revision and publica-
tion of this book. 
Lake Minnetonka, Minnesota 
September 2, I 94I 
LESTER B. 0RFIELD 
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ARTICLE FIVE 
THE CoNSTITUTioN 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Con-
stitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two 
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to 
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one 
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made 
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall 
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the 
Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without 
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the 
Senate." 
CHAPTER I 
The Genesis of Article Five 
THE idea of amending the organic instrument of a state is peculiarly American. Although many of our political and legal institutions take their origin from 
English and occasionally Continental conceptions, such is not 
the case in the fundamental matter of altering the constitu-
tion. The idea of a written constitution was developed at a late 
stage of Western civilization, and the United States, not 
Europe, took the lead. The doctrine of popular sovereignty 
had an especially strong appeal to the inhabitants of the col-
onies in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The people 
were sovereign: it followed that they could make a constitu-
tion. Corollary to this, of course, they could revise and 
amend the document which they had adopted. 
The first written charters or constitutions providing for 
their amendment appear to have been the charters of the 
Colony of Pennsylvania, which was the only colony to make 
such provision.1 Eight of the state constitutions during the 
period between the declaration of independence and the meet-
ing of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 contained 
amendment clauses.2 Even more important, the Articles of 
Confederation, defective as they were, made provision for 
their alteration. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that when 
the Constitutional Convention assembled some plan of re-
vision would be presented. 
The Constitutional Convention assembled on May 14, 
1787, and at the meeting of May 29, Randolph presented 
1 a POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, 
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, zd ed. (1878) 1518, 
1527, 1531, 15J6. 
• For detailed consideration of these laws, see Martig, "Amending the Con-
stitution," (1937) 35 MICH. L. REv. I2SJ-1255· 
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the first plan for a new constitution in the form of fifteen 
resolutions.3 The thirteenth declared that provision should 
be made for amendment of the constitution whenever thought 
necessary and that the assent of the national legislature should 
not be required. Charles Pinckney presented a proposed draft 
of a constitution at the same meeting.4 Article sixteen of his 
draft set forth that if the legislatures of two-thirds of the 
states should apply for a convention to amend the constitu-
tion, the national legislature should call one; or, in the alter-
native, Congress by a two-thirds vote of each house might 
propose, and two-thirds of the legislatures might adopt. Both 
drafts were referred to the committee of the whole house. 
On June s, the convention discussed Randolph's resolu-
tion. 5 Pinckney expressed doubt as to the propriety or need of 
an amendment clause. Gerry defended it, however, on the 
grounds that such a new and difficult experiment required 
periodical revision, that the opportunity for such revision 
would stabilize the government, and that "Nothing had yet 
happened in the states where the provision existed to prove 
its impropriety." Randolph's resolution was again brought up 
on June 9.6 Several members thought it not a necessity; they 
furthermore thought it improper to dispense with the con-
sent of Congress. Mason was of the opinion that the provision 
was necessary, since the Constitution, like the Articles of Con-
federation, would prove defective. It would be better to pro-
vide for amendments in any easy constitutional way than to 
rely on chance and violence. He was opposed to having Con-
gress participate in the process since it might abuse its power 
and refuse to give its assent to changes desired. The resolution 
8 
ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
2d ed. (1937 facsimile of 1836 ed.) 127-128. Volume 5 is a revised edition of 
Madison's diary of the debates. 
4 Ibid. 129-132· 
1 Ibid. 157. 
8 Ibid. 182. 
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was unanimously adopted, but the clause dispensing with the 
consent of Congress was postponed for further discussion. 
A long interval now occurred during which the convention 
appears to have ignored or overlooked the question of an 
amending clause. Randolph's original resolution, except as 
to congressional participation in amending,7 seems to have been 
the basis of action until August 6, when Rutledge delivered 
the report8 of the committee of detail, to which the resolu-
tion had been referred. Article nineteen of the committee's 
draft provided that Congress should call a convention on the 
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. 
There was no discussion of the report until August 30, when 
Gouverneur Morris suggested that Congress be permitted 
to call a convention whenever it chose. 9 But the convention 
unanimously agreed to the article as reported by the com-
mittee. 
The most serious and detailed discussion did not occur until 
the last week of the convention.10 On September 10, Gerry 
moved to reconsider article nineteen. The Constitution, he 
asserted, would be paramount to the state constitutions. Un-
der the article, two-thirds of the states could obtain a con-
vention, "a majority of which can bind the Union to inno-
vations that may subvert the state constitutions altogether." 
He asked whether such a state of affairs should be brought 
about. Hamilton seconded Gerry's motion, but with a dif-
ferent motive than the latter. He did not object to the result 
described by Gerry and contended that it was no worse to 
subject the people of the United States to "the major voice" 
than to so subject the people of a particular state. He desired 
an easier mode of amendment than that provided in the 
Articles of Confederation, and regarded article nineteen as 
• Ibid. I 90, 35 I, 3 76. 
8 Ibid. 376-38I. 
• Ibid. 498. 
10 Ibid. 53o-53z. 
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inadequate in accomplishing this. Like Gouverneur Morris, 
he proposed that Congress be given a free hand in calling a 
convention. 
"The state legislatures will not apply for alterations, but with 
a view to increase their own powers. The national legislature 
will be the first to perceive, and will be most sensible to the 
necessity of amendments; and ought also to be empowered, 
whenever two thirds of each branch should concur, to call a 
convention. There could be no danger in giving this power, 
as the people would finally decide in the case.''11 
James Madison also supported the motion for reconsidera-
tion. The language concerning the calling of a convention was 
too vague. It was not clear how the convention would be 
formed, nor by what rules it would transact business, nor 
what force its acts would have. The motion to reconsider was 
thereupon passed, nine states favoring and one opposing. 
Sherman moved that Congress be permitted to propose 
amendments to the states, but that "no amendments shall be 
binding until consented to by the several states." Wilson 
moved to insert "two thirds of" before the words "several 
states" in Sherman's proposal. This failed by a five to six vote, 
but a later motion by Wilson to insert instead "three fourths 
of" was adopted. 
Madison then moved to postpone the amended proposi-
tion in order to consider a proposal of his own, worded much 
like the present Article Five providing for proposal of amend-
ments by Congress either on a two-thirds vote of each house 
or on application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, 
and ratification by the legislatures or conventions of three-
fourths of the states. Hamilton seconded the motion. This pro-
posal meant a significant change in the entire scheme. Instead 
of permitting amendment by a single convention, the plan 
made necessary the participation of the legislatures or conven-
tions of the states. At this point Rutledge stated that he would 
n Ibid. 5JI• 
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never agree to an amending power "by which the articles 
relating to slaves might be altered by the states not interested 
in that property, and prejudiced against it." 12 A proviso was 
then added to Madison's plan to meet this objection, and his 
amended proposition was adopted by a vote of nine to one. 
Five days later, as the convention was about to conclude 
its labors, the amendment clause was reported as Article Five 
by the committee of style and arrangement.13 Sherman 
feared that "three fourths of the states might be brought to 
do things fatal to particular states; as abolishing them alto-
gether, or depriving them of their equality in the Senate." 
He therefore thought it reasonable that the limitations on 
the amending power should be enlarged so as to provide 
"that no state should be affected in its internal police, or de-
prived of their equality in the Senate." 
Mason believed that the proposed method of amending 
the constitution was "exceptionable and dangerous." Both 
modes required action by Congress immediately or ulti-
mately; hence no amendment of the proper kind could be ob-
tained by the people if the government became oppressive, 
as he believed would be the case. Gouverneur Morris and 
Gerry then moved to amend the article so as to require a 
convention on the application of two-thirds of the states, in 
order to obviate this objection. Madison pointed out in re-
sponse that he did not see why Congress would not be as much 
obligated to propose amendments applied for by two-thirds 
of the states, as to call a convention on a similar application. 
He was not unalterably opposed to providing for a con-
vention, but thought that difficulties might arise as to the 
form and quorum, matters which should be avoided in con-
stitutional regulations. The motion for a convention was, 
however, unanimously adopted. Sherman moved to amend 
lJI Ibid. 532. 
u Ibid. ssx-ssz. 
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Article Five so as to require ratification of amendments by all 
state legislatures or conventions instead of three-fourths of 
them, but his motion failed, seven to three. Gerry moved 
to amend so as to allow ratification only by the state legisla-
tures and not by state conventions as an alternative method, 
but this failed, ten to one. 
One last attempt was made to limit the amending body. 
Sherman, in accordance with his previously expressed idea, 
moved to annex at the end of the article a clause that "no state 
shall, without its consent, be affected in its internal police, 
or deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate."14 Madison 
objected that if such special provisos w~re added every state 
would insist on them, for their boundaries, exports, and other 
matters. Sherman's motion then failed, eight to three, the 
small states, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware voting 
for it. He then moved to strike out Article Five altogether, 
and this motion also failed, by an eight to two vote. Gouver-
neur Morris moved to annex the simple proviso, as it now 
appears in Article Five, "that no state, without its consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." And 
as Madison concisely reports it, this motion, "being dictated 
by the circulating murmurs of the small states, was agreed 
to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question, 
saying no." At this same meeting the entire Constitution as 
amended was accepted by the convention, and ordered to be 
engrossed.15 Two days later on Monday, September 17, the 
engrossed Constitution was read and signed, and the conven-
tion adjourned.16 
1
' Ibid. 552. 
lll Ibid. 553· , 
16 Ibid. 553-567. For an account of the adoption of the Constitution by the 
states, see Martig, "Amending the Constitution," (1937) 35 MICH. L. REV. 
1253 at u6I-u66. 
CHAPTER II 
Judicial Review of Validity of Amendments 
A. JUSTICIABILITY 
T O one not particularly familiar with constitutional law the notion of a court's passing on the legality of a constitutional amendment might seem strange. To 
him it would perhaps seem correct that the courts should un-
questionably assume the validity of the Constitution and its 
amendments as an irreducible minimum in the decision of 
cases. To a Continental lawyer accustomed to a legal system 
in which the courts may not declare invalid even a statute, 
the idea of a court's determining whether a constitutional 
amendment is valid or not would seem astonishing. Even one 
familiar with American constitutional law might well have 
had some doubts before the litigation over the legality of the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. 
Prior to the decisions in the 1920's, the only instance in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States had passed 
on the legitimacy of an amendment to the federal Constitution 
had arisen more than a century before in the case of Hollings-
worth v. Virginia/ as to the adoption of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. In that case the attorney general of the United States, 
in defending the legality of the amendment, made no at-
tempt to show that the matter was a political question, and 
the court did not discuss the issue. The case can therefore be 
cited only to the effect that the court and the parties assumed 
it to be a legal question. The court, moreover, passed only 
on the legality of the procedure of amendment, and not on 
the content of the amendment itself. In the later and much 
1 (1798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378. 
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cited case of Luther v. Barden/ the Supreme Court declared 
in dictum that the question of validity of the adoption of 
an amendment was a political question. This case attracted 
great attention and was widely cited in the state decisions, so 
that many came to have the view that the question was polit-
ical. Last of all, inasmuch as the courts have not assumed to 
pass on the constitutionality of the Constitution itself, there is 
some logic in arguing that, since an amendment becomes as 
much a part of the Constitution as any other part of it (in 
fact repeals any part inconsistent with it), the legality of an 
amendment is no more open to attack than that of the Con-
stitution itself. 
It may be laid down dogmatically that the constitutionality 
of the Constitution itself is a political question.3 In the first 
place it would seem a contradiction in terms to raise such a 
question, except in reference to the matter of its having been 
• (I849) 7 How. (48 U. S.) I at 39· Taney, C. J., said: "In forming the 
constitutions of the different States, after the Declaration of Independence, and 
in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political 
department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amend-
ment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has 
followed its decision." As late as I 8 8 8 it was asserted that this case "is still 
the law of the federal courts" in Smith v. Good, (C. C. R. I. I888) 34 Fed. 
204 at 208. 
3 Luther v. Borden, (I 849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) I; Smith v. Good, (C. C. R.I. 
I888) 34 F. 204; Brickhouse v. Brooks, (C. C. Va. I9o8) I65 F. 534; State v. 
Starling, (1867) IS Rich. L. (S.C.) 12o; Koehler v. Hill, (I883) 6o Iowa 
543, I4 N. W. 738, I5 N. W. 6o9; Miller v. Johnson, (I892) 92 Ky. 589, I8 
S. W. 522, constitution held valid although the convention which had been 
elected to draft it made several changes in it after it had been voted on by the 
people of the state; Taylor v. Commonwealth, (I903) 10I Va. 829, 44 S. E. 
7 54, constitution upheld though it had never been submitted to popular vote; 
Carpenter v. Cornish, (I 9 I 2) 83 N.J. L. 696, 85 A. 240, affirming 83 N.J. L. 
254, 83 A. 3I; O'Neill, J., dissenting in Foley v. Democratic Parish Committee, 
(I9I5) 138 La. 22o, 70 So. Io4. See the statement in Brittle v. People, (I87J) 
2 Neb. I 98 at 2 I o: "When, however, a State government has been formed, and 
the State admitted to the Union with a given constitution, courts must recognize, 
and are as fully bound by, the fact as the merest citizen; and I submit, with all 
respect, that we can as well dispute the validity of the United States Constitu-
tion, because the convention framing it, disregarding all instructions limiting 
its members to making amendments to the old articles of confederation, assumed 
to make an entirely new frame of government, as we can inquire into any sup-
posed irregularities or illegalities which may have entered into the construction 
of our own." 
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validly adopted according to the previously existing consti-
tution. Where the existing constitution has come into opera-
tion through a revolution, obviously a very dangerous prob-
lem would arise if the courts should attempt to pass on the 
validity of the new constitution. Where the new constitution 
has not been the result of a revolution, a new government has 
not begun to function under the new constitution, the people 
have not acquiesced, and the old courts continue to operate, 
they could declare the new constitution void.4 Where a new 
government, executive and legislative, had taken their oaths 
under the new constitution, or even where a new government 
had commenced to operate under the new constitution and 
there was popular acquiescence, it would still perhaps be log-
ically possible for the old courts to declare the new constitu-
tion invalid. But where the courts, as well as the other branches 
of the government, are operating under the new constitution, 
it seems inconceivable that they could pass on the validity of 
the instrument which is their creator. In theory, the court 
might decide the new constitution was invalid. But this would 
be tantamount to a declaration that the court itself no longer 
exists, since it was the creature of the constitution. The fu-
tility of the proceeding would make such a decision unlikely. 
As an actual fact such a court might continue to exist if the 
other departments of government accepted and enforced the 
decision, but this would seem to be a case of usurpation. 
From the fact that the courts cannot declare the existing 
constitution invalid, it follows that they cannot so declare 
•Loring v. Young, (t9z1) z39 Mass. 349, IJZ N. E. 65. The paucity of 
precedent on this point seems to have led to the broad view frequently asserted 
that the validity of a constitution is not assailable at any stage. In 1 5 L. R. A. 
5z4, the commentator on Miller v. Johnson, (189z) 9z Ky. 589, 18 S. W. 
5 zz, points out that since there is no question of opposing governments or of 
the existence of the court, and since the adoption of a new constitution is in 
effect only an amendment of the old one and does not in fact upset the existing 
government, "it is difficult to see why the question of lawful adoption is not as 
much a judicial question in case of a new constitution as it is in the case of an 
amendment, eo nomine." 
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any part of it (exclusive of amendments) 5 except where the 
parts are in conflict, in which event the courts perhaps would 
speak of construing or harmonizing. In fact, to declare a 
part void would seem even less justifiable than to nullify 
the whole new constitution, for in recognizing part of a new 
constitution it must recognize its entire validity. Since the old 
constitution is no longer in existence, there is no authority on 
which it can predicate a declaration that a part of the new 
constitution is invalid. 
The view that the courts may not declare the existing 
constitution or a part of it (exclusive of amendments) invalid 
has particular force as to the federal Constitution. In the case 
of the states, many of them have adopted wholly new con-
stitutions in pursuance, in most cases, of the mode prescribed 
in the previous constitution. In such cases there is doubtless 
justification for the courts' passing on the validity of the new 
constitution, though as a matter of fact such cases have been 
very rare. But the Constitution of the United States was not 
adopted according to the mode prescribed in the Articles of 
Confederation. In other words, our existing constitution is 
the product of a revolution, bloodless though it was.6 The 
• Carpenter v. Cornish, (z9rz) 83 N.J. L. 696, 85 A. 240, affg. 83 N. J. L. 
254, 83 A. 31. But this view seems to have been departed from in a number of 
Louisiana cases arising over the 1920 state constitution. Huff v. Seiber, (D. C. 
La. 1925) zo F. (2d) 236; Pender v. Gray, (1921) 149 La. z84, 88 So. 786; 
State ex rei. Hoffman v. Judge, (1921) 149 La. 363, 89 So. 215; State v. 
Jones, (1922) 151 La. 714, 92 So. 310. An earlier case, State v. American 
Sugar Refining Co., (1915) 137 La. 507, 68 So. 742, is partially explain-
able on the ground that the constitution then made no provision for a con-
vention, that the people by popular vote adopted the legislative restrictions as to 
subject matter imposed on the convention, and that the constitution was never 
ratified by popular vote. O'Neill, J., dissented on the ground that if part of 
the constitution could be declared invalid, the whole might be. See also, Foley 
v. Democratic Parish Committee, (1915) 138 La. 220, 70 So. 104. 
8 Jameson says that "it is clear, that the act of disregarding the provisions 
of the I 3th of the Articles of Confederation, was done confessedly as an act of 
revolution, and not as an act within the legal competence of either the people or 
the Convention, under the Constitution then in force." JAMESON, CoNSTITU· 
TIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (z887) 1 § 5641 p. 596. Under Article Thirteen, 
Congress should have proposed and the legislatures of every state should have 
ratified the constitution. Technically, every step was complied with except that 
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Supreme Court and all the other federal courts are and 
always have been the creatures of the existing Constitution. 
Thus there has never been any court before whom its invalid-
ity might be asserted. The federal courts have never assumed 
to pass on the validity of the original Constitution or any part 
of it, and have never admitted that it was the creature of 
revolution, though the commentators have frequently 
pointed it out. 
Passing from the question of judicial cognizance of the 
validity of the Constitution to that of an amendment thereto, 
it would not be illogical to expect somewhat the same treat-
ment of the problem. 7 The adoption of a constitution and the 
adoption of an amendment certainly have many points in 
ratification was by three-fourths of the states (though all eventually ratified), 
inasmuch as the Constitutional Convention sent the Constitution to Congress, 
which at the advisory direction of the convention transmitted it to the state 
legislatures, which in turn at the recommendation of the convention passed it on 
to the state conventions. The framing of an entirely new constitution in viola-
tion of the directions of Congress and the designating of the ratifying bodies 
have been asserted to be revolutionary, but if the Constitutional Convention and 
the state conventions be regarded as advisory bodies the only illegal step was 
ratification by less than a unanimous vote. The ground of necessity pleaded by 
Randolph seems a rather dubious legal justification. See also, I CooLEY, CoN-
STITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed. (I 927) 9; I BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE 
AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (I89I) 98; McCulloch v. Mary-
land, (I8I9) 4 Wheat. (I7 U.S.) 3I6 at 403. 
Professor Powell has stated: "At one time I inclined toward the view that the 
Constitution is still unconstitutional and that from the lawyer's standpoint 
we should still be operating under the Articles of Confederation which pro-
vided for a perpetual union that could not be changed without the consent of 
Congress and the legislatures of all the states. I have since modified that view. 
While the Constitution was ratified in state conventions rather than in state 
legislatures as the Articles of Confederation prescribed, the conventions were 
called by the state legislatures and so may be regarded as having lawful au-
thority delegated by the legislatures. I now think that all irregularities were 
cured when North Carolina and Rhode Island finally ratified and that the 
Constitution then became constitutional though it had not been constitutional 
previously. Of course, Rhode Island's concurrence was coerced by threats of 
economic pressure, but she still concurred." Powell, "Changing Constitutional 
Phases," (I939) I9 BosT. u. L. REV. 509 at sn-su. 
• In Smith v. Good, (C. C. R. I. I888) 34 F. 204, it is asserted that both 
questions are political; while in Loring v. Young, (I92I) 239 Mass. 349, 
I32 N. E. 65, it is stated that both are judicial, Luther v. Borden, (I849) 
7 How. (48 U. S.) I, being distinguished on the ground that in that case two 
rival governments were arrayed against each other in armed conflict. 
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common. In both there is the exercise of the highest sovereign 
power of the state. The adoption of an amendment is the 
adoption of a constitution in little. It is conceivable that over 
a long period of time a constitution might be so altered as to 
bear little resemblance to the original document. Looked at 
from one point of view, an amendment is of even greater 
import than the original provisions of the constitution since it 
automatically repeals all clauses inconsistent with it.8 It may 
even repeal a Supreme Court decision. 9 Looked at from a 
practical standpoint, however, the chief difference is seen 
to be that an amendment does not produce so comprehensive 
and so serious an effect on the existing frame of government. 
The courts are left relatively free to see that the prescribed 
constitutional mode of alterations is complied with. 
I. Validity of Procedure of Adoption 
At the outset it should be noted that as a matter of logic 
a distinction might be taken between the justiciability of mat-
ters of procedure on the one hand and matters of substance on 
the other hand. By matters of procedure are meant questions 
as to whether amendments were properly proposed or prop-
erly ratified or both. Has an amendment been proposed or 
ratified according to the methods expressly or impliedly spec-
ified in Article Five? By matters of substance are meant, as-
suming that the proper procedure for amending has been fol-
lowed, questions as to the content of the amendment proper. 
Are there limitations as to the type of subject which may be 
dealt with by constitutional amendment, or if not, are there 
8 Johnson v. Tompkins, (C. C. Pa. r833) Baldw. 571 at 598, F. Cas. No. 
7416; Osborn v. Nicholson, (C. C. Ark. r87o) r Dill. 219, F. Cas. No. 10595; 
University v. Mciver, (r875) 72 N.C. 76; Grant v. Hardage, (1913) xo6 
Ark. 506, I53 s. W. 826. 
• The Eleventh, Fourteenth and Sixteenth Amendments operated to nullify 
previous decisions. Such would also be the effect of the child labor amend-
ment. The Eleventh Amendment operated retroactively. 
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limitations as to how certain subjects may be treated by con-
stitutional amendment? The Supreme Court need not treat 
these two problems alike, and the two types of validity will 
be discussed separately. The justiciability of matters of pro-
cedure of adoption will first be discussed. 
If the Constitution made specific provision for the submis-
sion of the question of the validity of amendments to a desig-
nated tribunal, it might perhaps be asserted that their validity 
is not a question for the ordinary courts, 10 though even in that 
case the exclusion of the courts has been doubted. 11 Article 
Five, however, is silent, so that there is much reason to assert 
that the validity of amendments, like so many other con-
troversies which may arise over the interpretation of the 
Constitution, is a legal question.12 The theory of the courts 
in claiming the power to adjudicate amendments is doubtless 
the same as that back of the power to declare laws unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court may set aside any unconstitutional 
act of Congress or of the President, and reverse its own and 
the decisions of the lower courts where the interpretation was 
erroneous. From this it follows that where there is a failure to 
10 Worman v. Hagen, (1893) 78 Md. 152, 27 A. 616. In State v. Swift, 
(r88o) 69 Ind. 505, two judges dissenting, it appears that the court assumed 
the validity of a statute interpreted to allow the governor to ascertain the adop-
tion of the amendment; in Rice v. Palmer, (1906) 78 Ark. 432, 96 S. W. 396, 
there is dictum that a statute could establish a special tribunal for the purpose. 
Jameson is of the view that Congress alone has the power to pass on amendments 
except in suits between individuals. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 
4th ed. (1887) 626-627. · 
n McConaughy v. Secretary of State, (1909) 106 Minn. 392, 119 N. W. 
408. But this seems improper since the courts, as well as the other departments 
of government, are bound by the Constitution. 
12 In practice, Congress has several times in effect decided on the meaning 
of Article Five. In resolutions it has asserted that the approval of an amend-
ment by the President is unnecessary (see infra, chap. III, note 30), that two-
thirds of a quorum of each house of Congress is the majority required for pro-
posing amendments [SENATE JouRNAL, rst <Cong., rst sess. (Sept. 9, 1789), 
p. 77 ], that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified [ ( 1868) 15 Stat. L. 
708-711], and that states may not withdraw their ratifications [(r868) 15 
Stat. L. 7o6, 708]. 
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comply with the regular mode of amendment prescribed in 
Article Five, the courts may regard the procedure as null and 
void. 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia/3 as mentioned above, seems 
to hav.e been the first case, either national or state, in which 
the validity of an amendment was passed on. But, as there 
stated, no attempt was made to show that the issue was a 
political one; the question, moreover, was simply one as to 
the procedure in adopting the amendment; and the court 
upheld the validity of the amendment. In I 8 3 6 a state 
case14 on the subject maintained the right of the courts to in-
quire into the validity of amendments. But the opinion of the 
court was brief, and like the prior federal case upheld the 
validity of the amendment. In I 849 the federal Supreme 
Court asserted in dictum that the question was political.15 
Until the recent cases on the Eighteenth16 and Nineteenth17 
Amendments, this was the only pronouncement of the court 
on the subject, so that if there had been no intervening cir-
cumstances the court might have adhered to its view in that 
case. However, in the meantime there had been constantly 
increasing litigation in the state courts over the validity of 
amendments. In I854 the Alabama court in Collier v. 
Frierson 18 asserted that it was a justiciable question and held 
an amendment invalid. The case is notable for the fact that 
it is the first and only case before I88o holding an amend-
ment unconstitutional. In I 8 56 the Mississippi Supreme 
Court held the question a judicial one.19 In I864, however, 
:Ill (1798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378. See note r, supra. 
"State v. McBride, (r 836) 4 Mo. 303. 
18 Luther v. Borden, (r849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) r. 
"'National Prohibition Cases, (r92o) 253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. 
17 Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 1301 42 S. Ct. 217. 
18 (r854) 24 Ala. roo. 
19 Green v. Weller, (r856) 32 Miss. 650. 
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the Maryland court took the view that it was a political ques-
tion. 20 In I 8 76 the Minnesota court regarded it as judiciaJ.21 
Up to I88o only about seven cases had arisen in which the 
validity of an amendment was attacked in the courts. Up to 
I 890 about twenty such cases had arisen. But since that date 
a large number of cases have been decided. The state decisions 
have been virtually unanimous to the effect that the question 
is judicial, and the state courts now exercise supervision over 
every step of the amending process. 22 Luther v. B orden23 
was discussed by many of the courts, and the limited holding 
of that case was precisely defined. 
What then should be the position of the courts as to amend-
ment of the federal Constitution? That the question has been 
an open one even up to recent times is indicated by the cases 
which have arisen. In the first case which arose, H olling.s-
worth v. Virginia,24 the Supreme Court in I798 passed on 
the procedure of amendment with respect to a proposal by 
Congress and held that the President need not concur in the 
proposal of an amendment. But no one raised the point that 
20 Miles v. Bradford, (I864) :u Md. I7o. The same view has since been 
taken in State v. Swift, (I88o) 69 Ind. sos, power of political department 
inferred from a statute; Beck, J., dissenting in Koehler v. Hill, (I883) 6o 
Iowa 543 at 568, I4 N. W. 738, IS N. W. 6o9; Van Syckel, J., dissenting in 
Bott v. Board of Registry, (I 897) 6I N. J. L. I 6o, 3 8 A. 848; McCulloch, J., 
dissenting in Rice v. Palmer, (I9o6) 78 Ark. 432, 96 S. W. 396, pointing out 
that if the question is judicial the validity of an amendment is never definitely 
settled. 
21 Dayton v. St. Paul, (I 8 76) 22 Minn. 400. 
""(I939) 53 HARV. L. REV. IJ4; (I94o) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 402. 
""(I849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) x. In that case two rival governments were in 
armed conflict; the validity of a constitution, not an amendment, was in issue, 
and the opinion was therefore dictum; federal jurisdiction was involved as to 
the validity of a state constitution, and not of a federal amendment; the consti-
tution of Rhode Island provided no mode of amendment. There are dicta in a 
few cases that when the amendment relates to the existence, power or functions 
of the courts, the question is political. Koehler v. Hill, (I883) 6o Iowa 543, 
I4 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 6o9; State ex rel. McClurg v. Powell, (I9oo) 77 
Miss. 543, 27 So. 927 • 
.. (I798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378. 
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the issue was a political one; and it should be noted that the 
court upheld the amendment involved. The opinion was a 
brief one of only five lines. In I 849 the Supreme Court in a 
dictum in the famous case of Luther v. Borden25 stated that 
the question was a political one. In White v. H art26 the 
Supreme Court in dictum intimated that the validity of the 
Civil War Amendments was a political question. In Dodge 
v. Woolsey 27 Mr. Justice Campbell in a dissenting opinion 
referred with approval to the doctrine of political questions 
as laid down in Luther v. Borden. In Smith v. Good28 a 
federal circuit judge, in passing on a controversy involving 
the validity of an amendment to a state constitution, held the 
controversy to be a political one and stated that the case of 
Luther v. Borden was still controlling in the federal courts, 
and that it had been followed in White v. Hart. Thus the 
cases arising in the nineteenth century seem to have regarded 
the question as a political one. 
It was in the first one-third of the twentieth century that 
support for the view that the issue should be regarded as a 
judicial one received its greatest impetus, though some of the 
cases involved substance rather then procedure. In 1905 a 
lower federal court held that the validity of an amendment 
to a state constitution was a judicial question.29 In 1910 a 
lower federal court passed on the validity of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, seeming to have assumed that the validity of 
the substance of an amendment involved a judicial question.30 
This latter case was offset by a lower federal court decision 
as to the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment that only the 
.. (1849) 7 How. (48 U.S.) r. The facts are given in note 23, supra . 
.., (1871) 13 Wall. (8o U.S.) 646. 
~ (1885) 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 at 373· This case did not involve the 
validity of an amendment . 
.. (C. C. R.I. 1888) 34 F. 204 . 
.,. Knight v. Shelton, (C. C. Ark. 1905) 134 F. 423. 
10 Anderson v. Myers, (C. C. Md. 1910) 182 F. 223, affd. Myers v. Ander-
son, (1915) 238 U. S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932. 
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political department can declare an amendment void for vio-
lating alleged limitations as to substance.81 Thus up to I920 
there were no decisions by the Supreme Court itself squarely 
passing on the justiciability of amendments. In fact, between 
1798 and I920 the validity of no federal amendment was 
passed upon by the Supreme Court. In I 920 in Hawke v. 
Smith 32 the Supreme Court passed on a question of ratifica-
tion by the state legislatures and concluded that the states 
could not restrict the ratifying power by providing for a bind-
ing popular referendum. The decision, it is to be noted, is 
aimed at the acts of the states and not those of Congress. The 
court did, however, construe the meaning of the phrase 
"legislatures" in the federal Constitution rather than the 
phrase as it appeared in the resolution of Congress proposing 
the amendment. 
In the same year came the National Prohibition Cases,S3 in 
which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Eight-
eenth Amendment against arguments of unconstitutional 
content and improper procedure of adoption. The solicitor 
general argued that both of these questions were political. 
The procedural question involved the meaning of "two-thirds 
of both Houses" in the proposal of an amendment by 
Congress. 34 The Supreme Court failed to develop any doc-
trine as to just what questions it was deciding, or of its own 
power. Hence the decision is somewhat dubious as a precedent. 
In Dillon v. Gloss,S5 decided a year later, the court seemed 
more clearly to review the extent of the powers of Congress 
under Article Five with respect to fixing the time limit for 
ratification, but the court was not very explicit as to its own 
powers. In I 922, in Leser v. Garnett,S6 the court again seems 
51 Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920) 264 F. 186. 
•• (192o) 253 U.S. 221,40 S. Ct. 495· 
as (192o) 253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. 
•• See infra, chap. III, at note 28 . 
.. (1921) 256 u.s. 368, 41 s. Ct. 510. 
•• (1922) 258 U.S. 130,42 S. Ct. 217. 
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inferentially to have given comfort to the doctrine of po-
litical question. After arguing only by analogy to the Fif-
teenth Amendment, the court declared that the subject of 
the Nineteenth Amendment was within the amending power. 
But as to the argument that two of the states had not ratified 
properly, the court gave the broad answer that "official notice 
to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they had done so 
was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his procla-
mation, is conclusive upon the courts."37 Thus in effect the 
court treated the state acts and the acts of the secretary of 
state as involving the doctrine of political question. 
In 1931 after almost a decade the court in United States v. 
Sprague38 did not try to distinguish the question before it 
from that in Leser v. Garnett. The court ruled that Congress 
could select the method of ratification, whether by state legis-
latures or by state conventions. The language of the court is 
such as to induce the belief that the court regarded the 
amending process as generally justiciable. 
There was an interval of eight years without any decisions 
on the amending clause. Then came the decisions in 1939 
involving the ratification of the child labor amendment. 39 
The court laid down a doctrine that some steps in the amend-
ing process involved political questions. It should be carefully 
noted that it did not hold all questions concerning the amend-
ing process to be political. The effect of the previous rejection 
by a state of an amendment was held to involve a political 
rt Ibid., 258 U. S. at 13 7· ROTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw ( 1939) 
399, states: "It should be noted that the conclusive effect of the official notice 
to, and the certification thereof by, the Secretary is based on certain assumptions. 
How far a court would reach its own independent conclusion on the matters 
thus assumed cannot be definitely stated." See also Quarles, "Amendments to 
the Federal Constitution," (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 617 at 618, Mr. Quarles, 
however, states that the proposal of an amendment is a political question • 
.. (1931) 282 u.s. 716,51 s. Ct. 220. 
""Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v. 
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 922, 
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question. The interval of time in which the states might ratify 
an amendment was also held to involve a political question.40 
Thus it is only as to these two questions that the court defin-
itely decides that no justiciable question is involved. The 
court came to no conclusion as to the justiciability of the ques-
tion whether a lieutenant governor of a state was such a part 
of the legislature that he could cast a deciding vote when 
the state senate was evenly divided. The court gave as its rea-
son that the court was equally divided, although nine judges 
heard the case. 41 The Kansas Supreme Court had apparently 
regarded all three of the above issues as justiciable/2 and the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals had inferentially regarded the 
first two as justiciable.43 The majority opinion thus seems to 
leave untouched the apparent doctrine of the earlier cases 
that certain procedural questions were justiciable. 
The difficulties in deciding how long the states should have 
to ratify, particularly where there has been a considerable 
period of no action at all followed by widespread action, 
doubtless justified the court in treating the question of time 
as a political one. A proper review of whether Kansas had 
ratified the child labor amendment would entail "an ap-
praisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, 
social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within 
the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of 
justice."44 It should be noted, however, that just such an 
.. Two of the justices, McReynolds and Butler, seemed to dissent on the issue 
of lapse of time. Presumably they concurred in the view that the effect of prior 
rejection by a state was a political question. See note, (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 
1455 at 1457. 
01 It is therefore suggested in (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1455 that the court 
"sawed a justice in half." But McReynolds,]., was absent at the last conference 
of the court held on June 3· (1939) 28 GEo. L. J. 199 at 2001 note 7· 
"Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 390, 71 P. (2d) 518; see opinion 
by Mr. Justice Black, (1939) 307 U. S. 433 at 456, 59 S. Ct. 972. 
'"Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. 11 108 S. W. (2d) 1024. 
"Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 433 at 453, 59 S. Ct. 972. 
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appraisal has been made in the multitudinous cases involving 
due process. 45 On the other hand, the difficulties as to the 
effect of rejection were not so great, although admittedly the 
theorists were badly divided. The court might well have 
held, as the solicitor general argued, that states could consti-
tutionally reverse their former acts of rejection or ratification 
until such time as three-fourths of them had ratified. Per-
haps, however, that question was deemed too closely linked 
with the time allowable for ratification. The court indicated 
two reasons for regarding the question of the effect of a prior 
rejection as involving a political question: (I) historical 
precedent in the efforts made by New Jersey and Ohio to 
withdraw their ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Congress in effect declaring their withdrawals abortive/6 and 
( 2) the absence of any basis in either Constitution or statute 
for judicial interference. But neither reason is strongly con-
vincing.47 With respect to the first, it seems an unusual ap-
proach for the body recognized as having the power to re-
view acts of Congress to adopt and rely on an act of Congress 
as precedent, particularly since the act of Congress was passed 
in a period of unrest and since the court had had no oppor-
tunity to pass on its validity. With respect to the second reason, 
it should be observed that there were no stronger constitu-
tional or statutory bases for the decisions rendered in previous 
cases arising concerning the amending process. 
Making the effect of a prior rejection a political question 
results in greater uncertainty as to the status of an amend-
ment. On the general problem of justiciability it should be 
remembered also that the state courts have frequently and 
by the great weight of authority held that they may pass 
45 Moore and Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26 
VA. L. REv. 697 at 709; (1939) 39 CoL. L. REV. 1232 at 1235-1236; (1940) 
24 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 404. 
48 (x868) 15 Stat. L. 708. 
•• ( 1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 399-400, 
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upon the validity of the procedure of amending the state 
constitutions, even though there be no express basis therefor. 
From the point of view of orderly amending procedure it 
is doubtful that the doctrine of political question should be 
extended to other procedural steps. If orderly procedure is 
essential in the enactment of ordinary statutes, should it not 
be even more so as to the adoption of important and perma-
nent constitutional amendments? Such orderly procedure 
might call for compliance with certain fundamental pre-
requisites without emphasizing small details. 
In Coleman v. Miller/8 four of the members of the Su-
preme Court felt that a far more sweeping doctrine of polit-
ical questions should be laid down. Mr. Justice Black in an 
opinion concurred in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, thought that Congress 
possesses "exclusive power over the amending process," that 
neither "state nor federal courts can review that power," and 
that "whether submission, intervening procedure or Congres-
sional determination of ratification conforms to the commands 
of the Constitution, calls for decisions by a 'political depart-
ment' of questions of a type which this Court has frequently 
designated 'political.' " 49 No question can get into the courts. 
"The process itself is 'political' in its entirety, from submis-
sion until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, 
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference 
at any point." 50 In the companion case of Chandler v. Wise/1 
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas state that "we do 
'"(1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. 
""Ibid., 307 U.S. at 459, 457· 
00 
Ibid., 307 U. S. at 459· 
151 
(1939) 307 U.S. 474 at 478, 59 S. Ct. 992. For a criticism of this view, 
see Quarles, "Amendments to the Federal Constitution," (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 
617. It is pointed out that the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly ex-
cept the amending process from the judicial power of the federal courts, whereas 
it inferentially does except the processes of impeachment, election of Congress-
men, expulsion of Congressmen, and suits against the United States by citizens 
of another state. 
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not believe that state or federal courts have any jurisdiction 
to interfere with the amending process." 
The view that the amending process involves essentially 
political issues has been urged by a number of writers. Albert 
E. Pillsbury, former Attorney General of Massachusetts, 
argued in I 909 that the scope of the amending power is a 
political question.52 Wayne B. Wheeler argued in I920 that 
the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was a political 
question. 53 Professor Oliver P. Field in I 924 pointed out 
that courts had developed the doctrine of political questions 
where there was a "lack of legal principles for the courts to 
apply in their consideration of cases involving certain types 
of subject matter." 54 Melville Fuller Weston set forth a doc-
trine of political questions in I 92 5 particularly with respect 
to the adoption and amendment of constitutions. 55 Walter F. 
Dodd in I93I was one of the most recent writers on the sub-
ject. 56 
2. Validity of Substance 
It has just been seen that even under the most recent de-
cisions some questions of procedure in amendment are justici-
.. Address, (1909) 16 ME. ST. BAR. AssN. PRoc. 17 at 26 . 
.. "The Constitutionality of the Constitution is not a Justiciable Question," 
(1920) 90 CENT. L. J. tp . 
.. "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," (1924) 8 
MINN. L. REv. 485 at 513· Professor Field did not suggest application of the 
doctrine to the federal amending process. His article is cited as authoritative by 
Chief Justice Hughes in Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 433 at 455, 
59 s. Ct. 972. I 
.. "Political Questions," (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 296 at 304, 307. This 
article was also cited as authoritative in Coleman v. Miller, supra. Compare 
Finkelstein, "Judicial Self-Limitation," (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, and 
"Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation," (1925) 39 HARV. L. REv. 221 
at 234 . 
.. "Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions," ( 193 I) 8o 
U. PA. L. REv. 54 at 89. See also Yawitz, "The Legal Effect under American 
Decisions of Alleged Irregularities in the Adoption of a Constitution or Cop-
stitutional Amendment," (1925) 10 ST. LoUis L. REv. 279 at 283; note 
(1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 72; (1938) 26 KY. L. J. 364; page 5 of brief of the 
Solicitor General of the United States as amicus curiae in Coleman v. Miller, 
(1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1232 at 1235; 
Moore and Adelson, "The Supreme·Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26 VA. L. 
REv. 697 at 707-709. 
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able. But there may be difficulties other than procedural ones. 
Will the courts inquire into the substance of an amendment, 
or is that a political question? Most of the cases have involved 
the question of the validity of procedure. It was not until I 920 
that the Supreme Court passed on the substance of an amend-
ment. The court ruled, in the National Prohibition Cases,51 
that there were no defects of substance in the Eighteenth 
Amendment. The following year the Nineteenth Amend-
ment was attacked as improper in substance and the court ex-
pressly discussed the: question of substance,58 whereas no 
reasoning was set out in the National Prohibition Cases. Back 
in I 9 I 5 when the content of the Fifteenth Amendment was 
attacked, the court completely ignored that argument in its 
decision. 59 In I 93 I the Supreme Court inferentially refused 
to allow an attack on the substance of an amendment when it 
held that all amendments were subject to ratification by state 
legislatures if Congress so chose.60 In the light of the recent 
decisions on the child labor amendment, it may be that the 
court now regards the substance of an amendment as pre-
senting a political question. That would from a practical point 
of view be a defensible position since no limitations on sub-
stance have yet been found, and it is unlikely that any will 
ever be found. 61 
Relatively few attacks have been made on the substance 
of amendments in the state courts. Apparently the first case 
in which this question was directly raised was that of Liver-
more v. Waite 62 by the California court in I 894. That court 
""National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486 • 
.. Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. IJo, 42 S. Ct. 217. 
""Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U.S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932. 
00 United States v. Sprague, (1931) 282 U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 220. 
81 See infra, chap. IV. 
82 (1894) 102 Cal. 113, 36 P. 424. The court suggests that the power of 
the legislature to propose amendments is much less than that of a convention, 
and that a convention is subject only to the Constitution of the United States. 
The distinction appears unsound, however, as a convention is merely a legal 
agent of the state for the purpose of amendment, just as the legislature is. 
The court also contends that an amendment which if adopted would be in-
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held that an amendment was void in substance because certain 
of its provisions were to become operative at the will of certain 
officials mentioned in it, although it was regularly voted on 
by the people. Neither the federal nor the state constitution 
imposed such a restriction and it seems that it was one discov-
ered by the California courts. Two years later the Missouri 
court took the opposite view in a case involving similar facts. 63 
Where the constitution is silent as to the scope of an amend-
ment, the view of the state courts appears to be that the courts 
may not pass on the character of the amendment. 64 Where 
the state constitution contains limitations on the scope of. 
amendments, logically the courts should have power to de-
termine whether the content is proper. 65 Limitations on the 
scope of amendments should be found within the amending 
clause, and the other articles of the constitution should not be 
viewed as limitations. Thus the bill of rights and the amend-
ing clause are themselves subject to alteration unless expressly 
forbidden to be altered. Most state constitutions contain no 
such limitations, however, and the problem therefore seldom 
operative, or contingent on the acts of a group of individuals, is invalid. But if 
the people have imposed no such limitations, there would seem to be no good 
reason why such an amendment may not be proposed. 
83 Edwards v. Lesueur, (I 896) I 32 Mo. 4I o, 33 S. W. I I 30. But in State ex 
rei. Halliburton v. Roach, (I9Io) 230 Mo. 408, I30 S. W. 689, an amend-
ment was held void as being legislative in character, and also because it was 
operative for only ten years; but in dictum the court said that a proposed pro-
hibition amendment would be valid, since prohibition was subject to permanent 
as well as temporary regulation. This decision was probably a political one. 
Professor Rottschaefer says its position is indefensible. RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1939) 398. 
•• State v. Swift, ( r 88o) 69 Ind. 512; Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 
(r88r) 24 Kan. 700; State ex rei. Cranmer v. Thorson, (I896) 9 S.D. I49> 
68 N. W. 202; People ex rei. Elder v. Sours, (1903) 3I Colo. 369, 74 P. 167; 
Frantz v. Autry, (I907) I8 Okla. 561,91 P. I93; Louisiana Ry. & Navigation 
Co. v. Madere, (I9o9) I24 La. 635, so So. 6o9; State ex rei. Greenlund v. 
Fulton, (19I9) 99 Ohio St. I68, I24 N. E. I72; Switzer v. State ex rei. 
Silvey, (1921) 103 Ohio St. 3o6, I33 N. E. 552, suggesting that a federal 
amendment may be invalid for indefiniteness; Browne v. City of New York, 
(1925) 24I N.Y. 96,149 N. E. 2II. 
65 The Alabama constitution, article I 8, § 284, forbids the change of repre-
sentation in the legislature on any other than a population basis. 
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arises, as the doctrine of implied limits on the nature of 
amendments has not been adopted by the state courts. 
The Constitution of the United States contains one ex-
press restriction on the nature of amendments. No state may 
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate without its 
consent. Prior to I 8o8 no amendment could be made abolish-
ing the slave trade, or imposing a direct tax without appor-
tionment. Since that date, unless the courts adopt the view 
that there are implied limitations, the only criterion of char-
acter an amendment has had to meet is that it must not violate 
the equal suffrage clause. The absence of any limitations as 
to form or substance is shown in the cases of the Eleventh and 
the Eighteenth Amendments. The Eleventh Amendment 
operated retroactively. The Eighteenth Amendment by its 
own provision was not to go into effect until a year after its 
ratification, and was to be inoperative unless ratified within 
seven years after its submission by Congress to the states. 66 
Though, as has been seen, the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments were attacked as void in substance, the conten-
tions were rejected.67 Since no implied limitations as to scope 
are likely to be laid down and since the only limitation on 
content is the equal suffrage clause and that is really a limita-
tion on the method of ratification rather than on the substance 
of amendments, there would seem to be no great dangers 
arising out of the view that a political question is here in-
volved. Arguably, however, the Supreme Court cases on sub-
stance might be interpreted as meaning simply that there are 
no limitations on the substance of amendments. On that view 
it would not be necessary to assert that conformance to limi-
tations is a political question. 
86 See Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510; Druggan v. 
Anderson, (1925) 269 U.S. 36, 46 S. Ct. 14. 
61 National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350 at 386, 40 S. Ct. 486; 
Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217. 
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The question of justiciability has now been treated both as 
to the validity of the procedure of adoption and the validity 
of substance. It would seem of value to summarize the state 
of the law after the I 9 3 9 decisions. First, as to procedure it 
may be said that certain phases of procedure are political and 
certain are justiciable questions. The effect of a state's previ-
ous rejection of an amendment upon its later approval in-
volves a political question. 68 The time interval after submis-
sion of an amendment in which states may ratify also involves 
a political question. On the other hand, neither expressly nor 
impliedly overruled69 are earlier holdings that the following 
involve justiciable questions: (I) the meaning of "two-thirds 
of both Houses" in the proposal of an amendment by Con-
gress; ( 2) whether Congress has the power of selecting rati-
fication by legislatures rather than by conventions; (3) the 
necessity of the President's approval of the proposal of an 
amendment; and (4) the meaning of "legislatures" ratifying 
federal amendments with respect to compulsory popular refer-
enda. Undecided is the question whether a lieutenant gover-
nor of a state is such a part of the legislature that he may cast a 
deciding vote when the state senate is evenly divided. Second, 
as to the justiciability of the substance of an amendment, pos-
sibly though not probably unaffected are decisions as to the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments holding inferen-
tially that the problem is justiciable. 
With respect to the proper procedure required as a result 
of the doctrine of political question, it would seem the fol-
lowing is called for: a proper party plaintiff must first prose-
cute a suit to determine whether the matter involved is justi-
.. Probably there would be the same result as to the effect of a prior ratifica-
tion. (1939) 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 122 at 124. 
•• Moore and Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26 
VA. L. REv. 697 at 707-709. The majority of the court carefully distinguished 
Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510; four justices wished to 
overrule it. See also (1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 399· 
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ciable, and if it is not justiciable he must appeal to Congress.70 
If the question is found to be a political one, there would seem 
to be no very effective or regular methods of enforcing the 
procedure Article Five seems to demand. Thus political 
prestige rather than legal right may become the more domi-
nant influence. 
The doctrine of political question raises a number of ques-
tions, the answers to which cannot easily be predicted. Where 
a political question is found to be involved as to a certain pro-
cedural step in a given case, what are the powers of the Secre-
tary of State of the United States? May he promulgate the 
adoption of the amendment only under the formal express 
permission conferred by Congress, or may he do so unless 
Congress forbids promulgation? Is a two-thirds vote of Con-
gress necessary to allow or to prevent promulgation of the 
amendment? May Congress decide the political question be-
fore three-fourths of the states have ratified? If it does, may it 
later, but before three-fourths have ratified, change its posi-
tion? May Congress decide, with respect to a particular 
amendment, that a state once having rejected may later rat-
ify, and then decide differently with respect to a different 
amendment? 
B. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS 
It has been seen that at least some questions of the legality 
of the procedure of adoption of an amendment to the federal 
Constitution are justiciable. If the court had held that all 
questions concerning the amending process are political, ob-
viously no one could raise the question of validity in the 
courts. But since the court regards some questions as justici-
able, the problem immediately arises as to how the validity 
of an amendment may be attacked. 
•• (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 406. 
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r. Proper Forum 
It would seem feasible to raise the question of the validity 
of ratification by a particular state in the courts of that state 
as well as in the federal courts. One case reached the United 
States Supreme Court by writ of error to the Supreme Court 
of the state of Ohio to review a decree of the latter court.71 
Another case reached the Supreme Court by writ of error to 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland to review a judgment of 
the latter court.72 In each of these cases state courts passed on 
the validity of amendments to the federal Constitution. In 
each of them the proceeding was by a citizen and voter, or 
citizens and voters, of a state against its public officers. No 
question as to the jurisdiction of the state courts or as to the 
availability of the relief prayed, if a case were made out for 
the granting of such relief, was raised. 
2. Time of Attack 
It will be conceded that the validity of an amendment, if 
justiciable at all, can be attacked after its promulgation and 
when it is sought to be put into effect. But must the plaintiff 
wait until then to bring suit or may he sue before ratification? 
In an early case a federal trial court refused to permit at-
tack on the validity of an amendment prior to adoption. 73 
However, the state courts have permitted attacks on an 
amendment proposed by Congress even though it has not as 
yet been ratified by three-fourths of the states.74 This prac-
tice was impliedly approved by the Supreme Court when it 
refused jurisdiction upon other grounds of an appeal from an 
71 Hawke v. Smith, (r92o) 253 U.S. 22r, 40 S. Ct. 495· 
""Leser v. Garnett, (r922) 258 U.S. 130,42 S. Ct. 2I7. 
"' State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I 9 I 9) 2 57 F. 3 34· 
"Wise v. Chandler, (I937) 270 Ky. I, I08 S. W. (2d) 1024; Coleman v. 
Miller, (I9J7) I46 Kan. 390, 71 P. (zd) 5I8. In Hawke v. Smith, (I920) 
253 U.S. 2JI, 40 S. Ct. 495, the Supreme Court reviewed an Ohio case where 
the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment was attacked prior to adoption. 
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attack in a state court on the Child Labor Amendment after 
only twenty-eight states had ratified.75 Arguably an em-
ployer of child labor might have a sufficient special interest 
to attack the child labor amendment, and yet not be able 
to show that the injury is clear and immediate.76 In the first 
place, thirty-six states might never ratify. In the second place, 
the child labor amendment does not abolish child labor, but 
merely authorizes Congress to do so. Moreover, technically 
an injunction as to certifying by one state would be useless, 
since it is the action of three-fourths of the states and not the 
certifying notice that marks the adoption of an amendment. 77 
Another theory which may bar relief is that of the doctrine 
of separation of powers. 78 That doctrine prevents interference 
with legislative processes. For instance, no injunction lies 
against an administrative official who is submitting to the 
electorate a proposed amendment to a state constitution. 79 
••coleman v. Miller, (I939) 307 U.S. 433,59 S. Ct. 972. 
•• (I937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 1201. No irreparable injury was found in State of 
Ohio ex rel. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I9I9) 257 F. 334· 
77 United States ex rel. Widenman v. Colby, (App. D. C. I92o) 265 F. 998, 
affirmed (I92I) 257 U.S. 6I9, 42 S. Ct. I69. 
"' (I 9 3 7) 3 7 CoL. L. REV. 120 I ; State of Ohio ex rel. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, 
(D. C. Ohio, I9I9) 257 F. 334 (Eighteenth Amendment); Clements v. 
Roberts, (I92I) I44 Tenn. I29, 230 S. W. 30 (Nineteenth Amendment). 
79 State ex rel. Cranmer v. Thorson, (I 896) 9 S. D. I49, 68 N. W. 202; 
People ex rel. O'Reilly v. Mills, (I902) 30 Colo. 262, 70 P. 322. Cf. Elling-
ham v. Dye, (I9I2) I78 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. r. See also Frantz v. Autry, 
(1907) I8 Okla. 56I at 6o3-6II, 91 P. I93; Threadgill v. Cross, (I9Io) 26 
Okla. 403, I09 P. 558; State ex rel. Byerley v. State Board of Canvassers, 
(I9I9) 44 N.D. 126, 172 N. W. 8o; State ex rel. Marcolin v. Smith, (I922) 
105 Ohio St. 570, q8 N. E. 881; McAlister v. State ex rel. Short, (1923) 95 
Okla. zoo, ZI9 P. I34; Hamilton v. Secretary of State, (I924) 227 Mich. III, 
198 N. W. 843. But see Wells v. Bain, (I873) 75 Pa. St. 39; Hatch v. Stone-
man, (I88s) 66 Cal. 632,6 P. 734; Livermore v. Waite, (I894) Ioz Cal. xq, 
36 P. 424; Edwards v. Lesueur, (I896) IJZ Mo. 4Io at 441, 33 S. W. xqo; 
People ex rel. Attorney General v. Curry, (I9oo) qo Cal. 8z, 6z P. SI6; 
Holmberg v. Jones, (190I) 7 Idaho 752, 65 P. 563; State ex rel. Halliburton 
v. Roach, (I9Io) 230 Mo. 408, qo S. W. 689, two judges dissenting; 
State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, (I9I4) 49 Mont. 387, I42 P. zio; Tax Com-
mission Case, (I923) 68 Mont. 450, 2I9 P. 8I7; State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 
(I917) 35 N.D. 34, I59 N. W. z8I, which seems not to have been followed 
in State ex rel. Byerley v. State Board of Canvassers, supra. 
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Arguably the same theory should apply where the federal 
secretary of state is the defendant. 80 Hence to attack the valid-
ity of an amendment it is thought necessary to await its ap-
parent ratification. The difficulty of the plaintiff if he does so 
wait is that he will run into the objection that the courts will 
not go behind the secretary of state's promulgation of ratifi-
cation. It has been argued that the validity of ratification of 
an amendment as distinct from the substance of an amend-
ment may not be attacked after the secretary of state's procla-
mation of its adoption. 81 It has also been stated that an irregu-
larity of Congress in proposing an amendment cannot be 
attacked prior to adoption, as for instance by an action to en-
join the governor of a state from submitting an amendment 
to the legislature, but only after its promulgation and when 
it is sought to put it into effect. 82 That seems sound policy as 
preventing too free attack on amendments, and as giving 
proper weight to the fact that it was Congress that was acting. 
With respect to the remedy of injunction, it should be . 
noted that it might be sought at any of a number of stages: 
(I) against the submission of an amendment to the state by 
the Secretary of State of the United States; ( 2) against sub-
mission by the governor to the legislature or state conven-
tion; (3) against legislative officers certifying action by the 
legislature; ( 4) against certification of ratification by the 
governor; ( 5) and against certification by the Secretary of 
State of the United States. No case has arisen as to submission 
by the United States Secretary of State to the state. It is true 
that after Congress has proposed an amendment, the secretary 
of state sends a copy thereof to each governor, and the gov-
"" Nor would mandamus lie against the secretary of state to compel announce-
ment of the rejection of an amendment, since the statute under which he acts 
imposes no such duty on him, (1818) 3 Stat. L. 439; (1934) 5 U.S. C.§ 16o. 
81 Brief for Appellant, p. 2, in Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. 1, ro8 
S. W. (2d) 1024. 
82 RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 388, citing State of Ohio 
ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334· 
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ernor in turn transmits it to the legislature. But the Constitu-
tion is silent as to these two steps, which are based simply on 
statute. It would therefore seem that they might be omitted 
as unnecessary. Since the two steps are not legally significant, 
injunction would be refused as futile. With respect to submis-
sion by the governor to the legislature, it has been held in a 
lower federal case that no injunction lies to attack an irregu-
larity of Congress in proposing. 83 With respect to legislative 
officers certifying action by the legislature, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas refused relief by way of mandamus. 84 The 
Kentucky state court allowed injunction and a declaratory 
judgment with respect to certification by the governor to the 
Secretary of State of the United States.85 With respect to 
injunction against certification by the secretary of state, no 
injunction should lie, and it has been refused,86 since the Con-
stitution calls for no act by the secretary of state, the final act 
being the approval by three-fourths of the states. 
In favor of permitting attack before adoption by three-
fourths of the states is the view that procedural difficulties 
in framing constitutional questions should be minimized in 
the interests of efficiency and certainty.87 To refuse relief 
seems technical. To grant it makes for speed. The opposing 
argument is that constitutional decisions should be few in 
83 State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 2.57 F. 334· 
"'Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 4901 71 P. (zd) 518. 
""Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 2.70 Ky. 11 108 S. W. (zd) 102.4. Since the 
governor had already mailed the certificate of ratification to. the secretary of 
state (subsequent to the filing of the bill for injunction and issuance of the 
restraining order, but prior to the service thereof), it is hard to see how either 
an injunction or a declaratory judgment would accomplish anything. (1937) 
37 CoL. L. REv. 12.01. It was argued in the case that since, under the doctrine 
of Leser v. Garnett, (192.2.) 2.58 u.s. 130, 42. s. Ct. 2.17, the validity of in-
operative ratifications might not be assailed after promulgation by the federal 
secretary of state, the proper time to attack was at the time the governor was 
about to send in notice of ratification. 
88 Fairchild v. Hughes, (192.2.) 2.58 U. S. u6, 42. S. Ct. 2.74. 
81 Comments, (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 148; (1932.) 41 YALE L. J. 1195; 
Fraenkel, "Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1935 Term," (1936) 
85 U. PA. L. REv. 2.7 at 78. 
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number, postponed as long as possible, and rendered only 
if necessary.88 
3· Proper Party Plaintiff 
The right of a party to raise the issue of validity of an 
amendment should be determined by the same theories that 
are applied to other constitutional issues. In a case arising in 
the federal courts it was held that the general right of a 
citizen to have the federal government administered accord-
ing to law, and to prevent waste of public moneys was not 
a basis for a suit to decide whether a federal amendment about 
to be adopted was valid.89 But a private individual whose 
interests of person or property have been injured, or are 
threatened with injury, by the enforcement of legislation 
the validity of which depends upon the validity of a constitu-
tional amendment, should have the right to raise the issue 
in a proceeding to which he is a party. 
Members of the Kansas legislature assailed the validity 
of the ratification of the child labor amendment by an orig-
inal proceeding in mandamus in the Kansas Supreme Court 
to enjoin further proceedings, and to compel the secretary 
of state of Kansas to erase the indorsement that the resolution 
had passed the senate and to indorse on the resolution a state-
ment that it did not pass. Petitioners also sought to restrain 
the officers of the legislature from signing the resolution, and 
the secretary of state from authenticating and delivering it 
89 Comments, (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 148; (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 649 at 
67o-67t; (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 255 at 268 ff.; Frankfurter, "A Note on Ad-
visory Opinions," (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002. 
89 Fairchild v. Hughes, (1922) 258 U.S. 12.6, 42 S. Ct. 274. This case did 
not decide that such a party could not attack in the state courts. See also, notes 
(1937) 37COL.L.REV,12.01; (1937) 24VA.L.REV.194; comments, (1937) 
47 YALE L. J. 148; (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1455; and article by Moore and 
Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938 Term, II," (1940) 26 VA. L. REv. 697 
at 706. 
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to the governor. The Kansas Supreme Court denied a writ of 
mandamus but stated that the right of the plaintiffs to sue was 
itself clear.90 The United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari and though it upheld the action of the legislature it 
agreed, four judges dissenting, that the parties had a right to 
sue.91 This holding is probably consistent with earlier cases.92 
The holding is also in accord with the theory of most state 
courts recognizing any citizen's interest.93 The Wyoming court 
has held that a taxpayer might sue to enjoin an election as to 
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, although the injunction 
was refused in the particular case since the election was 
legal. 94 In Iowa a recent statute authorized injunctions against 
the submission of amendments to state constitutions. Any 
taxpayer might sue. The governor and secretary of state could 
be enjoined from submitting the amendment. Thus Iowa is 
the first state to allow the judicial determination of the valid-
ity of a constitutional amendment before its adoption. 95 
In Kentucky, where a suit was brought by individual citi-
zens and members of the legislature to enjoin certification of 
ratification to the secretary of state by state officials, no ques-
90Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 390, 71 P. (2d) 518. Petitioners 
were 21 members of the Kansas senate, 20 of whom voted against the resolu-
tion, and 3 members of the house. 
91Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. For the views 
of the four judges dissenting as to jurisdiction, see the opinion by Frankfurter, J., 
307 U.S. at 464-470. See also (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1232; cf. (1937) 47 
YALE L. J. 148 at 150; (1937) 24 VA. L. REv. 194 at 195. 
03 Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221,40 S. Ct. 475; Leser v. Garnett, 
( 1 9 2 2) 2 58 U. S. 13 o, 42 S. Ct. 21 7 (suits by citizens and electors) ; Moore and 
Adelson, "The Supreme Court: 1938' Term, II," (1940) 26 VA. L. REV. 697 
at 707. Compare (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1232 at 1233-1234. 
03 (1937) 47 YALE L.]. 148; (1933) 43 YALE L. ]. 340 at 341; Ellingham 
v. Dye, (1912) 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1; Zoercher v. Alger, (1930) 202 Ind. 
214, 172 N. E. 186, 907. 
•• Spriggs v. Clark, (1932) 45 Wyo. 62, 14 P. (2d) 667, noted (1933) r8 
CoRN. L. Q. 278, (1933) 1 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 271 and (1933) roN. Y. 
u. L. Q. REV. 395· 
.. Comment, (1932) 17 IowA L. REv. 250. 
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tion of the plaintiff's capacity to sue was raised, for the de-
fendant had failed to file a special demurrer.96 When the 
Kentucky case came to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Solicitor General of the United States, in his brief for the 
United States as amicus curiae, conceded that the case was 
properly before the court.97 He pointed out that the peti-
tioners (defendants in the state court) were public officers 
performing federal functions and were seeking to sustain the 
validity of the act of ratification. Hence decisions holding 
that public officers may not invoke the jurisdiction of the court 
in their official capacity .to challenge the constitutionality of 
state acts were not in point. The case, moreover, was not 
academic. To prevent official notice of the action of the state 
from reaching the Secretary of State of the United States 
interfered with the amending process. Official notice from the 
state is conclusive on the federal secretary of state as to the 
procedural validity of the ratification, and the proclamation 
by the federal secretary of state is conclusive on the courts in 
that regard. Moreover, the orderly receipt of official notice 
aids in avoiding confusion and uncertainty. 
The solicitor general was more dubious in the Kansas case, 
since the petitioners (plaintiffs in the state court) were public 
officers attacking the validity of the claimed ratification. But 
he went on to point out that at least two of the petitioners 
were members of the state legislature when the amendment 
was previously rejected and had voted for rejection. Hence 
their suit might be regarded as an effort on their part to pro-
96Wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024. The Kansas 
and Kentucky cases seem to be the first cases involving attacks on federal amend-
ments by legislators. (1939) 28 GEo. L. J. 199 at 201. Possibly in reality legis-
lators were given a standing to sue because they take part in the amending 
process. Or possibly jurisdiction was taken to make possible a decision on the 
merits. 
91 But he admitted that if the case had been first brought in a federal court it 
would properly have been dismissed on the ground that the complainants had no 
sufficient legal interest. Brief, p. 34• 
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teet and vindicate their votes as against what was asserted 
to be a spuriously countervailing act. 
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the Kentucky case, con-
cluded that it was without jurisdiction on certiorari to re-
view the action of the Kentucky court directing the clerk o£ 
the court to give official notice to the secretary of state of re-
jection of the child labor amendment, since after the gover-
nor forwarded the certificate of ratification there no longer 
existed a controversy. 98 The case had become moot. That is 
to say, while the petitioners might be proper parties, there 
must still be a controversy. The writ of certiorari was there-
fore dismissed. The court thought that the state court had 
jurisdiction up to the time of forwarding the certification 
of ratification. After such forwarding "there was no longer 
a controversy susceptible of judicial determination."99 Jus-
tices Black and Douglas concurred on the ground that neither 
the state nor federal courts "have any jurisdiction to inter-
fere with the amending process."100 Justices McReynolds and 
Butler thought that the Kentucky judgment should be af-
firmed. 
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the Kansas case, con-
cluded that the members of the Kansas Senate who voted 
against ratification of the child labor amendment, and who 
claimed that their votes were sufficient to prevent ratification, 
had such an interest in mandamus proceedings begun by them 
and other legislatures questioning the validity of the legisla-
tive action as to give the United States Supreme Court juris-
diction to review on certiorari the adverse decision of the 
Kansas Supreme Court even though they would not have had 
standing to sue initially in the federal courts.101 The Kansas 
98 Compare Chase v. Billings, (1934) 106 Vt. 149, 170 A. 903. 
•• Chandler v. Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474 at 477-478, 59 S. Ct. 992. 
100 Ibid., 307 U. S. at 478. 
101 Moore and Adelson, "Thf.! ~upr~rne CQuxt; 19~8 Term, lit (194-o) z6 
VA. L. REV. 697 at 7o(i, 
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court had likewise treated the legislator's interest as sufficient 
to justify it in entertaining and deciding federal questions 
raised. The decision of the Kansas court was affirmed. Four 
of the judges thought that the petitioners had no standing to 
sue; that there was no controversy before the court. These 
four judges, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
thought it immaterial that such petitioners were given stand-
ing to sue in the Kansas Supreme Court. Such petitioners had 
no more standing than other citizens of Kansas or even of 
other parts of the United States. Every United States citizen 
was equally interested in whether or not the child labor 
amendment was still alive. Clearly such petitioners would 
have no standing to sue in a federal court. The federal courts 
are not bound by state court rulings as to the petitioners' 
standing.102 Petitioners' rights of voting in the Kansas legis-
lature were merely political rights undeserving of protection. 
Justice Butler, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice 
McReynolds, did not deny that the petitioners could sue. 
The present chapter indicates the difficulties encountered 
in attacking the validity of an amendment to the federal Con-
stitution. If the Supreme Court is not ready to apply the 
doctrine of political questions to all phases of the amending 
process, as four members of the court wish, it will apply it 
to some phases of the amending process and what such phases 
are remains largely uncertain. Even if the court finds a justi-
ciable question presented, the court may find that the case was 
brought in the wrong court, or that it was brought at too early 
a stage in the amending process, or that it was not brought 
by a proper party plaintiff, or that there was no controversy. 
102 A more logical line of reasoning would seem to be as follows: a majority 
of the court hold that the effect of a prior rejection and the time interval for 
ratification are not justiciable questions. Such a holding means that they are not 
justiciable in either state or federal courts, Mr. Justice Black's opinion brings 
this out clearly. Moreover, since the issues are "exclusively federal questions and 
not state questions," as pointed out by the Chief Justice, Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U. S. 433 at 438, 59 S. Ct. 972, the holding as to justiciability binds the 
state courts. See comment, (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1455 at 1456, note 4· 
CHAPTER III 
The Procedure for Amending the Federal 
Constitution 
A. EXCLUSIVENESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MODES 
O
NE of the basic questions which may arise concerning 
the validity of a constitutional amendment, and the 
one which has most frequently arisen, is whether 
the proper procedure was followed in its adoption. The Con-
stitution in Article Five makes express provision as to the 
mode of procedure, and resort must therefore first be had to 
it. Two methods of proposal and two of ratification are desig-
nated. Proposal may be by a two-thirds vote of each house of 
Congress, or by application Of the legislatures of two-thirds 
of the states to Congress for the call of a national convention. 
Ratification may be by the state legislatures or by specially 
called state conventions, as Congress may choose, a favorable 
vote by three-fourths of the states being required in either 
case. From these express provisions it reasonably follows that 
the indicated methods are exclusive, and the courts have so 
declared.1 
Revolution as a mode of changing the Constitution would 
thus be unlawful. In fact, it seems inconsistent to speak of 
revolution and law in the same breath, for supposedly one 
of the essential characteristics of the conception of law is order 
and regular procedure. Jameson defines a revolution as "a 
political act or acts done in violation of law, or without law."2 
A century and a half ago, and for that matter a good deal 
'Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495; RoTTSCHAEFER, 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 8. 
• }AMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887) 101. 
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later, it was common for the courts to refer to the right of 
revolution as a legal right, and not to distinguish it as a po-
litical or ethical right. Our revolt from England and the ir-
regular procedure in the adoption of our Constitution re-
sulted in stamping the judicial mind with a tolerant attitude 
toward revolution. Both, while perhaps justifiable politically 
and morally, were not so from a juridical viewpoint. For 
many years the courts and the commentators either tacitly 
affirmed the right, or used vague language capable of varying 
interpretations. 3 In several state constitutions the bill of rights 
expressly declared that the people at all times had a right 
to alter and amend the constitution.4 But for over a century 
the states, as well as the nation, have lived under constitu-
tions in most cases regularly adopted and amended. As are-
sult the courts look . askance at the idea of revolution, and 
expressly refer to it as illegal. 5 Hence, alteration in the consti-
tution not secured by constitutional methods would be in-
"In Wells v. Bain, (1873) 75 Pa. 39 at 47, the following modes of altering 
the Constitution are indicated: "r. The mode provided in the existing constitu-
tion. 2. A law, as the instrumental process of raising the body for revision and 
conveying it to the powers of the people. 3· A revolution." For discussion of 
this case, see Shenton, "The 'Sovereign' Convention of 1873,'' (1935) 22 
PA. B. A. Q. 171. See also Fuller, "Political Questions," (1925) 38 HARV. L. 
REv. 296 at 305. 
• Madison proposed an amendment to be prefixed to the Constitution pro-
viding "That the people have an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right 
to reform or change their Government, whenever it may be found adverse 
or inadequate to the purposes of its institution." AMES, THE PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1897) 185. 
5 "No heresy has ever been taught in this country so fraught with evil, as the 
doctrine that the people have a constitutional right to disregard the constitu-
tion, and that they can set themselves above the instrumentalities appointed by 
the constitution for the administration of law. It tends directly to the encourage-
ment of revolution and anarchy." Koehler v. Hill, (1883) 6o Iowa 543 at 616. 
"The Society has, it is true, the physical power to override its own restrictions. 
But such an act would almost certainly be illegal, because in violation of the 
letter of the law. Even were the whole people, by unanimous action, to effect 
organic changes in modes forbidden by the existing organic law, it would be 
an act of revolution." ]AMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. 
(1887) 599· 
"The legal assumption that sovereignty is ultimately vested in the people 
affords no legal basis for the direct exercise by the people of any sovereign 
power whose direct exercise by them has not been expressly or impliedly re-
served." ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 8. 
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valid, although sought by a large section of the people. The 
principle that the people are sovereign does not mean that 
they can change the constitution except as provided therein. 
As a result of the express provisions of Article Five, the 
federal Constitution has always been free from the difficulty 
existing in the case of the early state constitutions, which in 
several instances made no provision whatever for amendment 
or revision. 6 In those cases, it was held that the legislature had 
an implied power to call a convention for revision, after a 
popular vote on the question, but that the legislature itself 
had no power to propose amendments.7 Where the constitu-
tion provided for amendment by legislative proposal and did 
not expressly negative any other mode, the legislature might 
call a convention; but where the constitution provided for 
changes by a convention, it appeared that the legislature could 
not propose amendments. The early constitutions were either 
silent on the subject, or permitted revision in only one of the 
two ways just referred to. The earliest mode was revision by 
convention. Later some of the Southern states developed the 
legislative mode. Article Five embodies both modes, so that 
there can be no doubt of the authority to make use of either 
method. The subsequent state constitutions have in most cases 
copied the federal plan, which was the first to provide for 
both modes. In the event of a repeal of the amendment clause, 
perhaps Congress might, on analogy to the procedure in the 
case of early state constitutions, call a convention, but could 
not itself propose amendments. On the other hand, perhaps 
even its power to call a convention might be doubtful, inas-
much as the powers of the Congress must be expressly or im-
pliedly conferred by the Constitution.8 
8 
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I 9 I o) 
44-45· 
• Ibid. 
8 Where there is no amending clause in the constitution of a nation, the gen-
eral view is "that it is to be considered as tacitly understood, that amendment 
may be made either by the ordinary legislative method, or by the same power 
by which the constitution was originally adopted." This was the opinion given 
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B. PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS 
1. Proposal by National Convention 
One of the two modes of proposing a federal amendment 
is by constitutional convention, a method corresponding to 
the original organization which proposed the Constitution 
itself. Congress, at the request of two-thirds of the state legis-
latures, is to call a convention. It is thus to be noted that 
Congress may not call a convention on its own initiative apart 
from state action. In this respect Congress resembles the state 
legislatures, which generally are not authorized to call a con-
vention without a previous popular vote. When it is remem-
bered that a state legislature has all powers not forbidden it 
by the state or national constitution, while Congress has only 
the powers expressly or impliedly conferred by the Constitu-
tion, it seems clear that Congress has no power in the absence 
of a request by the state legislatures. Revision of the Constitu-
tion by a convention is thus left to the initiative of the states. 
All that Congress can do in bringing about a convention is of 
a purely advisory character, as by resolution inviting the state 
legislatures to apply for a convention. 
It must not be assumed, however, that Congress is a mere 
ministerial cog in the call of a convention. The convention 
does not come about through the mere act of the state legis-
latures. It is necessary that Congress act upon their applica-
tions. It would appear to be the constitutional duty of Con-
gress to issue the call when requested.9 A simple majority of 
by Italian jurists as to alterations of the Italian constitution, which is silent on 
the subject. WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 215. See also 
RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (1939) 9· 
• This seems to have been the early view. See Speech of Representative Samuel 
Lyman on March 14, I 796, in I BENTON, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF 
CoNGRESS (I857) 659. The debates at the Constitutional Convention show 
that this mode was provided because of the fear that the federal government 
might become oppressive and refuse to initiate amendments desired by the 
states. Iredell in his argument before the North Carolina Convention asserted 
that the duty was mandatory. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 2d ed. (1937 facsimile of 1836 ed.) 178. 
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Congress could issue it, and it is probable that the approval 
of the President is unnecessary.10 But suppose that Congress 
would refuse. Since Congress is one of the three coordinate 
branches of the government, there would seem to be no valid 
method of coercing it to make the call. While the federal 
courts may declare acts of Congress invalid, they may not do so 
until the act h~ been passed. Viewed negatively, there is no 
valid method of preventing Congress from passing an un-
constitutional act. Viewed affirmatively, there is no method of 
coercing Congress into performing its constitutional duty at 
any time.11 The Constitution specifically provides that Con-
gress shall reapportion the number of representatives in the 
lower house every ten years. Yet it is a well-known fact that 
reapportionment which ought to have been made in r 920 was 
not then made. A further difficulty is that Congress seemingly 
is left some discretion in the matter, as probably it is in the 
hands of Congress to decide when two-thirds of the state 
legislature have made the request. This would seem to follow 
from the 1939 decision leaving to Congress the power to fix 
the time for ratification and the effect of prior re j ections.12 
A clear case is of course possible should two-thirds of the 
states all at one time request a convention for an identical pur-
pose, and little discretion would seem to be left to Congress. 
In all likelihood, however, a much wider range of discretion 
will be left to Congress, since the probability of simultaneous 
requests for a single purpose seems remote. 
A question, then, which may face either Congress or the 
courts is, when have two-thirds of the legislatures made ap-
plication for the call of a convention? The issue may arise as 
to the time each individual state makes its request. Must the 
requests be simultaneous or approximately so? The answer 
would seem to be that the time relation between the action 
lJJ Supra, chap. II, at note 24. 
n Dodd, "Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions," ( 19 3 2) 
8o U. PA. L. REV. 54 at 82. 
10 Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 4331 59 S. Ct. 972. 
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of each legislature must be reasonably approximate. The call 
would seem to outlive the particular Congress to which it is 
addressed. But it would seem unreasonable that, for example, 
the request of a legislature in I 8oo should be joined to are-
quest in another state in I825, and these to requests in I850 
and I 900, to constitute the necessary two-thirds. The maxi-
mum life of a request should not be more than a generation. 
Perhaps the most perfect analogy is to be found in the length 
of time allowed for the ratification of amendments by the 
state legislatures. 13 
A closely related problem is whether the requests must 
seek a convention for identical purposes. Should two-thirds 
of the legislatures ask a convention for the purpose of a gen-
eral revision or for the same specific purpose, there would be 
no difficulty. But when one legislature desires a convention 
for one purpose, as to prohibit polygamy, another legislature 
for another purpose, as to adopt the initiative and referendum, 
and a third legislature for a general purpose, there is some 
doubt whether the prerequisite for a call has been met. The 
better view would seem to be that the ground of the applica-
tions would be immaterial, and that a demand by two-thirds 
of the states would conclusively show a widespread desire for 
constitutional changes. 
It may be pertinent to inquire whether or not a convention 
is now impending. The question is not wholly speculative, in-
asmuch as some of the opponents of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment have asserted that two-thirds, or almost that number, of 
the state legislatures have made the necessary request. Until 
I 9 30 there had been no systematic study of the instances where 
state legislatures had petitioned Congress to call a conven-
tion.14 In I 90 I several legislatures petitioned for a convention 
18 Infra, subdivision C. 
"See study by Senator Tydings of Maryland, S. Doc. 78, 71st Cong., 2d 
sess. ( 1 9 3 o) . The best discussion seems to be that by Wheeler, "Is a Constitu-
tional Convention Impending?" (1927) 21 ILL. L. REV. 782. 
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to consider an amendment for the popular election of Sena-
tors, and by I 909 twenty-six states had petitioned for that 
purpose. The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment would 
perhaps destroy the effect of these petitions. Eighteen 
states have requested a convention to punish polygamy. 
Twelve states have petitioned with reference to amendments 
on other subjects. In I899 Texas. and in I9II Wisconsin pe-
titioned for a convention without indicating its purpose. All 
in all, from I 90 I to I 926 thirty-two different states, or the 
necessary two-thirds, petitioned for a convention. The re-
quests have been over a considerable length of time, so that 
it seems proper to conclude that there is no sufficient basis for 
the call of a convention.15 The repeal of the Eighteenth 
Amendment fortifies this view. 
Assuming that a proper request for the call has been made 
and that Congress is willing to issue the call, a number of 
issues would still remain unsettled. When and where could 
the convention meet? How would the delegates be elected? 
W auld they represent the states or the people as an aggregate? 
The debates of the Constitutional Convention throw no light 
on these problems. Logically it would seem that Congress 
could regulate all these matters. In the first place, Congress 
is the general legislative body of the nation. Moreover under 
Article Five Congress is vested with three distinct powers: 
to propose amendments, to call a convention when requested 
by two-thirds of the states, and to designate the mode of rati-
fication (as, e. g., whether by state conventions).16 The 1939 
115 Where a legislature merely petitions Congress to. submit an amendment, 
it would seem improper to regard this as an application for a convention. See 
Report by New York State Bar Association Committee, 74 CoNG. REc. (1931) 
2924 at 2926, and (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 143· 
lB "As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to 
deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing con-
ditions may require; and Article V is no exception to the rule." Dillon v. 
Gloss, (1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510. It would seem, however, that 
Congress could not add additional burdens to the constitutional procedure for 
amending the Constitution. See Hamilton v. Secretary of State, (1924) 2'1.7 
Mich, 111, 198 N. W. 843. 
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decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate a tend-
ency to give wide powers to Congress. It might reasonably 
be argued that under its power to call a convention it has im-
plied authority to fix the time and place of meeting, the num-
ber, manner, and date of the election of delegates, and that it 
also may determine whether the delegates shall represent 
the states or the nation at large. If the precedent of the Consti-
tutional Convention were followed, the call would be ad-
dressed to the states, and would leave to them the method of 
selecting delegates; and the convention would vote by states. 
Perhaps the most important question concerning a con-
vention is as to the extent of its powers. Could it propose a 
wholly new constitution? Article Five says that Congress 
"shall call a convention for proposing amendments." If this 
rule were interpreted literally, it might be argued that the 
convention could not propose an entirely new constitution in 
the form of a single document superseding the existing Con-
stitution. But there would seem to be no lawful reason why 
the convention could not propose what was the equivalent of a 
new constitution in the form of separate amendments.17 The 
organization and peculiar mandate from the people of a con-
vention would seem to warrant the belief that it may revise 
the Constitution at its discretion. The courts should be slow 
to adopt a construction which would permit a new constitution 
only by revolution. The precedent of instructions by Congress 
as to the scope of its action and the violation thereof by the 
Constitutional Convention can, however, scarcely be cited, as 
the convention had no legal standing under the Articles of 
Confederation. Where the states apply for a convention for 
general purposes, it would seem that the convention would be 
free to draft a new document. But even though the application 
17 Mr. Stone, Representative from Maryland in the First Congress, doubted 
that the amending power extended to the making of a new constitution. ANNALS 
OF CoNGREss, 1st Cong., 1st sess. (1789) 739; Platz, "Article Five of the 
Federal Constitution," ( 19 34) 3 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 17 at 24, 46. 
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were for a limited purpose, it would seem that the state legis-
latures would have no authority to limit an instrumentality 
set up under the federal Constitution.18 In reality, the right of 
the legislatures is confined to applying for a convention, and 
any statement of purposes in their petitions would be irrele-
vant as to the scope of powers of the convention. Inasmuch 
as Congress issues the call simply on the basis of the applica-
tion of the state legislatures, there would seem to be no war-
rant for an attempt by Congress to limit the changes pro-
posed.19 The primary and in fact the sole business of the con-
vention would be to propose changes in the Constitution. In 
this sphere the only limitation on it would seem to be Article 
Five. 
A very serious disturbance might be created if the conven-
tion should go beyond its constituent functions and attempt to 
legislate. An analysis of the fundamental nature of a con~ 
vention would seem to exclude such a power. The earliest 
view seems to have been that a convention was absolute.20 The 
18 In I903 the California legislature adopted the following resolution: "And 
the request of and consent to, the calling and holding of such convention as 
hereby made and given, is limited to the consideration and adoption of such 
amendments to said Constitution as herein mentioned and no other." Cal. Stat. 
(I903) 68J. 
19 Wells v. Bain, (I874) 75 Pa. 39; Woods' Appeal, (I874) 75 Pa. 59· 
In State ex rel. McCready v. Hunt, (I834) 2 Hill. L. (S.C.) I, it was held 
that acts of the convention on subjects not mentioned in the legislative call 
were valid only if ratified by the people. The Louisiana cases have taken the 
view that the convention is confined to the subjects specified. Huff v. Selber, 
(D. C. La. I925) IO F. (2d) 236; State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 
(I9I5) 137 La. 407, 68 So. 742. The 1920 convention was forbidden to alter 
the existing provisions as to limits on the indebtedness of the state and its 
political subdivisions, the tenure and salary of officers, and the location of the 
state capital. 
20 
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I 9 I o), 
chap. III. A recent case leaning in that direction is Baker v. Moorhead, (I 9 I 9) 
I03 Neb. 8II, I74 N. W. 84o, holding that the general rule that provisions of 
a constitution will be construed as mandatory, rather than directory, does not 
apply with the same strictness to the provisions for constitutional conventions, 
as it applies to other clauses of the constitution, even that providing for amend-
ments, on the ground that the constitution makers of one generation do not in-
tend to prevent later generations from exercising their "sovereign right" to alter 
the constitution. 
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convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the 
other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently 
cited in decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly 
limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it 
by the legislative call. 21 A third and intermediate view is that 
urged by Dodd-that a convention, though not sovereign, is 
a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the ex-
isting constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as 
to the extent of its constituent power.22 This view has become 
increasingly prevalent in the state decisions. Accepting this 
view, it would seem that no restrictions can be placed on the 
scope of its constituent activity, but that its acts beyond this 
function would be void. 23 Hence a convention would have no 
power to interfere with the President or Congress or the states, 
except of course as the provisions of the proposed constitu-
tion might do. It probably could not appropriate money ex-
cept where Congress failed to act. 24 The Constitutional Con-
vention referred the matter of salaries to Congress. After all 
it seems that there need be no fear of usurpation by a con-
vention. In the first place, it is limited to the business of alter-
ing the Constitution. In the second place, its power in this 
respect is further limited, for it may merely propose, not 
adopt, changes. In the third place, the convention not only 
has no power to adopt, but also has no power to provide for 
ratification. The latter power is left to Congress. Under the 
proposed Wadsworth-Garrett amendment the convention 
would be authorized to refer its proposals to the state legis-
01 }AMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed. (I887) §§ 382-389. 
22 DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I9IO) 
7 3· n-8o; HoAR, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS (I 9 I 7) 9 I. 
23 Ex parte Birmingham & Atlantic Ry. Co., (I905) I45 Ala. 5I41 42 So. 
II8; Opinion of the Justices, (I889) 76 N.H. 6I21 85 A. 78I. The conven-
tion may not fix the date when amendments shall go into effect, hut if the legis-
lature authorizes, and the people acquiesce, its action is valid. See Hawkins v. 
Filkins, (I866) 24 Ark. 286. 
"Platz, "Article Five of the Constitution," (I934) 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
I7 at 47· 
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latures or state conventions, as it chose, in the same manner 
that Congress may now act. 
What is the precise nature of the control to which a con-
vention would be subject? Clearly it would be bound by the 
Constitution, since under our legal system there is no organ of 
government not subject to the Constitution. Congress's con-
trol would seem to be limited to fixing the date and place 
of elections and meeting, and to determining the mode of 
representation, whether by states or by the nation. The state 
legislatures would have no control over the convention what-
ever. The convention should not be hindered from selecting 
its own officers, fixing its own rules of procedure, passing on 
the qualifications and election of its members, and from pro-
posing any alterations it chooses.25 While in existence it is a 
separate arm of the nation, coordinate with Congress in its 
sphere. A more doubtful question is whether the courts might 
enjoin the convention. As to mere irregular procedure this is 
doubtful, particularly since the convention merely proposes 
while the states accept or reject; but if the convention went 
beyond its constituent functions, and sought to perform ex-
ecutive or legislative acts, perhaps the courts might intervene. 
The courts could probably pass on the legality of amendments 
proposed by the convention after they had been adopted by 
the states. Its proposals would stand on no different footing 
than amendments proposed by Congress. A nice problem 
might be raised if Congress should issue a call, and an attempt 
should be made to enjoin the election of delegates on the 
ground that the applications of the state legislatures for the 
call were insufficient. The state decisions, however, have held 
that the courts will not supervise conventions, nor anticipate 
their action when assembled.26 On the principle that the courts 
""Goodrich v. Moore, (1858) z Minn. 49· 
20 Frantz v. Autry, (1907) 18 Okla. 561, 91 P. 193; but see Wells v. Bain, 
(1873) 75 Pa. 39, which asserts Jameson's view that a convention is not a 
coordinate branch of the government. 
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will not enjoin the acts of a coordinate branch of the govern-
ment, the courts would probably refuse to intervene in the 
case of a federal convention. 
2. Proposal by Congress 
The second method of proposing an amendment is by a 
two-thirds vote of each House of Congress. Under the Articles 
of Confederation, Congress alone could propose amendments, 
but only a majority vote was required. This mode is of par-
ticular importance inasmuch as every amendment thus far 
adopted, as well as proposed, has been initiated in this manner. 
Since all but five amendments proposed by Congress have 
been adopted by the states, proposal seems to have been the 
most critical step in the amending process. Something like 
three thousahd propositions to amend have been offered to 
Congress, and only twenty-six have emerged successfully. 
A proposition to amend is generally offered in the form of a 
joint resolution, though on occasion the form of a bill has been 
employed. At this point it may be well to note that when 
Congress is engaged in the amending process it is not legis-
lating. It is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by 
Article Five. This article for the most part controls the proc-
ess; and other provisions of the Constitution, such as those 
relating to the passage of legislation, have but little bearing.27 
As it is couched in general terms as to the mode of proposal, it 
appears that considerable discretion is left to Congress. In 
practice, after the proposition has been introduced and read 
twice, it is referred to a committee, generally the committee 
on the judiciary, unless there is a committee on the subject 
to which the amendment refers. If the resolution is important 
and many favor it, it is referred to a select committee. Most 
"'But Professor Rottschaefer states that Congress could prescribe rules for 
ratification by state conventions and that in doing so, it would be exercising 
power under Article One. RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 387. 
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amendments die in committee. Next the amendment may be 
reported and discussed but not voted on. If fortunate, it may 
be voted on, and either passes or fails. Amendments may be 
proposed in Congress at any time and in any number, and 
there is no requirement that an amendment deal only with 
one subject. In this respect the process is much freer than that 
provided in the constitutions of many of the states. Nor is 
there any requirement that the amendment be entered on the 
journals of each house of Congress, nor passed by more than 
one Congress. The state constitutions generally contain a sub-
stantial number of regulations on the legislative procedure 
of amendment, and a large number of cases arise on such sub-
jects as entry on the legislative journals and publication in 
the newspapers of the proposed amendment. 
As a result of the broad phrasing of Article Five, there has 
been but little litigation concerning the legality of the pro-
cedure of Congress in proposing amendments. One question 
which has arisen is what is meant by "two-thirds of both 
Houses." The question was first raised as to the adoption of 
the Twelfth Amendment. It has been contended that it means 
two-thirds of the entire membership. Congress in practice 
interpreted it to mean two-thirds of a quorum of each house, 
and many amendments, including some of the first ten, have 
thus been proposed. The Supreme Court upheld this interpre-
tation.28 Article Five also provides that amendments shall be 
28 National Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U. S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588; 
State of Ohio ex rel. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I 9 I 9) z 57 F. 3 34; 
Jebbia v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 343; semble, Missouri 
Pacific Ry. Co .. v. Kansas, (I9I9) 248 U.S. 276, 39 S. Ct. 93; Green v. Weller, 
(I856) 32 Miss. 650. The two-thirds vote is required only on the final passage 
of the resolution; the amendment, while being considered, may be amended 
by a majority vote. Apparently the absence of representation in Congress, 
through secession or otherwise, is no bar to a proposal, as the Fourteenth 
Amendment was submitted by a Congress in which only twenty-five out of 
thirty-six states were represented. When the Fifteenth Amendment was pro• 
posed it was argued in the Senate that there was no authority to propose as 
three states were still excluded from membership. CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 
3d sess. ( r 8 6 9) 7 I r. The function of selecting the mode of ratification would 
seem to be apart from that of proposing an amendment, and it might be argued 
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proposed whenever Congress "shall deem it necessary." 
When the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was at-
tacked, its opponents asserted that Congress had not shown 
that it deemed it necessary. The Supreme Court pointed out, 
however, that there had been no such express declaration in 
any previous resolution of amendment.29 The earliest ques-
tion to arise was whether the approval of the President was 
necessary. The Attorney General, in arguing the case, pointed 
out that the amending process was unique in its nature and not 
legislative, and also that a two-thirds instead of a majority 
vote was required to pass a proposal. The Supreme Court in 
a concise opinion thought it obvious that the President's ap-
proval was unnecessary.30 
that only a majority vote is required, But Congress has always performed both 
functions in a single resolution. Perhaps the call of a convention would require 
only a majority vote. 
29 National Prohibition Cases, (r92o) 253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588; 
Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. r86. 
80 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, (r 798) 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 378; see also Hawke 
v. Smith, (r92o) 253 U. S. 221 at 229, 40 S. Ct. 495· In spite of the early 
decision of the point, there seem to have been some doubts as to the necessity 
of the President's approval, JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. 
(r887) ~§ 556-561. In I803 a motion in the Senate to submit the Twelfth 
Amendment to the President was defeated. In r 86r the President signed the 
Corwin amendment without anyone's protesting. President Lincoln inadver-
tently signed the Thirteenth Amendment, but immediately notified Congress, 
and the Senate adopted a motion that his approval was unnecessary and not 
a precedent. In submitting the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, President 
Johnson informed Congress that he was acting in a purely ministerial capacity. 
The President has signed no subsequent amendments. President John Quincy 
Adams was of the view that the President should not even suggest amendments 
to Congress. At present resolutions of amendment are printed in the statutes as 
signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, and at-
tested to by the clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate. 
Some state decisions have distinguished between the proposal and the sub-
mission of an amendment, and assert that the governor must approve the latter. 
Hatch v. Stoneman, (r885) 66 Cal. 632, 6 P. 734· This has not been the prac-
tice of Congress, which has always performed both acts in a single resolution. 
Jameson is of the view that both the submission of a state amendment and the 
call of a state convention are legislative. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoN-
VENTIONS, 4th ed. (r887) 576. But it seems doubtful that the President's ap-
proval would be required if Congress were to call a convention, particularly 
as the call arises at the application of the state legislatures. The same reasoning 
would seem to apply to an attempted, distinction between the proposal and the 
selection of the mode of ratification, whether by legislatures or conventions. 
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Several important speculative questions might arise in con-
nection with the powers of Congress. Could Congress propose 
an entirely new constitution in the form of an amendment? 
Though such action would be extraordinary, there would 
seem to be no legal reason why it could not. Article Five con-
tains no limit as to the number and nature and separability of 
amendments. It might perhaps be asserted that a general re-
vision is more appropriate by a convention, particularly since 
this alternative mode is expressly provided, but this would 
seem a question of policy rather than of law, and no limita-
tion should be implied. The Constitution itself makes no dis-
tinction between proposals by Congress and by a convention, 
since provision is for a "Convention for proposing amend-
ments." Since a convention would probably have full powers 
to propose and since Congress probably has the same powers 
as a convention, it would seem that Congress could probably 
propose a whole new constitution. No one has yet been able to 
draw a satisfactory line between amendment and revision, 
and it is doubtful that the courts would attempt to do so. An 
Indiana case, however, appears to hold that a legislature may 
not propose a wholly new constitution.31 
Suppose Congress should attempt to withdraw an amend-
ment after it had been proposed.32 This question was directly 
81 Ellingham v. Dye, (x9rz) 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1. But in that case 
the legislature failed to go through the form of legislative proposal under the 
amending clause. In Root's brief in the National Prohibition Cases, (x9zo) 
Z53 u.s. 350, 40 s. Ct. 486, s88, it is contended that the power of Congress to 
propose is not so great as that of a convention. See also Livermore v. Waite, 
(1894) xoz Cal. 113, 36 P. 4Z4. In Switzer v. State ex rei. Silvey, (x9zx) 103 
Ohio St. 306 at 317, 133 N. E. ssz, the court puts this query: "What would be 
said of a proposed amendment to the federal constitution, if bearing the proper 
label 'amendment' which this proposal does not do, it suggested merely that it 
proposed to abandon the present written constitution and adopt the 'English' or 
the 'Chinese Plan' of government, instead of the American 'Federal' plan? 
Could it logically be held that such proposal fell within the word 'amendment' 
as contemplated in the federal constitution?" 
32 }AMESoN, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONs, 4th ed. (x887) 634; BuRDICK, 
THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (19zz) § 19. Perhaps it would 
be improper for one House of Congress to withdraw its proposal after the other 
House had acted, and possibly even before. In Crawford v. Gilchrist, (19rz) 
52 AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
raised in I 8 64 when Senator Anthony proposed to repeal the 
joint resolution submitting the Corwin amendment.33 In such 
a case the analogy of a state legislature's attempting to with-
draw its ratification of an amendment would seem apposite. 34 
The practice has been to regard such a withdrawal as inef-
fectual. The theory apparently is that each affirmative step 
in the passage of an amendment is irrevocable. If Congress 
had first rejected and then passed the proposition, its action 
would be proper, since negative action is viewed as no action 
at all. From a strictly logical viewpoint it would seem that 
Congress could withdraw an amendment before three-fourths 
of the states had ratified. The amendment has no legal effect 
until adopted. It is a mere res nullius. Yet on the basis of con-
venience it may be replied that confusion would be introduced 
if Congress were permitted to retract its action. It may also 
be argued that when Congress has proposed, its work is done, 
since Article Five limits it to proposing, and leaves the matter 
of adoption up to the states. Both of these arguments are rather 
technical, and possibly on the basis of the I 9 3 9 cases the Su-
preme Court would regard the question as a political one. 35 
The questions of the power of Congress to provide that 
ratification should be only by legislatures elected subsequently 
to the proposal by Congress and its power to regulate the 
rules of procedure of the legislatures in ratifying amend-
ments36 are discussed in the section on ratification by state 
legislatures. 
64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963, one house of the state legislature was allowed to with-
draw its consent to a proposed state amendment after the other house had con-
sented. Cockrell, J., dissenting, pointed out that when the Civil War Amend-
ments were ratified, the legislatures were not allowed to withdraw their 
ratifications. 
33 S. J. R. 25, CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., rst sess. ( r 864) 522. 
"'See this chapter, infra, p. 70 et seq. 
35 Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433,59 S. Ct. 972; (1940) 24 
MINN. L. REv. 393 at 396. 
36 See infra, p. 63 et seq. 
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Suppose the Congressional procedure of proposing an 
amendment was defective in some respect. Would such de-
fect be cured by ratification by the states? One writer asserts 
that the Supreme Court would have to find the amendment 
invalid. 37 There are some cases involving amendment of state 
constitutions which hold that the defect would be cured.38 
C. RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS 
1. Ratification by State Conventions 
The second great step in the amending process is ratifica-
tion by the states. 39 One method of such ratification is by state 
conventions. The first amending clause proposed at the Con-
stitutional Convention provided for this mode of ratification 
exclusively. The Constitution itself was adopted by such con-
. ventions. The fact of ratification by such conventions was early 
asserted to prove the national, rather than the federal, char-
acter of the Constitution. This mode of ratification may there-
fore be described as the national method, and that by the 
state legislatures as the federal. The framers of the Constitu-
tion doubtless expected that the method would be used, but 
so far every amendment except one has been referred to the 
state legislatures. 40 Attempts had sometimes been made to use 
the method even before it was used as to the Twenty-First 
Amendment. At the time of proposal of the Thirteenth and 
"'Platz, "Article Five of the Federal Constitution," ( r 9 34) 3 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 17 at 31 • 
.. (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV. 593· 
39 The selection of the mode is left up to Congress. As has been pointed out, 
the question seems distinct from that of the content of the amendment itself. 
Both have always been provided for in the resolution of amendment. 
'"Ratification by conventions might become useful if a state should abolish 
its legislature and adopt the initiative and referendum for all legislation. See the 
suggestion of Parker, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) 
107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920. But the state would lose its vote unless Congress 
provided for ratification by conventions. It would seem that Congress could 
not provide for ratification in some states by conventions and in others by the 
legislatures. 
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Fifteenth Amendments it was sought to secure such a sub-
mission. In connection with the latter amendment it was 
argued that gerrymandering prevailed in many of the states 
and that Congress could regulate the selection of the conven-
tion so that they would truly represent the people. Further-
more it was pointed out that the previous amendments, espe-
cially the first twelve, restricted only the national government, 
while this amendment curtailed the power of the states. 
Therefore the people should have an opportunity to pass 
upon it. In reply it was stated that Congress had never used 
the method because it was dilatory, expensive, and generally 
unw1se. 
The claim has been made that the Eighteenth and Nine-
teenth Amendments should have been ratified by conventions 
on the ground that they took away power from the states and 
interfered with personalliberty.41 There is nothing in Article 
Five, however, which gives any greater validity to ratifica-
tion by conventions than by the state legislatures. Certainly 
the language of the article makes no distinction, and there 
seems no reasonable basis to imply one. The question has been 
adjudicated in the recent case of United States v. Sprague/2 
which went to the Supreme Court. In this case the Eighteenth 
Amendment was assailed on the ground that it should have 
been ratified by conventions because it conferred "new direct 
powers over individuals" and was not simply a change in the 
u JESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS DESTRUCTION BY ALLEGED DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW (1927) 7I; Marbury, "The Nineteenth Amendment and 
After," (1920) 7 VA. L. REV. I at s; Root's brief in the National Prohibition 
Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. In Ex parte Kerby, (1922) 
102 Ore. 612, 205 P. 279, it was held that the power to amend the state 
constitution through legislative proposal with a subsequent popular vote was 
equally broad as that by the constitutional initiative, including the right to alter 
the bill of rights. That the Eighteenth Amendment should have been ratified 
by state conventions is the chief contention of Smith, "Is Prohibition Constitu~ 
tional?" (1929) 4 PLAIN TALK 415. 
'"(1931) 282 U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. zzo, noted (1932) 27 ILL. L. REV. 72, 
(1931) 29 MicH. L. REV. 777, (1931) 79 U. PA. L. REV. 8o7 and Creekmore, 
"The Sprague Case," (1931) 3 Miss. L. J. 282. 
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machinery of the federal government. It was pointed out that 
the Constitution itself, which surrendered up liberties of the 
people, was ratified by conventions. Finally it was urged that 
the Tenth Amendment re-enforced this view and cured any 
doubts.43 The trial court rejected all these views, yet held the 
Eighteenth Amendment unconstitutional on a theory of 
"political science" and a "scientific approach to the problem 
of government." 44 The United States Supreme Court in up-
holding the Eighteenth Amendment rejected all these 
theories. 
Conventions, like legislatures, are mere agents of the 
people. Much criticism of the amending process has arisen in 
recent years on the ground that the people do not participate. 
The difficulties of changing Article Five so as to permit of 
such participation seem very great, but it should never be 
forgotten that there is always the possibility of ratification by 
conventions if Congress so chooses. 
Perhaps the nearest approach until the last decade to a pos-
sible controversy over the legality of ratification by conven-
tions was in the case of the Corwin amendment. This amend-
ment was submitted by Congress to the state legislatures. An 
Illinois convention, which had been convened to change the 
state constitution, on its own initiative voted on the amend-
ment and accepted it. As only two other states ratified it, the 
effect of its action never got into the courts. But since Congress 
is vested with the power to select the mode of ratification, and 
had here chosen the other mode, it would seem that the action 
of the convention was null and void. 45 
"'Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the 
Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771. 
"United States v. Sprague, (D. C. N.J. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 967 at 982, 984. 
Oddly enough, the trial court, though criticising the Supreme Court for its 
holding in the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 
588, that the court could pass on the substance of amendments, held that certain 
amendments must be ratified by conventions. 
411 AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1897) .286. 
Fullerton, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) 107 Wash. 
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Another question of great importance is, in case ratification 
by conventions is provided for, what body can regulate their 
election and procedure? Since Congress is given several 
powers under the amending clause, among which is the power 
to determine that ratification shall be by conventions, it might 
reasonably be argued that it has the power to prescribe the 
date and mode of their election. 46 When the Constitution 
itself was adopted, the state legislatures appear to have con-
trolled these matters. Congress simply referred the Constitu-
tion to the state legislatures with the recommendation that 
they pass it on to conventions to be called in each state. 
Up to 1933 no amendments had been submitted to con-
ventions. The first twenty amendments had been ratified by 
legislatures. When the Twenty-First Amendment was pro-
posed there was considerable discussion as to whether Con-
gress should call the conventions, and as to whether Congress 
should lay down the rules for conventions with respect to 
qualifications of electors, protection against fraud and irregu-
larities, and election by districts or at large. Mr. James M. 
Beck, formerly solicitor general, claimed that Congress had 
no power to regulate such conventions in any respect.47 Former 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer asserted that Congress 
had such power and that its power was exclusive. 48 But he 
later advised Congress to regulate a few matters and leave 
the rest to the states.49 Senators Hebert and Lewis and Rep-
I67 at I99> I8I P. 920, uses as reductio ad absurdum the conclusion that con-
ventions could ratify, although Congress selected the legislative mode, if the 
constitutional methods of ratification were not exclusive . 
.. "· .. Congress is plainly given the power to submit such a proposal to 
conventions in the several states, and to provide the manner of electing delegates 
to, and the calling of, such conventions, all of which could be readily done by 
Congress wholly apart from state constitutional and statutory law." Parker, 
J., dissenting in State ex rei. Mullen v. Howell, (I9I9) 107 Wash. I67 at I96, 
I8I P. 920. Jameson is of the view that the state legislatures would issue the 
calls for conventions. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (I 8 8 7) 
6I, I53· 
•• 76 CoNG. REc. (I932) I24-I3o. 
"'76 CoNG. REc. (I932) 130. 
'"NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 2, I933, p. 8, col. I. 
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resentative Sumners thought that Congress might regulate, 
while Senators Bratton (now United States Circuit Judge) 
and Walsh were of the opposite opinion. 50 The writers were 
also divided. Howard Lee McBain/1 Ralph T. Martig52 and 
Professor Dowling53 thought that Congress could regulate. 
Professor Rottschaefer, writing in 1939, has taken the same 
view.54 Former Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby in 1938 
likewise expressed that opinion. 55 Historical evidence to show 
that Congress may call state conventions is cited in a recent 
article by Abraham C. Weinfeld. 56 Other writers have denied 
the power, for example, Alexander Lincoln, 57 former Attorney 
General William D. Mitchell,58 and Herbert S. Phillips/9 
and Federal Judge William Clark.60 In 1937 Representative 
Wadsworth introduced a bill to regulate ratifying conven-
tions in several respects. 61 Election was to be at large, within 
five years after proposal, and the time of convention meeting 
was fixed. 
In favor of Congressional regulation several arguments 
may be made. If Congress could not control, ratification by 
50 76 CoNG. REC. (1932) 4153, 4152-4153, 4163, 4148-4150; see Weinfeld, 
"Power of Congress over State Ratifying Conventions," (1938) 51 HARV. L. 
REV. 473 at 474• 
51 McBain, "Or by Conventions," NEW YoRK TIMES, Dec. 11, 1932, §IV, 
p. I :7• 
"""Amending the Constitution," (1937) 35 MICH. L. REv. 1253 at 1273-
1274, 1284; see also (1934) 2 GEO. WASH L. REV. 216; (1933) 7 ST. JoHN's 
L. REV. 375· 
53 "A New Experiment in Ratification," (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 383 at 387. 
•• CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 392 . 
.. HEARINGS ON s. J. RES. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess, (I 9 3 8) 6o. 
56 "Power of Congress over State Ratifying Conventions," (1938) 51 HARV. 
L. REV. 473 at 476-488. 
07 "Ratification by Conventions," (1933) 18 MASS. L. Q. 287. 
58 "Methods of Amending the Constitution," (1932) 25 LAWY. & BANKER 
265. 
50 "Has the Congress Power Under Article V of the Constitution to Call and 
Regulate the Holding of Ratifying Conventions Independent of State Legis-
latures?" (1933) 6 FLA. S. B. A. J. 573· 
80 HEARINGS ON S. J. REs. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938) 21-25, 
01 H. R. 299, 75th Cong., xst sess. (1937). 
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convention would be at the mercy of the state legislatures, 
hence this method of ratification would be almost the same 
as legislative ratification. Although the Twenty-First Amend-
ment was rapidly ratified, other amendments might be long 
delayed if the regulation of conventions was left to the state 
legislatures. Ratification by state conventions is a federal 
function, as is ratification by state legislatures. 62 Under Article 
One, section 4, Congress may regulate the election of United 
States Senators and Representatives. Even though reasoning 
from the premise that a legislature must be what was a legis-
lature at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, a con-
vention must be what a convention then was, not all conven-
tions were even then called by the states. 
When the Twenty-First Amendment was submitted, Con-
gress after considerable debate was silent as to the calling of 
conventions. In 1933 forty-three states passed laws provid-
ing for the holding of conventions to ratify the Twenty-First 
Amendment.63 The only states not passing statutes were 
Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Dakota. 
Pursuant to such statutes, conventions were held in 1933 in 
thirty-eight states. Thirty-seven conventions ratified, the 
only rejection occurring in South Carolina. In North Caro-
lina, the electorate voted for convention delegates, but against 
holding a convention. In Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and 
62 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently advised that a state 
constitutional provision as to calling a convention to amend the state con-
stitution did not apply to state conventions to amend the federal Constitution. 
Opinion of the Justices, (1933) 204 N. C. 8o6, 172 S. E. 474· The United 
States Supreme Court has held that state constitutions may not fetter state legis-
latures in the ratification of federal amendments. Leser v. Garnett, ( 1922) 2 58 
U. S. uo, 42 S. Ct. 2 1 7. See also the opinion of Judge Parker, dissenting, in 
State ex rei. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) 107 Wash. 167 at 196, 181 P. 920, 
quoted in note 46, supra. 
08 BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (I 93 8) 5 I 5 ; see also article by the same 
author on the same subject, (1935) 29 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. I005-IOI7. The 
state convention records and laws are set out in detail in the volume by Brown, 
a book indispensable to the student of ratification of federal amendments by 
state conventions. 
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South Dakota provision was made for the choice of convention 
delegates in the next year, 1934.64 The number of delegates 
varied from 329 in Indiana to 3 in New Mexico.65 In only 
six conventions were there more than a hundred delegates. 
The states, in providing for conventions, inferentially 
recognized the power of Congress to deal with the subject. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that when Congress fails 
to act, the state legislatures may call conventions.66 Twenty-
one state laws provided that if Congress later acted as to the 
organization of state conventions, then the state statute was 
superseded. Only New Mexico framed a statute denying the 
power of Congress to act. 67 
The scope of the power of state conventions would seem 
to be reasonably clear. They have the exclusive power of the 
states to ratify amendments proposed to them by Congress. 
They are not at liberty to go outside their constituent func-
tions, however, so as to interfere with the state or national 
governments. What was said of the powers of a national con-
vention applies almost completely to state conventions with 
the sole exception that the function of the former is to pro-
pose and the latter to ratify. In passing on the amendment, 
the conventions have the same powers and disabilities as the 
state legislatures have. 68 The same time limits and the same 
right to reject and later to ratify would seem to govern.69 
While these conventions are state instrumentalities in some 
respects, their powers with respect to ratification are derived 
from Article Five, so that they may also be looked upon as 
federal agencies. Doubtless the states might empower such 
81 BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT (1938) 5, 
.. Ibid. SI6. 
00 State ex rei. Donnelly v. Myers, (1933) IZ7 Ohio St. 104, 186 N. E. 918. 
81 Brown, "The Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment," (I 935) 29 
AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 1005 at IOo8-I009, 
08 See in general, }AMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887) 
chap. VI. 
69 See infra, p. 70 et seq. 
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conventions to perform strictly state functions in addition to 
their functions of ratification. The Illinois convention which 
attempted to ratify the Corwin amendment was sitting as a 
state constitutional convention. 
The most striking characteristic of the conventions which 
ratified the Twenty-First Amendment was their lack of true 
deliberation. 70 The question arose whether the state legisla-
tures could so regulate the conventions as to strip them of 
their deliberative character, as by providing for a popular 
referendum which should be binding on the convention. The 
Alabama Supreme Court advised that no deliberation was 
necessary and that a popular referendum might be made 
binding. 71 The Alabama legislature passed a bill over the gov-
ernor's veto providing for such referendum. The Maine Su-
preme Court advised that deliberation was essential.72 
In favor of the view that deliberation is not necessary, it 
may be pointed out that Congress has already deliberated, 
whereas a convention to amend the state constitution must 
take that preliminary step; 73 and that the language of Hawke 
v. Smith/4 speaking of "deliberative assemblages" was im-
mediately followed by the statement that such bodies "would 
voice the will of the people." Moreover, legislative action was 
involved there, and legislative action is naturally deliberative, 
70 BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT (I938) 5· 
71 In re Opinion of the Justices, (I9J3) 226 Ala. 565, I48 So. Io7, noted 
(I933) 47 HARV. L. REV. I3o, (I934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 709, (I933) IS MINN. 
L. REV. 70, 
72 In re Opinion of the Justices, (I933) I32 Me. 49I, I67 A. I76, noted in 
(I934) 2 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 2I6. There are decisions which go even farther 
and reject a popular referendum as to a state statute providing machinery for the 
selection of members of conventions to ratify a federal amendment and for 
conducting such conventions. State ex rei. Donnelly v. Myers, (I933) I27 
Ohio St. I04, I86 N. E. 9I8; State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, (I933) 333 Mo. 662, 
62 S. W. (2d) 895. That this view is extreme is pointed out by RoTTSCHAEFER, 
CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw (I939) 39I; (I934) I U. CHI. L. REv. 498; (I934) 
34 CoL. L. REv. I68. 
78 Dowling, "A New Experiment in Ratification," (I933) I9 A. B. A. J. 
383. 
•• (I92o) 253 U.S. 22I at 227, 40 S. Ct. 495· 
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at least to some extent. It may also be pointed out that the 
fact that the conventions which ratified the Constitution were 
deliberative is not conclusive, since there were no facilities 
for taking a popular vote in the early days.75 The meaning 
of "conventions" was vague in the early days. 76 Finally it 
may be argued that certification by the state and proclama-
tion by the secretary of state of ratification by three-fourths 
of the states bar any attack on the deliberative character of the 
conventions. 77 But, prior to the proclamation by the secretary 
of state, possibly the proper state officials might be enjoined 
from certifying the results of a pledged convention. 
2. Ratification by State Legislatures 
As has been indicated, the other method of ratification is 
by the state legislatures. This was the method of ratification 
used in amending the Articles of Confederation, and gives 
peculiar prominence to the states as such. The usual course 
of procedure is that after Congress has proposed an amend-
ment,· the secretary of state sends a copy thereof to the gov-
ernor of each state. The governor of each state in turn submits 
it to the legislature. These two steps, it is to be noted, are not 
mentioned in the Constitution, but are based simply on statute 
or practice. 78 Even though both of them were omitted, it 
would therefore seem that the amendment could not be at-
tacked for such omission. The only substantial requirements 
demanded by the Constitution are that there be a two-thirds 
•• McPherson v. Blacker, (I S92) I46 U.S. I at 36, I 3 S. Ct. 3· 
76 (I934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 709· 
77 Leser v. Garnett, (I922) 258 U.S. I3o, 42 S. Ct. 217. 
78 State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 
334· Some state legislatures attempted to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment upon 
telegraphic information without waiting for the official copy. This would seem 
to be valid where the legislature acts on the basis of correct information. Thus 
Nevada's ratification before an official copy reached the state seems to have been 
good. See MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (I909) 57· 
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vote of each house of Congress in its favor and that it be 
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures. In this 
respect Article Five resembles the chief prerequisites for the 
amendment of a state constitution: the vote of the constitu-
tionally designated majority of the legislature and the ap-
proval of the constitutional majority of the voters.79 It would 
seem then that a state legislature could proceed at once after 
Congress has proposed. 
To determine the legality of the acts of the state legisla-
ture in ratifying, one must first inquire into the nature of the 
function of the legislature in performing the act of ratifica-
tion. As in the case of Congress, resort must first be had to 
Article Five. The entire extent of the power of the legislature 
is to be found in that article, and anything in the state constitu-
tion to the contrary is void. 80 Thus the legislature may be 
placed in the unusual position of having violated its own rules 
of procedure and the state constitution, though this is not 
theoretically incorrect since the Constitution of the United 
States is supreme and the legislature is free to violate the state 
constitution whenever it is inconsistent with the federal Con-
stitution. The legislature in ratifying an amendment is not 
exercising a legislative function, just as Congress, when it 
proposes, is not legislating. 81 The state decisions also hold that 
,. See the opinion of Brewer, J., later a member of the federal Supreme Court, 
in Prohibitory Amendment Cases, ( 1 8 81) 24 Kan. 700. 
80 The present Missouri constitution forbids the legislature's adopting any 
amendment to the federal Constitution impairing the right of local self-
government. Mo. Const. (1875), art. 2, §3. The West Virginia constitution de-
clares it the duty of the state government to guard the state from federal en-
croachments upon its "internal government and police." W.Va. Const. (1872), 
art. z, §2. A Missouri constitutional convention proposed an amendment to the 
state bill of rights forbidding ratification of any amendment affecting "the 
individual liberty of the people of the United States." 
81 Mr. Justice Day, writing the opinion of the court in Hawke v. Smith, 
(1920) 253 U.S. 221 at 229,40 S. Ct. 495, stated: "Ratification by a state of a 
constitutional ar;nendment is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of 
the word. It is but the expression of the assent of the State to a proposed 
amendment." 
The Maine court in Opinion of the Justices, (1919) I18 Me. 544 at 546-
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when the legislature proposes an amendment to the state 
constitution it is not legislating. The provisions of the state 
constitution and the rules of the legislature as to the passage of 
statutes, bills, and other forms of legislation are not control-
ling in the adoption of an amendment. The legislature in 
ratifying is exercising a ministerial or constituent function; 
the ratifying process is equivalent to a roll call of the states. 
The courts have asserted that the legislature acts as a federal 
agent and exclusively under the federal Constitution.82 
Bearing in mind that Article Five is the source of the state 
legislature's authority, one may proceed to inquire what is the 
extent of this authority. In the first place, which legislature as 
regards time may ratify? Article Five makes no express pro-
vision, but it would seem that the legislature existing at the 
time of the proposal by Congress or any later legislature 
existing during the pendency of the amendment may pass on 
it. Congress probably could not forbid such action.83 Any pro-
547, I07 A. 673, stated: "Here again, the State Legislature in ratifying the 
amendment, as Congress in proposing it, is not, strictly speaking, acting in the 
discharge of legislative duties and functions as a law making body, but is acting 
in behalf of and as representatives of the people as a ratifying body under the 
power expressly conferred upon it by Article V. The people through their 
Constitution might have clothed the Senate alone, or the House alone, or the 
Governor's Council, or the Governor, with the power of ratification, or might 
have reserved that power to themselves to be exercised by popular vote. But 
they did not." Contra: ( I9J8) I 8 BasT. U. L. REv. I 69 at I 73· 
82 This question is distinguishable from that in Haire v. Rice, ( r 907) zo4 
U. S. :t91, Z7 S. Ct. z8I, in which it was held that when Congress designates a 
state legislature as an agency for carrying out a federal purpose, the legislature 
must act in subordination to the state constitution since that is the source of its 
powers. Similarly the state is engaged in ordinary law making when it regulates 
the election of Representatives in Congress, hence the governor's veto is effective. 
Smiley v. Holm, (1931) z85 U.S. 355, sz S. Ct. 397, noted (193z) I7 CoRN. 
L. Q. 466; (I9Jz) z7 ILL. L. REv. 445; (I93z) 30 MICH. L. REV. 969, 1337; 
(r9p) 16 MINN. L. REv. 85o. In the amending process, the state legislatures 
derive their authority directly from Article Five, which supersedes anything 
inconsistent therewith in the state constitutions. This seems to be the answer 
to the theory advanced by Brown, "The Sixteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution," (I9:to) 54 AM. L. REV. 843 at 849, that the Sixteenth 
Amendment is void because some of the legislatures ratifying had no power to 
impose an income tax. 
88 In the case of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, efforts were made 
to provide that ratification should only be by legislatures elected subsequently to 
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vision of the state constitution forbidding the existing legis-
lature from doing so would seem to be unconstitutional. As a 
matter of fact, in the case of the Nineteenth Amendment the 
existing Tennessee legislature proceeded to ratify although 
the state constitution definitely provided that ratification must 
be by a subsequently elected legislature. 84 When it is recalled 
that every amendment has so far been acted upon by existing 
legislatures, there can seem little doubt of the propriety of 
this procedure. It would also seem that a special session of the 
legislature would have the power to ratify. 85 
Another question is whether Congress or the states may 
regulate the rules of procedure of the legislatures in ratifying 
amendments. The constitutionality of Congressional regula-
the proposal by Congress. See chap. VI, p. 1 89, infra. It was argued that 
Congress had this power by necessary implication. In reply it was argued that 
the Constitution referred to the then existing legislatures and any later legislatures 
during the pendency of the amendment. Moreover, all previous amendments 
had been ratified by the existing legislatures. The proposed Wadsworth-Garrett 
amendment expressly provides for ratification by subsequently elected legis-
latures only. See chap. VI, p. 189 et seq. 
"' The Tennessee Attorney General rendered an opinion that this was valid. 
(1920) 24 LAW NOTES Sr. Chapter s6o of the Acts of 1920 of Massachusetts 
declares it to be the policy of the state that the legislature should defer its 
action on federal amendments until a popular vote has been taken. A commission 
appointed by the governor of Virginia under an act of March 25, 1926, to 
study revision of the state constitution recommended that it be the policy of the 
state that only subsequently elected legislatures act on federal amendments. 
Former Governor Alfred Smith of New York in his January 4, 1928, message 
urged an amendment to the state constitution "that no future amendments to the 
federal Constitution be acted upon by the Legislature before referendum by 
State statute to the people." N.Y. LEG. Doc. (1928), No. 3, p. 90. 
85 The decision in People ex rel. Attorney General v. Curry, (1900) 130 Cal. 
82, 62 P. 516, that a special session of the California legislature could not pro-
pose amendments to the state constitution unless the subjects thereof were speci-
fied in the proclamation calling the special session, seems erroneous, and was 
based on the theory that an amendment is a form of legislation. In Sweeney v. 
King, (1927) 289 Pa. St. 92, 137 A. 178, an opposite result was reached and 
the California decision was rejected. The child labor amendment was ratified 
in Kentucky by the legislature when in special session, although the governor's 
original proclamation did not mention the subject of ratification. His amended 
proclamation did so mention. The Alabama court advised that the legislature 
may not at a special session provide for a convention to pass on an amendment 
unless the subject is included in the governor's proclamation. In re Opinions of 
the Justices, (1933) zz6 Ala. 168, 146 So. 407. 
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tion would seem exceedingly doubtful. The states cannot be 
coerced into adopting an amendment. If they choose to re-
main passive and never so much as discuss the amendment, 
there is nothing Congress can do to force them to act. Congress 
has done its work when it proposes, and the matter of adop-
tion is for the states. 86 On the other hand, the state legislature 
is not bound by its ordinary rules of procedure in the ratifica-
tion of an amendment. A federal amendment could not be in-
validated for a breach of the rules, especially when they were 
of such a nature as to impede the adoption of an amendment. 
As a minimum power the state could provide for the time and 
place of meeting of the legislature, whether it should be bi-
cameral or unicameral, the number and election of its mem-
bers, its organization and officers. The state could perhaps 
even abolish its legislature altogether, at least as far as Article 
Five is concerned, although such action might be regarded as 
a failure to maintain a republican form of government. Rati-
fication would then have to be by conventions, or the state 
would lose its voice in the amending process. 
It would seem improper that a mere majority vote of the 
legislators taken in an individual poll at a time and place 
other than prescribed in the state constitution would be suffi-
cient. On the other hand, there would seem to be some doubt 
'"' One of the most detailed plans for regulating the legislatures is that 
proposed by Senator Morton as a result of the obstructive tactics in the Indiana 
legislature to hinder the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. AMES, THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1909) 291. On the sixth 
legislative day of the meeting of any state legislature, each house was to pro-
ceed at noon to act upon any amendment proposed; except that the legislature 
must not have taken any action on the amendment at any of its previous sessions. 
If a majority of the members of each house voted for it, it passed. If no conculsive 
action was taken the first day, the houses were to meet at the same hour each 
subsequent day until such action had been taken. In case of resignation, with-
drawal, or refusal to qualify of a minority of either house, such action would 
not affect the passage of the amendment. The governor was to forward 
certified copies of the action of each house to the President of the United States. 
This bill, like any other proposed regulation of the action of the state legisla-
ture, would seem to have no warrant in the terms of Article Five, but, failing 
of passage, no issue was raised. 
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that the state constitution could prescribe an excessive ma-
jority for its adoption. Article Five is silent as to the majority 
of votes required in the state legislatures, so that it is not clear 
what majority is necessary and whether Congress or the states 
could determine what the majority shall be. Perhaps a simple 
majority of a quorum of each house is suffi.cient.87 The two 
houses of the legislature will probably each vote separately 
on the amendment. A state may permit the vote of the 
lieutenant governor to count in favor of ratification when the 
senate would otherwise be equally divided. 88 The approval of 
the governor appears to be superfluous. In fact, even amend-
ments to the state constitutions have only in exceptional in-
stances required the signature of that official. 89 
87 Leser v. Board of Registry, (r92.1) 139 Md. 46, 114 A. 840. When the 
Fifteenth Amendment was proposed, the Indiana constitution required a quorum 
of two-thirds of the legislature to transact business. The speaker of the House 
of Representatives ruled, however; that a majority of the total membership 
could act on the amendment. INDIANA HousE JouRNAL (r869) 6o:z.. See 
MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1909) 63. Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (192.1) 30 
YALE L. J. 32.1 at 344, is of the view that the state may determine the quorum. 
88 Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 39o, 71 P. (:z.d) 518; (1938) 18 
BosT. U. L. REV. r 69 at I 73· The United States Supreme Court, being equally 
divided as to whether or not this was a political question, left the decision of the 
lower court undisturbed. Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 
972.· 
89 In re Senate File No. 3I, (r889) 2.5 Neb. 864, 4I N. W. 981; State ex rei. 
Morris v. Mason, (I89I) 43 La. Ann. 590, 9 So. 776; State v. Dahl, (I896) 6 
N.D. 8r, 58 N. W. 4I8; Commonwealth ex. rei. Attorney General v. Griest, 
(I9oo) 196 Pa. St. 396, 46 A. sos; Warfield v. Vandiver, (I9o8) 101 Md. 
78, 6o A. 538; Murphy Chair Co. v. Attorney General, (1907) 148 Mich. 563, 
IIZ N. W. I27; State v. American Sugar Refining Co., (I9I5) 137 La. 407, 
68 So. 742; People ex rei. v. Ramer, (I916) 62 Colo. u8, I6o P. 1032; 
Mitchell v. Hopper, (I92.2) 153 Ark. 515, 24I S. W. Io; (I931) 45 HARV. 
L. REv. 355· Fullerton, J., dissenting in State ex rei. Mullen v. Howell, (I919) 
I 07 Wash. I 67, I 8 I P. 920, asserts that the governor must sign a federal amend-
ment when the constitution provides that legislative measures are subject to the 
approval of the governor. In Hatch v. Stoneman, (r88s) 66 Cal. 634, 6 P. 734, 
and Clements v. Hall, (I92.I) 2.3 Ariz. :z., :z.oi P. 87, it is asserted that the 
governor must approve the submission as distinguished from the proposal. But 
in the case of a federal amendment the legislature ratifies and does not submit 
an amendment, so that such a distinction, at best a doubtful one, cannot be made. 
The governor of New Hampshire vetoed the Twelfth Amendment, but enough 
states ratified to make the state's ratification unnecessary. The governor of 
Arkansas vetoed the Sixteenth Amendment, yet the act of the state legislature 
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Other questions of procedure also arise. Under the rules of 
some states, measures passed are open to reconsideration 
within a prescribed period. 90 But where a federal amendment 
has passed, whether the vote of adoption is irrevocable is 
seemingly a "political question." 91 Question may also arise as 
to the form of ratification. In most states it has been by joint 
resolution, as in the case of its proposal by Congress, but there 
seems to be no objection to employing the form of a bill.92 
was transmitted to the Secretary of State and Arkansas was counted as a 
ratifying state. When the Kentucky legislature rejected the Thirteenth Amend-
ment the state governor refused to sign the resolution, as he regarded his ap-
proval as unnecessary. On the other hand, a state may require signature of the 
governor to a bill regulating the election of representatives in Congress. Smiley 
v. Holm, (I93I) :z.Ss U.S. 355, s:z. S. Ct. 397· 
00 At the time the Nineteenth Amendment was submitted, under the rule of 
the Tennessee House of Representatives a member voting for a resolution might 
change his vote and move to reconsider. This suspends the passage of the measure 
for two parliamentary days or until a new vote is taken. A move to reconsider 
the Nineteenth Amendment was immediately made in the house after the legis-
lature had accepted it, but the governor had sent in the ratification, although on 
reconsideration the house rejected it. 
In West Virginia the rules of the senate provided that after a measure is 
defeated and a motion to reconsider is lost, it cannot be reconsidered at that 
session. Although the senate had first rejected the amendment, it proceeded 
to ratify it despite the rule, and the ratification was sent in. But in Leser v. 
Board of Registry, (I9:Z.I) I39 Md. 46, II4 A. 84o, the court asserted that 
this resolution, although identical in language to the former one, came from 
the other house and hence was a different measure. In this case on appeal the 
Supreme Court held that the violations of legislative procedure in the two 
states were immaterial since two other states had later ratified and that official 
notice to the secretary of state, "duly authenticated," from the state legislatures 
was conclusive on the secretary of state, and being certified to by his proclama-
tion is conclusive on the courts. Leser v. Garnett, (I9:z.:z.) 2.58 U. S. I3o, 42. 
S. Ct. :z. I 7. The meaning of "duly authenticated" is not clear, since in many 
states there is no official who has the power to make a certificate of any action 
by the legislature which shall be conclusive on the courts. It perhaps means that 
the enrolled bill rule is to be applied to the action of the legislatures on 
amendments. 
01 Coleman v. Miller, (I939) 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972.. The converse 
was there involved: Is a vote of rejection irrevocable? See (I939) I3 So. CAL. 
L. REV. u:z. at 12.4. 
82 There is a dictum in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (I9I9) I07 Wash. 
I 67, I 8 I P. 92.0, that the legislature may act by joint resolution, though the 
state constitution makes no provision therefor. Parker, J., dissenting on another 
point, says, I07 Wash. at I9:z., that the act of ratification would ''be in sub-
stance identical in character, whether done by the legislature by a vote upon an 
informal motion, by a formal resolution, or by a formal bill as in the enactment 
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It would seem improper to attach conditions or reservations 
to the ratification. Article Five makes no -provision for them, 
so that it appears that the legislature must accept or reject 
unconditionally. When the Constitution was ratified, serious 
attempts were made to impose conditions, but it was objected 
by such leaders as Hamilton and Madison that this would be 
equivalent to rejection, and as a result each state accepted the 
Constitution with no reservations, the obligation to adopt the 
Bill of Rights being wholly moral. 93 
The development of the initiative and referendum has re-
sulted in attempts in some of the states to refer federal 
amendments to a popular vote.94 The referendum laws have 
generally been couched in broad terms providing for a vote 
on all measures approved by the legislature. The Ohio con-
stitution expressly provided for a referendum on federal 
amendments, so that the issue was squarely raised. Where 
there was merely a general referendum law, the courts some-
times avoided the question by deciding that a federal amend-
ment was not a measure of the kind to be referred.95 The Ohio 
of ordinary state laws." Fullerton, J., in a dissenting opinion, asserts that a 
joint resolution is improper, and that an amendment must be passed in the 
manner provided for enacting laws under the state constitution. 
00 1 HAMILTON,. WoRKs, Lodge ed. (r885) 463, 465; r BuRGEss, PoLITICAL 
SCIENCE AND CoMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1891) 149; JAMESON, 
CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. ( r8 8 7) 629. 
•• In a recent case a state court held that a proposed initiative measure for 
a popular vote in the state on the question whether its congressmen should be 
requested to support an amendment repealing the Eighteenth Amendment was 
invalid on the ground that Article Five gives the people no direct voice in the 
amending process. Opinion of the Justices, (1928) 262 Mass. 6o3, r6o N. E. 
439· There is a dictum in Ex parte Dillon, (1920) 262 F. 563, that Congress 
also could not permit a referendum . 
.. Whittemore v. Terral, (1919) 140 Ark. 493, 215 S. W. 686; In re Opin-
ion of the Justices, (1919) ll8 Me. 544, 107 A. 673; Herbring v. Brown, 
( 1919) 92 Ore. r 76, r 8o P. 328; Prior v. Noland, ( 1920) 68 Colo. 263, 
r88 P. 729; Carson v. Sullivan, (r92o) 284 Mo. 353, 223 S. W. 5.71; 
State v. Morris, (1920) 79 Okla. 89, 191 P. 364. Contra: State ex rel. Mullen 
v. Howell, (r9r9) 107 Wash. 167, r8r P. 920. See also Barlotti v. Lyons, 
(1920) 182 Cal. 575, 189 P. 282; Decher v. Vaughan, (r92o) 209 Mich. 
565, 177 N. W. 388. 
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Supreme Court held that a federal amendment was subject 
to referendum, but the matter was finally put at rest on appeal 
when the Supreme Court of the United States held the 
referendum unconstitutional. 96 When the framers of the 
Constitution provided for ratification by the state legislatures, 
they meant formal representative bodies who could not dele-
gate these powers. Hence even though a state constitution 
gives the people a right to legislate, they are not to be re-
garded as the legislature for the purpose of ratifying a federal 
amendment.97 Thus it appears definitely settled that the states 
have no authority to permit the people to participate directly 
in the amending process, but may perhaps call for an advisory 
vote before the legislature finally acts.98 However, the legis-
lature would have power to ratify either before or after such 
a vote, and the popular vote would have no binding force. A 
Professor Noel T. Dowling believes that in the light of the recent cases 
of Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, and Chandler v. 
Wise, (I939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992, Congress could provide that all 
amendments be submitted to state conventions, the delegates to be elected by 
popular vote and to be bound by a popular referendum on the amendment. 
Dowling, "Clarifying the Amending Process," (I 940) I WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
215 at 222. 
96 Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495; National Prohi-
bition Cases, (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. Other cases taking 
the same view are: Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal. 1920) 262 F. 563; Feigen-
span v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. r86, and Barlotti v. Lyons, Decher 
v. Vaughan, semble Prior v. Noland (one judge dissenting), Re Opinion of the 
Justices, Carson v. Sullivan and State v. Morris, all cited supra, note 95· Contra: 
Hawke v. Smith, (1919) 100 Ohio St. 385, 126 N. E. 400, one judge dissent-
ing; State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, supra, note 95, four judges dissenting. 
117 The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Davis v. Hildebrant, 
( 191 6) 241 U.S. 565, 36 S. Ct. 7o8, which gave a broader meaning to the word 
"legislature" as used in Article I, sec. 4· In that case Congress had itself 
recognized the referendum as part of the legislative authority for the purpose 
of elections. The latter article allowed the state to legislate within the limita-
tions therein named, but in the ratification of an amendment no legislation is 
required, and only an expression of assent is desired. 
'"'The legislature may call for an advisory vote before finally acting. 
Parker, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) I07 Wash. 
167, I 8 I P. 920. But see note 94, supra. A referendum on the subject of repeal 
of the Eighteenth Amendment, the vote being advisory, is valid. Spriggs v. 
Clark, (1932) 45 Wyo. 63, I4 P. (2d) 667, noted (I933) I8 CoRN. L. Q. 
2.78, (I933) I GEO. WASH. L. REV. 27I, (I933) 10 N.Y. u. L. Q. REV. 395· 
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ratification by the legislature would be valid despite rejection 
by a popular referendum. Ratification by a popular referen-
dum, unaccompanied by legislative ratification, would have 
no legal effect. 
A problem which has several times come up in practice is 
whether a legislature may change its action with respect to 
an amendment. One view with respect to ratification by state 
legislatures is that the first action by the legislature of a given 
state is conclusive and binds future legislatures, even though 
the first action was that of rejection. This view, which has re-
ceived but small support, was taken in Wise v. Chandler 99 
by the highest state court of Kentucky. It was argued that a 
convention ratifying a federal amendment could not change 
its action; hence rejection by a convention would be final; 
and that a state legislature had no greater power than a con-
vention. It should be noted that treating both acceptance and 
rejection as conclusive is logically consistent and insures pro-
tection of minority rights.100 
The Supreme Court of Kansas disagreed with the Ken-
tucky court and held an original vote of rejection not con-
clusive, though stating an original vote of ratification would 
be conclusive.101 The Kansas view is supported by Congres-
sional practice as to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, 102 and by the legal theory that the Constitution creates 
"'(I937) 270 Ky. I, Io8 S. W. (2d) I024, noted or discussed (I938) I8 
BosT. U. L. REv. I69; (I937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 12oi; (I937) 26 GEo L. J. 
I07 at II8; (I938) 6 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2I8; (I938) 26 KY. L. J. 364; 
(I938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 269; (I938) I7 NEB. L. BuLL. 8I; (I938) II 
So. CAL. L. REv. 472; (I937) 24 VA. L. REv. 194; (1937) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 
I 29; (I 9 3 7) 4 7 YALE L. J. I 48; Dowling, "Clarifying the Amending Proc-
ess," (I940) I WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2I5. 
The same view was also taken by Cadwalader, "Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution," (I926) 6o AM. L. REV. 389 at 393; Grinnell, "A 'Point of 
Order' on the Child Control Amendment," (I934) 20 A. B. A. J. 448, re-
printed in (I934) I9 MASS. L. Q.No. 5, p. 22. 
100 (I938) II So. CAL. L. REV. 472. 
101 Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan, 390, 71 P. (2d) 518. 
""'(1938) rr So. CAL. L. REv. 472. 
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only a power to ratify and not a power to reject.103 It is also 
supported on the ground of public policy in that less delay re-
sults and that it is less confusing than counting subsequent 
reversals. 104 To allow a rejection to be final is to make the 
amending process less deliberate. There might also be some 
difficulty as to the meaning of rejection, as for instance, is 
rejection by one house of the state legislature a rejection? 
However, this difficulty might be readily resolved by adopt-
ing the view that only an affirmative vote of rejection by both 
houses of the legislature is binding. 
In declaring the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Congress counted two states which had first rejected and then 
ratified. The Kentucky court sought to explain this by saying 
that the rejections should not count as rejectiqns because they 
were by illegal governments.105 But it by no means follows 
that an illegal government may not perform some valid acts, 
such as ratification of a federal amendment.106 The Supreme 
Court has stated in a leading case: 107 "acts necessary to peace 
and good order among citizens ... which would be valid 
if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded 
in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though 
unlawful government .... "Action on a constitutional amend-
ment may be included within such acts. 
A third possible view is that a state should be able to re-
ject, despite prior ratification, before three-fourths of the 
103 Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (r9zr) 30 YALE L. J. 3zz; 
(1940) z4 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 395-396. In opposition it was argued to the 
Kentucky court that Van Devanter, J., had stated in Rhode Island v. Palmer 
(National Prohibition Cases), (r9zo) z53 U. S. 350 at 386, 40 S. Ct. 486, 
58 8: "The referendum provisions of state constitutions and states cannot be 
applied, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, in the ratifica-
tion or rejection of amendments to it." See also the view of Senator Garrett 
Davis, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., zd sess. (r87o) 1479-148o. 
1
"' (r938) rr So. CAL. L. REv. 47z. 
"'"This distinction is approved in ( 193 7) z4 VA. L. REV. 194. 
100 See (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. rzor at rzo3, note z1; (1938) zz MINN. 
L. REV. Z69. 
107 Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 700 at 733· 
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states had ratified.108 Of course, such subsequent rejection 
could not come after three-fourths of the states had ratified. 
Under this view, both the Kentucky and the Kansas courts 
were in error as to the effect of prior ratification. Ratification 
should not be more final than rejection. Ratification by less 
than three-fourths of the states is ineffectual. Such is the theo-
retical approach. But there are even stronger practical argu-
ments. It is more democratic to allow the reversal of prior 
action. A truer picture of public opinion at the final date of 
ratification is obtained. No great confusion is likely to result 
from such a rule.109 Not to allow reversal of an acceptance 
may cause a cautious legislature not to act.110 
It would seem to follow from the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court that the fact of rejection by more than one-
fourth of the states does not bar ultimate ratification of an 
amendment if Congress deems the amendment still open for 
ratification. The view that rejection by more than a fourth 
of the states destroyed an amendment has been taken by the 
Kentucky Court.111 The Kansas Court took the opposite 
view.112 Since rejection by a single state was not conclusive, it 
logically followed that rejection by a group of states carried 
no greater weight. Thus the fact that twenty-one states had 
rejected the child labor amendment and notified the secre-
108 Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution," (1926) 10 MINN. 
L. REV. 185 at 188; (I938) I8 BosT. U. L. REV. I69; (I938) 22 MINN. L. 
REV. 269; (I9J8) I7 NEB. L. BuLL. 8I; (I937) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. I29; 
NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, HEARINGS ON S. }. RES. IJ4, 75th Cong., 3d 
sess. (1938) 4I-42; RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (I939) 395· The 
solicitor general in his brief in Coleman v. Miller at p. 26 admitted that rati-
fication should be rescindable. 
100 (1938) I8 BosT. U. L. REV. I69. 
110 (1938) II So. CAL. L.REv. 472. 
111 Wise v. Chandler, (I937) 270 Ky. I, Io8 S. W. (2d) I024. It had 
earlier been claimed that rejection by more than one-fourth of the states would 
defeat the proposal until it was resubmitted to the states by Congress. Statement 
by Special Committee of the American Bar Association, "The Federal Child 
Labor Amendment," (I935) 2I A. B. A. J. II at I2; Grinnell, "A 'Point of 
Order' on the Child Control Amendment," (I934) 20 A. B. A. J. 448. 
112 Coleman v. Miller, (I937) 146 Kan. 490, 71 P. (2d) 518. 
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tary of state and four states had rejected without such notice 
did not destroy the amendment. That the present Article Five 
does not allow rejection by one-fourth of the states plus one 
to defeat the amendment permanently was to some extent in-
dicated by the Wadsworth-Garrett Joint Resolution in 1926 
proposing an amendment which would expressly permit one-
fourth of the states plus one to kill the amendment. In the 
case of the Fourteenth Amendment ten states out of thirty-
seven, or more than one-fourth, had rejected, yet Congress 
treated it as ratified.113 Thus the prevailing view seems to be 
that a rejection is not final, 114 but there has as yet been no 
test of the finality of a ratification. 
The Civil War created some new problems as to the amend-
ing process. The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by 
Congress at a time when only twenty-five out of thirty-six 
states were represented in: that body. Can Congress coerce the 
states into ratifying an amendment? The action of Congress 
in conditioning the readmission of some of the Southern States 
to representation in Congress on the acceptance of the Civil 
War Amendments was morally, if not legally, in the nature 
of coercion.115 In normal times of peace such a method of 
113 FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT (I 908) c. 4· 
msee discussion in (I940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 395· Professor Noel 
T. Dowling believes that much can be said for making it final. Dowling, "Clar-
ifying the Amending Process," (I 940) I WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2 I 5 at 222. 
=Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas were required to ratify the Fifteenth 
Amendment as a condition precedent to readmission .. Mathews says: "Since they 
ratified under duress, some question might be raised as to the validity of their 
ratifications." MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND }UDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIF-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1909) 75· See also, VON HOLST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Mason translation (I887) 3I, note; 2 CURTIS, 
CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (I896) I6I; I WILL-
OUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2d ed. (I929) 594· 
"For some strange reason no one raised the contention that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was itself unconstitutional. Legislatures of Southern states under 
military government were chosen under regulations not of the state's own 
choosing, and their coerced ratification of the Amendment was deemed suffi-
cient, although the states were not sufficiently restored to the Union to have 
representation in Congress." Powell, "Changing Constitutional Phases," (I939) 
I9 BosT U. L. REv. 509 at 5u. 
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amendment would doubtless be discredited. The Supreme 
Court has intimated in a dictum that the validity of the Civil 
War Amendments is a political question which may not be 
inquired into.116 In case of a rebellion the question may also 
arise as to what is meant by three-fourths of the state legisla-
tures. Does it mean simply three-fourths of the loyal states, or 
does it mean three-fourths of the whole number? 117 Since the 
Supreme Court has held that a state cannot take itself out of 
the Union, it would seem to mean three-fourths of the whole 
number.118 This question might also arise when a new state 
has been admitted after the date of proposal. Logically it 
would seem that three-fourths of the number, including the 
new state, would be necessary. In the case of the Eleventh 
Amendment Secretary of State Pickering was doubtful, on 
account of the admission of Tennessee, whether three-fourths 
had ratified, but discovered that the required majority had 
done so before Tennessee was admitted. 
The most recent of the Supreme Court decisions concern 
themselves with the question of the time limits for the ratifica-
110White v. Hart, (I87I) 13 Wall. (8o U.S.) 646. But in Feigenspan v. 
Bodine, (D. C. N. J. I92o) 264 F. I86, it is asserted that the Thirteenth 
Amendment was not the "decision of war." In Leser v. Garnett, (I922) 258 
U. S. IJO, 42 S. Ct. 2I7, it is denied that the Fifteenth Amendment was illegally 
adopted. 
111 von Holst believes that "it must be recognized as an anomaly that sta;es 
which were actually at the time neither full members of the Union, nor en-
titled to equal rights under it, voted upon an amendment to the constitution." 
VON HoLsT, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Mason transla-
tion ( I8 8 7) 3 I, note. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by six de facto 
legislatures. Seward in his first proclamation of ratification, July 20, I868, 
referred to these legislatures as "newly constituted and newly established bodies 
avowing themselves to be and acting as the legislatures, respectively" of the 
states. I5 Stat. L. 706 at 707; I WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d ed. 
( I929) 594· 
118 This is the view in Calhoun v. Calhoun, (I87o) z S.C. 283. The view 
of Burgess that the three-fourths majority should have been computed on the 
basis of the loyal states, and the Southern states then readmitted as "states" 
under the Constitution with the Fourteenth Amendment already a part of it, 
seems out of harmony with the theory of the Supreme Court. BuRGESS, RECON-
STRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, I866-I876 ( I902) 202-206. 
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tion of amendments. Five amendments proposed by Congress 
never have been ratified by the states. Article Five makes no 
provision as to time. In 1789 with the first ten amendments, 
today known as the Bill of Rights, there was submitted one 
dealing with the compensation of members of Congress. In 
I 8 7 3 after Congress had passed the "salary grab act," the 
Ohio Senate passed a resolution purporting to ratify this 
amendment.119 But as no other states ratified, the validity of 
this belated attempt was not litigated. The question was first 
litigated as to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. 
In Dillon v. Gloss 120 the court held that Congress could pre-
scribe a reasonable period and that a seven-year maximum 
period was not unreasonable. The argument of the court was 
that proposal and ratification are steps in a single process; 
that since amendments may be proposed only when deemed 
necessary, they must be presently disposed of; and that since 
ratification is but the expression of the people's assent, it must 
be sufficiently contemporaneous in all states to reflect the will 
of the people in. all sections at relatively the same time. The 
limited character of the holding should be noted. There were 
four very old unratified amendments. The court did not as-
sume to define a reasonable period. It held that Congress 
could fix a definite period for ratification under its power to 
designate the mode of ratification; but it could fix only a 
reasonable period. Seven years was a reasonable period. The 
court did not say that a period somewhat longer than seven 
years fixed by Congress would be unreasonable; nor did it 
lay down ~ny rule as to the situation where Congress had fixed 
no period. Thus even though the child labor amendment 
remained unratified after fifteen years it was not clear before 
the recent decisions whether too long a period had expired. 
119 Ohio Laws ( 1 8 73) 409. 
,.. (t9ZI) zs6 u.s. 368, 41 s. Ct. 510. 
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The dictum in Dillon v. Gloss that the states should ratify 
during an interval when sentiment for the amendment really 
existed was not conclusive, since on one side there was the 
recent revival of interest while on the other side there was no 
interest during the years from 1927 to 1933.121 
The child labor amendment was thought by the Ken-
tucky Court,122 and by a number of commentators,123 to have 
been extinct because of the long period of failure to ratify by 
three-fourths of the states. The Supreme Court concluded, 
however, that a political question was involved, hence the 
matter was left in the hands of Congress.124 Under the earlier 
rule Congress could prescribe a reasonable period when the 
amendment was proposed. Under the new rule Congress 
could prescribe such period at any later time. 
Finally it remains to be inquired what it is that marks the 
conclusive adoption of an amendment. The secretary of state 
by statute is required to issue a proclamation of the ratifica-
tion.125 It might therefore be supposed that it is his act that 
completes the adoption. It has been held, however, that his 
action is unnecessary in this respect, and that it is the approval 
121 (193 7) 47 YALE L. J. 148. ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 
393, note 17, puts this question: "Quere as to the effect upon this issue of the 
fact that there was an intervening period during which the proposal had no 
relation to the then prevailing sentiments and felt needs, where the total period 
between the submission and purported ratification would be unreasonably 
long by any ordinary standard?" 
=wise v. Chandler, (1937) 270 Ky. x, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024. Contra: 
Coleman v. Miller, (1937) 146 Kan. 390, 71 P. (2d) 518. 
123 Mitchell, "Methods of Amending the Constitution," (1932) 25 LAWY. 
& BANKER 265 at 267; (1938) 18 BosT. U. L. REv. 169 at 185. 
1"'Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; (1940) 13 
So. CAL. L. REv. 12.2 at 124; (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 393· 
""Rev. Stat.§ 205; 8 U.S. C (1934) § x6o: "Amendments to Constitution. 
Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State that any amend-
ment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, ac-
cording to the provisions of the Constitution, the Secretary of State shall forth-
with cause the amendment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the 
States by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become 
valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United 
States." 
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by the last state to make up the three-fourths majority that 
makes the amendment law.126 Article Five makes no mention 
of the secretary of state, and his proclamation is based purely 
on an act of Congress. When the state legislatures have com-
pleted their ratification, a certificate thereof is transmitted 
to the secretary of state. Suppose it be alleged that a state 
legislature has not actually ratified. Could the courts go back 
of the certificate of ratification and inquire into the legislative 
proceedings? Or would they be bound by the certificate? It 
appears that the certificate would be regarded as conclusive.127 
The same question might arise as to whether Congress had in 
fact proposed an amendment. The Supreme Court has held 
on at least two occasions that it will accept the enrolled bill as 
128 Fairchild v. Hughes, (r9:u) 258 U.S. 126, 42 S. Ct. 274; Dillon v. 
Gloss, (1921) 256 U.S. 368,41 S. Ct. 510, aff'g Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal. 
I 920) 262 F. 563; United States ex rel. Widenman v. Colby, (App. D. C. 
1920) 265 F. 998, aff'd (1921) 257 U.S. 619, 42 S. Ct. 169. In Ex parte 
Dillon the court said (p. 565): "Congress might perhaps provide that the 
Department of State should ascertain and determine the fact of ratification, 
and that an amendment should not take effect until due promulgation of that 
determination by proclamation or otherwise; but Congress has not so provided." 
The constitutional rule laid down in the amendment may become operative at 
a later date specified in the amendment. This was the case as to the Eighteenth 
Amendment. 
The dictum in Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433 at 451, 454,456, 
59 S. Ct. 972, that Congress can implement its decision on political phases of 
the amending power through its control of the action of the Secretary of State 
when, in the presence of certified ratifications by three-fourths of the states, the 
time arrives for promulgation of the adoption of an amendment, appear in-
consistent with the earlier view that the date of consummation rather than of 
promulgation is determinative. (1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 401. Pro-
fessor Noel T. Dowling also suggests that the earlier cases have been overruled. 
Dowling, "Clarifying the Amending Process," (1940) I WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2I5 at 220. 
127 Leser v. Garnett, (I922) 258 U. S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217; Chandler v. 
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992. In Dillon v. Gloss, (I92I) 256 
U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, the court took judicial notice of the fact of ratifica-
tion by three-fourths of the state legislatures. For a good discussion of judicial 
notice with reference to amendments, see Gottstein v. Lister, ( r 9 I 5) 8 8 Wash. 
462, I53 P. 595· RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 399, states: 
"It should be noted that the conclusive effect of the official notice to, and the 
certification thereof by, the Secretary is based on certain assumptions. How 
far a court would reach its own independent conclusions on the matters thus 
assumed cannot be definitely stated." See also Quarles, "Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution," (I940) 26 A. B. A. J. 6I7 at 6I8, 
78 AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
final as to the passage of a statute, and will not examine the 
legislative j ournals.128 The state courts are divided, but the 
recent tendency has been to adopt the enrolled bill rule.120 
D. VALIDATION OF AMENDMENTS THROUGH 
ACQUIESCENCE 
The discussion up to this point has described the procedural 
requirements for the validity of an amendment. Suppose, 
however, that a federal amendment has been proclaimed as a 
part of the Constitution after the apparent ratification by 
three-fourths of the states and that it has been long regarded 
as a part of the Constitution. Would it later be open to attack 
on the ground that there had been some defect in the pro-
cedure, or that the amendment was void in substance? Con-
cretely, would the first fifteen amendments, which date back 
a half a century and more, be subject to being declared null 
and void by the courts? 
In considering the application of the doctrine of acquies-
cence, it is well to bear in mind that the validity of the original 
Constitution itself cannot be assailed. This is a political ques-
tion, so that perhaps the doctrine of acquiescence may be re-
garded as unnecessary, or as only an added proof of its va-
lidity. The validity of an amendment, however is only in 
part a political question, so that the applicability of the doc-
trine of acquiescence is likely to be asserted by those who 
would oppose any attack on amendments long regarded as a 
part of the Constitution.130 It should be noted, however, that 
128 Field v. Clark, (1891) 143 U.S. 649,12 S. Ct. 495; Harwood v. Went-
worth, (1896) 162 U.S. 547, 16 S. Ct. 890. Both are cited as controlling in 
Leser v. Garnett, supra, note 127. 
"'"Boyd v. Olcott, (1921) 102 Ore. 327, 202 P. 431. The Montana court 
took the peculiar view that while< an enrolled statute was conclusive, the legis-
lative journals would be resorted to in the case of an amendment. Tax Com-
mission Case, (1923) 68 Mont. 450, 219 P. 817. 
""'Curtis is of the view that although the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments were adopted through compulsion, they have become valid partly through 
acquiescence. 2 CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ( 1896) 161; see Marbury, 
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whether the doctrine of the political question or that of acqui-
. escence be applied, the result arrived at amounts to much the 
same thing. 
Several factors lead to the conclusion that amendments 
may not become valid through acquiescence. In the first place, 
of the first seventeen amendments only the validity of the 
Eleventh has been adjudicated in the courts. It may be al-
leged that such want of adjudication is an argument to the 
effect that any test of their legality is now impossible. In reply 
it should be pointed out that the courts have simply assumed 
their validity, since the parties have failed to raise the issue. 
The Supreme Court has several times stated that it decides 
only the points before it.131 The fact, therefore, that it had 
held laws passed under various amendments valid would not 
preclude it from inquiring into their validity when the issue 
is squarely raised. If, then, some party should expressly argue 
that an amendment, either old or recent, is invalid, the courts 
would in all probability pass on the matter.132 The federal 
Supreme Court and other courts passing on the validity of 
federal amendments have given but little comfort to the 
protagonists of the doctrine.133 However, the doctrine of the 
"The Limitations upon the Amending Power," (1919) 33 HARV. L. REV. 223 
at 232. See also Platz, "Article Five of the Federal Constitution," ( 1 934) 3 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 17 at 31; (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 1201; Yawitz, "The 
Legal Effect under American Decisions of an Alleged Irregularity in the 
Adoption of a Constitution or Constitutional Amendment," (1925) 10 ST. 
Louis L. REV. 279 at 283; Dodd, "Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of 
Constitutions," (1931) SoU. PA. L. REv. 54 at 73; Willis, "The Doctrine of 
the Amendability of the United States Constitution, (1932) 7 IND. L. J. 457 
at 468; (1929) 23 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 920. 
=Boyd v. Alabama, (1877) 94 U. S. 645 at 648. 
182 Knight v. Shelton, (C. C. Ark. 1905) 134 F. 423 at 433-437; Machen, 
"Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) 23 HARV. L. REv. 169 at 187-
190; Morris, "The Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution," ( 1909) 
189 No. AM. REv. 82. But in Leser v. Board of Registry, (1921) 139 Md. 46, 
114 A. 84o, it is asserted that it cannot be assumed that the courts, in passing on 
cases arising under amendments, decided on the basis of amendments adopted 
in violation of the Constitution. 
,.. "The suggestion that the Fifteenth [Amendment] was incorporated in 
the Constitution, not in accordance with law, but practically as a war measure, 
which has been validated by acquiescence, cannot be entertained." Brandeis, J ., 
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1939 cases as to political questions might ultimately be ap-
plied as to acquiescence. 
The strongest support for the doctrine of acquiescence 
comes from the decisions of the state courts concerning the 
validity of amendments to the state constitutions. Most of the 
decisions on the precise point appear to favor the doctrine.134 
The whole number of decisions is so small, however, that their 
weight may be doubted. Moreover, mere unqualified acqui-
escence is not sufficient. Two or three limitations seem to have 
been laid down. The acquiescence must have been for a con-
siderable period. All the branches of the government and the 
people must have acquiesced in the legality of the amend-
ment. Probably the acquiescence of the people would be im-
plied where the government has acquiesced, and perhaps by 
the government is meant the legislative and executive, and 
in Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. qo, 42 S. Ct. 217. See also State of Ohio 
ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334; United States 
ex. rei. Widenman v. Colby, (App. D. C. 1920) 265 F. 998; Leser v. Board 
of Registry, (1921) 139 Md. 46, 114 A. 84o. Contra: Smith v. Good, (C. C. 
R.I. 1888) 34 F. 204; Appellant's Brief in National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 
253 U.S. 35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. 
On the other hand, Professor Thomas Reed Powell, "Changing Constitu-
tional Phases," (1939) 19 BosT. U. L. REv. 509 at 512, states: "There must 
be a doctrine of prescription for the acquisition of impeccable constitutionality 
as there is for the acquisition of title to land." 
,.... Niblack, J., dissenting on another point, State v. Swift, ( 18 So) 69 Ind. 
512; Prohibitory Amendment Cases, (x881) 24 Kan. 7oo; Secombe v. Kit-
telson, (1882) 29 Minn. 555, 12 N. W. 519, Mitchell, J., rendering the opin-
ion; State ex rei. Torreyson v. Grey, (1893) 21 Nev. 378, 32 P. 190; Nesbit v. 
People, (1894) 19 Colo. 411,36 P. 221; Weston V; Ryan, (1903) 70 Neb. 2II, 
97 N. W. 347, but, semble, that could attack if not ratified by the constitu-
tional majority of the popular vote; McCulloch, J., dissenting in Rice v. Palmer, 
(1906) 78 Ark. 432,96 S. W. 396; State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, (1907) 
78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1113; Jones v. McClaughry, (1915) 169 Iowa 281, 
151 N. W. 210; O'Neill, J., dissenting in State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 
(1915) 137 La. 407, 68 So. 742; Armstrong v. King, (1924) 281 Pa. St. 207, 
126 A. 263, when the popular vote has been taken, but could attack for in-
sufficient popular vote. Semble, State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, (1914) 49 Mont. 
387, 142 P. 210; Marshall, J., in State ex rel. Postel v. Marcus, (1915) 160 
Wis. 354 at 376-379, 407; State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, (1918) 44 N.D. 
459, 171 N. W. 213. Contra: semble, People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, (1903) 
31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167, one judge dissenting; McBee v. Brady, (1909) 15 
Idaho, 761, 100 P. 97, disaffirming Holmberg v. Jones, (1910) 7 Idaho 752, 
6s P. s63. 
PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING CONSTITUTION 81 
not necessarily the judiciary. In the third place, the amend-
ment must be fundamental in character, and affect the frame-
work of the government. 
E. DESUETUDE OF AMENDMENTS 
A final question which suggests itself is whether the Con-
stitution may be indirectly altered through the desuetude of 
an amendment. It may perhaps be accurately stated that the 
Fifteenth Amendment has never been enforced according to 
its true spirit.135 The status of the Eighteenth Amendment 
has been asserted to be comparable to it. If an amendment re-
mains a dead letter on the books over a long period of years, 
may it be contended that it is no longer a part of the Constitu-
tion? The idea of enforcement seems to be an essential in-
gredient in the conception of law. In Rome before the Im-
perial Era, in Germany, Scotland, and South Africa custom 
may abrogate statute. In France, Spain, and Italy a contrary 
view prevails.136 Similarly under the Anglo-American com-
mon law a statute remains in force until it is repealed.137 The 
135 "It [the Fifteenth Amendment] has been despised, flouted, nullified, 
evaded. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States, the lawful guardian 
of the Constitution, has in no single instance held any state or federal statute or 
the act of any state or federal officer to be in conflict with the Amendment: and 
no case in that court can be found in which [it] would have decided differently 
if the Amendment had never existed. • . • 
"Confronted by these remarkable circumstances, the student of constitutional 
law not unnaturally asks himself: 'Can it be that an enactment which has thus 
borne the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune for nearly forty years and 
yet during that time has never affected the result in a single case in the court 
of the last resort-can it be that such an enactment is indeed part of the funda-
mental law of the United States?'" This question was raised by Machen, "Is 
the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) 23 HARV. L. REV. 169. Since this 
article the Supreme Court in two cases has held state legislation void as contrary 
to the amendment. Guinn v. UnitedStates, (1915) 238 U.S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 
926; Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U.S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932· 
""PoUND, READINGS IN RoMAN LAW, 2d ed. (1915), Part I,§ 2, "Forms," 
pp. 5-14. 
""GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) § 419 and Ap-
pendixes VII and IX. 
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Constitution of the United States is of course superior to the 
common law and to statutes. Since statutes do not lose their 
validity through nonenforcement, it would seem a fortiori 
that an amendment of the Constitution would not. When an 
amendment has once become a part of the Constitution, it re-
mains a part until repealed by a later amendment. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Scope of the Federal Amending Power 
0 NE of the most recent problems which has arisen with respect to the process of amending the federal Constitution and, next to justiciability, the most im-
portant, is the scope of the power to amend.1 The early case 
of Hollingsworth v. Virginia 2 simply went to the question 
of procedure. The Supreme Court never considered the matter 
in its opinions until the validity of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment was assailed, among other grounds, for defects in sub-
stance. 3 The briefs in the cases on the Eighteenth and Nine-
teenth Amendments contained extensive discussions on the 
subject, and the court rendered decisions disposing of the 
question. The contention of the opponents of the amendments 
was that there are certain implied limitations on the power 
to amend. Before analysis of this contention, it seems proper 
first to deal with the express limitations, if any, on the power. 
A. EXPRESS LIMITATIONS 
Article Five contains three express restrictions, two of which 
have now expired by their own terms. One states "that no 
Amendment which may be made prior to the year one thou-
sand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the 
first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article." 
The former clause provides: "The Migration or Importation 
of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
1 In I 899 George T. Curtis wrote: "One of the most important subjects that 
can engage the attention of the statesmen and people of this country is the 
extent and scope of the power to amend the Constitution of the United States." z 
CuRTis, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (I 896) I sz. 
• (I798) 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378. 
8 National Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. 
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proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior 
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax 
or Duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding 
ten dollars for each Person." The latter provides: "No Capi-
tation, or other direct Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion 
to the Census of Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken." After I 8o8 these clauses of course became obsolete 
as limitations on the power to amend.4 During the two decades 
they were in force, however, it seems that there was no con-
stitutional authority reposed in any body whatsoever to change 
the Constitution contrary to the purport of the clauses, since 
they are stated as unconditional prohibitions. Even though 
not only three-fourths of the states, but every one of them, 
and even though Congress and the then people unanimously 
desired such changes, it would seem that under the authority 
and control asserted by the judiciary today over the entire 
amending process, such changes could have been brought 
about only by revolution. However, if these limitations had 
been permanent, perhaps they might have been ignored as 
making the Constitution unworkable. 5 
At present there is only one express limitation, "that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suf-
frage in the Senate." This restriction, it is to be noted, is not 
absolute, however, inasmuch as if a state consents it may 'lose 
its equal suffrage. Thus, this clause is a restriction on the 
method rather than the scope of amendment. The clause itself 
• The Supreme Court seems to have slipped into error in a dictum in Dodge 
v. Woolsey, (1855) 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 at 348, when it refers to the slave 
trade exception as a "temporary disability to amend, and the other two per-
manent and unalterable exceptions to the power of amendment." The explana-
tion of this ambiguity seems to be that the slave trade clause in the first clause 
of section 9 of Article I in itself limits its operation to the year 1 8o8, while 
the direct tax clause does not. Otherwise the Sixteenth Amendment would be 
open to attack as void. Strictly speaking, the court is not correct in calling 
even the equality of the Senate clause unalterable inasmuch as all the states 
might repeal it. See infra, pp. 84 et seq.; 96 et seq. 
• RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 9-1o. 
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could be repealed by an amendment ratified by all the states. 
Or if every state ratified the amendment, any given state or 
any number of states could be deprived of their equality. The 
same result would be reached if the state or states whose repre-
sentation was reduced, together with enough others to make 
the necessary three-fourths, adopted such an amendment. 
On the other hand, if one or more states had their representa-
tion increased, all the others would have to consent since they 
no longer had equ~l suffrage. If the states were divided into 
three groups, the first of which got an increase of two senators, 
the second of one senator, and the third no increase at all, the 
second and third groups would have to consent to the increase 
of the first group. Consent by a state to one reduction in equal-
ity would not be consent to a still further reduction. Theoreti-
cally, states which got greater representation would not have 
to consent. It has been suggested that even this express limita-
tion might be disregarded directly, or if not directly, indi-
rectly by first repealing the clause and then depriving a state 
of its equal representation.6 Professor Rottschaefer states: 
"There has been found no case in which the power to amend 
has been employed to directly or indirectly modify a constitu-
tional provision expressly excepted from that power. The 
issues that such an attempt would raise could not be settled by 
any reasoning derived by logical processes from prevailing 
conceptions of sovereignty, and those based on considerations 
of convenience and expediency point to the solution that such 
attempts to limit the power of amendment should be held 
6 Burgess says that "in dealing with the great questions of public law, we 
must not, as Mirabeau finely expressed it, lose the grande morale, in the petite 
morale." 1 BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1891) 154; VON HoLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1887) 52, note. See also the suggestion of DODD, THE REVISION AND 
AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910) 236; Sandelius, "National 
Sovereignty versus the Rule of Law," (1931) 25 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 1 at 4· 
See contra: Platz, "Article Five of the Federal Constitution," (1934) 3 GEo. 
WASH. L. REV. 17 at 26, 40; STIMSON, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1908) 357; WOODBURN, AMERICAN 
POLITICS: THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1903) 209. 
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futile. The necessities of orderly government do not require 
that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter 
all future generations." 7 
The 1939 decisions of the Supreme Court may ultimately 
have serious effects on the application of the equality of suf-
frage in the Senate proviso. The Supreme Court may con-
clude that this is the type of procedural problem which should 
be treated as a political question. Or it may decide that this is 
an issue of substance and a fortiori involves a political ques-
tion. In either event the proviso would not effectually limit 
the scope of the federal amending power. 
Although there is thus at present only one explicit limita-
tion, attempts have been made at various times to add other 
express limitations. Comprehensive limitations were proposed 
at the Constitutional Convention itself, but failed of adop-
tion. 8 Gerry moved to reconsider a proposed draft permitting 
Congress to call a convention to amend the Constitution on 
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. 
The effect of this provision, he asserted, would make the 
Constitution paramount to the state constitutions, since a ma-
jority of the convention could "bind the Union to innovations 
that may subvert the state constitutions altogether." 9 Hamil-
ton thought that the latter result was entirely proper. Sherman 
moved that Congress should be authorized to propose amend-
ments to the states, but that the proposed amendment should 
not be valid until consented to by all the states. Mr. Wilson 
favored Sherman's proposal, except that he would allow rati-
fication by two-thirds of the states to be sufficient.· On' the last 
day that Article Five was discussed by the convention, Sher-
man reiterated Gerry's view as to the dangers of an unre-
stricted power to amend. He favored restricting amending 
power so "that no state should be affected in its internal police, 
'CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (1939) 9-1o. 
8 See 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITU-
TION, (1937 reprint of 1836 zd ed.) 530-53z, ssr-ssz. 
0 Ibid. 531. 
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or deprived of its equality in the Senate.'no Thus a clear and 
comprehensive limitation would have been placed on the 
amending process as relating to interference of any kind with 
the powers of the states. He again moved to amend Article 
Five so as to require ratification by all the states. Gerry pro-
posed to limit ratification to the legislature only. Sherman 
put his proposed limitation in the form of a motion, but Madi-
son objected that if such special provisos were appended every 
state would demand them for their boundaries, exports, and 
other matters. After this motion failed, Sherman moved to 
strike out Article Five altogether. On the motion of Gouver-
neur Morris the "equal suffrage of the Senate" clause was 
adopted at the urging of the smaller states. It is significant 
that the restriction against affecting a state in its internal police 
proposed together with it by Sherman was not adopted. Dur-
ing the time just preceding the Civil War the Corwin amend-
ment forbidding any amendment abolishing slavery was pro-
posed by Congress, but failed of ratification.11 While there 
has since that time been an increasing number of proposals 
to change the amending process, these have related to the pro-
cedure rather than to the nature and substance of amend-
ments. 
B. ALLEGED IMPLIED LIMITATIONS 
The major controversy as to the scope of the amending 
power has not been concerned with the meaning of the express 
limitations, but as to the existence and nature of so-called 
implied limitations on the power to amend. All sorts of sur-
mises have been offered as to specific things which may not be 
done.12 Many of the discussions in legal periodicals have 
lJ) Ibid. ssr. 
11 AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1897) z86. 
12 Dissolving the federal Union, abolishing the state governments, or lodg-
ing all power in Congress, so that it would resemble the British Parliament-
Machen, "Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) z3 HARV. L. REV. 169 
at 171; repealing the Bill of Rights--JESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS 
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taken the view that there are certain implied limitations, 
though there has been considerable disagreement as to their 
underlying bases. The remainder of this chapter will be de-
voted to an analysis of the rationale of these views and a 
statement and exposition of the arguments in favor of the 
contrary view that there are no such restrictions whatever on 
the amending power. 
Is there an implied guarantee of continued existence of the 
states? Perhaps the basic argument advanced in favor of im-
DEsTRucTroN BY ALLEGED DuE PRocEss OF LAW (I 9 z 7) ; repealing the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments-z CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (I 8g6) 
I 6o; destroying alleged inalienable rights of personal liberty, or nationaliz-
ing women-Abbott, "Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment," 
(Igzo) zo CoL. L. REV. I83 at I86; departing from the scheme and purpose 
of the original Constitution-Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of 
Constitutional Amendment," (I9I9) I8 MICH. L. REV. ZIJ at zz3; abolition 
of republican form of government, office of President, the Supreme Court, pro-
hibition of intoxicating liquors, forming several new states within· other states, 
or uniting two existing states, changing Article Five so as to allow ratification 
by a majority of the state legislatures, or a minority, or none at all-Appel-
lant's Brief in National Prohibition Cases, (Igzo) Z53 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 
588; abolition of the Senate or House of Representatives, setting up a hereditary 
monarchy, abolition of slavery-Representative Pendleton of Ohio, CoNG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist sess., pp. zg9z-z993; negro suffrage in the states, 
allowing the Northern states to determine the question of suffrage and not 
allowing the Southern states to do so-Senator Dixon of Connecticut, CONG. 
GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess., p. 707; woman suffrage in the states-
Appellant's Brief in Leser v. Garnett, (Igzz) Z58 u.s. IJO, 4Z s. Ct. ZI7; 
national income tax-Brown, "The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution," (Igzo) 54 AM. L. REv. 843; deprivation of the power of the 
states to tax-Marbury, "The Limitations upon the Amending Power," (I 9 I 9) 
33 HARV. L. REv. ZZ3 at zz6; election of President and the Supreme Court 
by the people, reenactment· of laws by Congress after Supreme Court decision 
holding them void-Child, "Revolutionary Amendments to the Constitution," 
(I9z6) IO CoNST. REV. z7 at 34; national referendum on acts of Congress or 
on treaties, destruction of Senate's equal legislative power, transfer from the 
Senate to the House of the power to confirm appointments, make treaties, and 
try impeachments-Brown, "The Perpetual Covenant in the Constitution," 
(I9Z4) ZI9 No. AM. REV. 30 at 33; encroachment on states' police power, 
prescribing what people wear, eat, or drink-Holding, "Perils to be Appre-
hended from Amending the Constitution," (I9z3) 57 AM. L. REv. 481 at 
48 6; the Twelfth Amendment-Senator Tracy of Connecticut, ANNALS OF 
CoNGREss, 8th Cong., Ist sess. (I8o3) 163; hereditary monarch, Radin-
"The Intermittent Sovereign," (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 5I4 at sz5. For a rather 
full list, see Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of 
the Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771. 
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plied limitations is the contention that the Constitution guar-
antees the existence of the states, or, stated less emphatically, 
that under its aegis the states can not be destroyed, or even de-
prived of important powers.13 The inherent sovereignty of 
the states has been asserted with varying stress ever since the 
Constitution was adopted. It was the essential doctrine of the 
Secessionists.14 Even today it survives in a much mutilated 
form in the views of those who assert "states' rights." The 
Civil War seems to have settled by force of arms that secession 
is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court from earliest times 
has repeatedly said that the people of the United States are 
sovereign and that they adopted the Constitution. However 
much historical strength the view of state sovereignty may 
have had, the court decisions seem to have been in the opposite 
direction. It is true that the Court has spoken of an "inde-
structible Union, composed of indestructible States." 15 But 
18 Marbury's Brief in Myers v. Anderson, (I9I5) 238 U. S. 368, 35 S. 
Ct. 9 3 2 ; Brief of Elihu Root, Amicus Curiae, p. 53 :ff ., N a tiona! Prohibition 
Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588; Appellant's Brief in Leser v. 
Garnett, (I922) 258 U.S. I3o, 42 S. Ct. 2I7; Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations 
on the Power of Constitutional Amendment," (I92o) I8 MICH. L. REv. 2I3 at 
220; Marbury, "The Limitations upon the Amending Power," (I9i9) 33 
HARV. L. REv. 223 at 225; White, "Is there an Eighteenth Amendment?" 
(I92o) 5 CoRN. L. Q. II3 at II4. The objection was raised in the Senate and 
in several of the state legislatures when the Fifteenth Amendment was pro-
posed. CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess., p. 988 (Hendricks), 995 (Davis), 
I639 · (Buckalew), Appendix 15I (Doolittle), I58-I65 (Saulsbury); 
MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (I909) 57-75. 
"" • • • if it [an amendment] come fairly within the scope of the 
amending power, the State is bound to acquiesce, by the solemn obligation which 
it contracted, in ratifying the constitution. But if it transcends the limits of the 
amending power,-be inconsistent with the character of the constitution, and 
the ends for which it was established,-or with the nature of the system,.....:. 
the result is different. In such case, the State is not bound to acquiesce. It may 
choose whether it will, or whether it will not secede from the Union." Calhoun, 
"A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," WoRKS, 
Cralle ed. (I 8 54) 3 oo. Hayne seems to have taken the same view. 9 DANE, A 
GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (I829), Ap-
pendix I7. See also the arguments in State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt, (I834) 
2 Hill L. (S. C.) I. But see I WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d ed. 
(I929) 6oo. 
10 Texas v. White, (I868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 700 at 725; Lane County v. 
Oregon, (I868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 7I. 
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by this would seem to be meant that such destruction may 
not be brought about by the simple statutory action of either 
government, for the court did not mention the amending 
process. 
It may be conceded that perhaps the most fundamental 
parts of the Constitution are those dividing the powers of 
sovereignty between the states and the nation. It is undoubt-
edly true that a substantial redistribution of powers is the 
most significant change which could be made in our constitu-
tional organization. The Preamble speaks of the Constitution 
as being ordained and established, among other reasons, "in 
order to form a more perfect Union." Yet it is remarkable 
that there is no exception set out in Article Five against 
amendments which would abolish or greatly diminish the 
powers of the states. The sole exception is "that no State, 
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage 
in the Senate." This clause merely preserves equality of the 
states in the Senate, and not the existence of the states them-
selves. If the preservation of the states were so tremendous 
a desideratum, it would seem from a logical, if not historical, 
point of view, that a proviso would have been inserted ex-
pressly guaranteeing their continued existence. As a matter 
of fact, an exception intended effectually to preserve the ex-
istence of the states was offered and rejected at the Constitu-
tional Convention. Sherman proposed that "no state shall 
without its consent, be affected in its internal police." This 
does not say in so many words that the states may not be 
abolished, but since the existence of a state is virtually identi-
cal with the existence of its police power, the effect was to pre-
serve the states. In fact, Mr. Sherman in making his proposal 
expressed his fear "that three-fourths of the States might be 
brought to do things fatal to particular states, as abolishing 
them altogether .... " 16 Since the amending power is placed 
18 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 
(1937 reprint of 1836 zd ed.) 551. See also supra, p. 4 et seq. 
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in the hands of three-fourths of the states and since they can 
bind the other one-fourth, it is difficult to see why, if they 
so choose, they cannot abolish a single state, or a minority of. 
states, or the entire number of states.17 
To assert that the amending power extends to the destruc-
tion of the states is scarcely necessary, however, to meet the 
arguments generally set forth in favor of implied limitations. 
Few serious persons propose to abolish the states at present, 
and there is no popular sentiment desiring such a change. 
The question is thus largely academic. The proponents of limi-
tations have been prone to assert that every amendment which 
diminishes the power of the state constitutes an annihilation 
of the states. In the case of the Nineteenth Amendment, it 
was argued, for instance, that allowing women to vote in state 
elections so completely changed the composition of the state 
as virtually to result in the abolition of the old states and the 
setting up of new ones. The same criticism has been made of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. The courts have held, however, 
that a mere change in the composition of the electorate of the 
state is not a destruction of the state.18 A state is not composed 
'simply of the existing electorate, but of the people, territory, 
and government. 19 A real destruction of a state would seem 
to consist in abolishing its constitution and the branches of its 
17 "There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United 
States. By their authority, the state constitutions were made, and by their au-
thority the Constitution of the United States was established; and they had the 
power to change or abolish the state constitutions, or to make them yield to 
the general government, and to treaties made by their authority." Ware v. 
Hylton, (1796) 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 198 at 236. 
"The people of all the States, or the constitutional majorities can transfer 
power from one or more states to the General Government, even against the 
consent of a constitutional minority-as where a state opposes, or even six 
states oppose eighteen states, and constitutional majorities in Congress, and 
states can, on the sth Article, transfer power from the one or six states to 
the Union, or take back power." 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND 
DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (1829), Appendix n-zz. 
18 "States, like individuals, retain their identity, though changed to some 
extent in their constituent elements." Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. (74 
U. S.) 700 at 728-729. See also Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U. S. qo, 42 
S. Ct. 217. 
'"Texas v. White, (x868) 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 700 at 721. 
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government, seriously altering its boundaries, or adding it 
to another state. Not until these facts existed could the court 
properly be said to be in position to pass on the question 
whether a state may be destroyed by constitutional amend-
ment. 
The view that the states may be destroyed is not a mere 
corollary of the proposition that the nation is sovereign and 
indestructible. It would seem that the same three-fourths of 
the states which could destroy the states could also dissolve 
the Union.20 Should the time ever come when the existence 
of a united nation was thought undesirable, there seems to 
be no legal objection to the states proceeding by amendment 
to destroy the nation. It has sometimes been claimed that a 
nation may not destroy itself. Yet such things have occurred 
too often in the past to support such a belief. In contempla-
tion of law almost anything is possible. Confederations and 
federations have existed in the past, and have dissolved. 
That they could not do so legally would seem to involve an 
unworkable conception of the law. It is submitted that if an 
amendment were adopted providing for the annexation of 
the United States to Great Britain or some other country, 
such amendment would be constitutional, though the effect 
""Attorney General Lee said in his argument in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 
(1798) 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 378 at 38o: "The people limit and restrain the 
power of the legislature, acting under a delegated authority; but they impose 
no restraint on themselves. They could have said, by an amendment to the 
Constitution, that no judicial authority should be exercised, in any case, under 
the United States; and if they had said so, could a court be held, or a judge 
proceed on any judicial business, past or future, from the moment of adopting 
the amendment? On general grounds, then, it was in the power of the people, 
to annihilate the whole, and the question is, whether they have annihilated a 
part of the judicial authority of the United States?" 
"The people made the Constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the 
creature of their will, and lives only by their will." Marshall, C. J., in Cohens 
v. Virginia, (18:u) 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 at 389. 
"He [Senator Rowan in Foote's Debates] says the States have power of 
right, that is constitutional power, to control and limit the General Govern-
ment, in all its branches, by amending the Federal Constitution, as provided for 
in the sth Article in it. To this I entirely assent." 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDG-
MENT OF AMERICAN LAW (1829), Appendix 16. 
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of the amendment would mean the destruction of our national 
existence.21 Thus it seems that the amending power is no more 
favorable to the continued existence of the nation than it is to 
that of the states.22 But perhaps the best answer to those who 
fear the destruction of the states is the fact that the whole 
power of ratification is left to the states as such. The whole 
power vested in Congress is to propose, and if the states are to 
be destroyed, it will be because they acting as states desire 
their own destruction. It would seem that they may be trusted 
to perpetuate their own existence. 
Is there an implied guarantee of police power of the states? 
One of the most frequently voiced arguments for implied 
limitations is the view that the police power and the rights 
of local self government of the states may not be impaired.23 
This contention may be disposed of at the outset by the reply 
that since the states themselves may be destroyed, it logically 
follows that their police power may be taken from them. 
Moreover, since the Constitution itself was a scheme to shift 
21 Bliss attacks the view that sovereignty may not be ceded, pointing out 
that it contradicts the facts of history,-the fact that states have voluntarily 
united with, have become merged or subordinate to other states. BLiss, OF 
SOVEREIGNTY (I88s) IIO, 
22 "The Federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and 
trustees of the people, constituted with different powers and designated for 
different purposes." Madison, in THE FEDERALIST, No. 46. 
Article Five "equally enables the general and the state governments to 
originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience 
on the one side, or the other." Madison in THE FEDERALIST, No. 43· 
""Root's Brief, p. 53 ff., in National Prohibition Cases, (I920) 253 U.S. 
35o, 40 S. Ct. 486, S88; STEVENSON, STATES' RIGHTS AND NATIONAL PRo-
HIBITION (I927) 79-96; Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of 
Constitutional Amendment," (I 920) I 8 MICH. L. REV. 2 I 3 at 220. It is 
sometimes broadly asserted that only the states have police power and that 
such power is unlimited. But the federal government itself exercises a consider-
able degree of it indirectly through the taxing, commerce, and postal powers. 
A list of such powers is set out in Shawnee Milling Company v. Temple, (C. 
C. Iowa, I9Io) I79 F. 5I7 at 524. Even apart from amendments to that end, 
the police power of the states is limited by the Constitution itself in the view 
of Holmes, J ., in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, (I 9 I o) 2 I 9 U. S. I 04, 3 I S. 
Ct. I 86. 
94 AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
some of the powers formerly held by the states to the federal 
government, there seems no convincing reason why subse-
quent transfers of power may not occur.24 An express proviso 
safeguarding the police power of the states was rejected by 
the Constitutional Convention.25 The equal suffrage in the 
Senate proviso indicated that the framers of the Constitution 
contemplated other deprivations of states' powers as valid. 
The police power when broadly defined means all the powers 
of the state.26 To say that this power may not be infringed 
is thus equivalent to asserting that no change affecting the 
powers of a state may be made by amendment. Such a view 
would confine amendments to changes in the federal govern-
ment, changes moreover which would take away powers from 
that government. This is true because all powers not pro-
hibited to the states are reserved to the states and to the peo-
ple. Hence all powers conferred on the federal government 
are conferred at the expense of the states, except in the case 
of those reserved to the people, whose consent is implicit in 
the amending process. 
The critics of the Eighteenth Amendment asserted, rightly 
it appears, that it impaired the police power of the states. 
From this they concluded that it was invalid. They pointed 
24 "The extent of the encroachment upon the police powers of the states is 
a political matter, to be determined by the people. That the exercise of the 
amending power granted by article V may encroach upon some of the state 
rights is true; but that is inevitable, and was necessarily contemplated when 
the power to amend was granted." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920) 
2.64 F. 186 at 192.. 
"Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds, or three 
fourths of the state legislatures, in amendments which may affect local inter-
ests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points 
which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We 
may safely rely on the disposition of the state legislatures to erect barriers against 
the encroachments of the national authority." Hamilton, in THE FEDERALIST, 
No. 85. 
""Supra, p. 4 et seq. That such provision was thought unnecessary, just as was 
the Bill of Rights, see Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth 
Article of the Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771 at 773· 
""In Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 192.0) 2.64 F. 186 at 191, the court 
concedes that "the police power in a very large sense is the state itself." 
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out that the previous amendments had not encroached on 
the police power, or if reminded of the Civil War Amend-
ments, asserted either that they do not affect the police power 
or that the question of their validity is a political question 
on the ground that they were adopted as war measures. The 
first ten amendments, it is true, are limitations on the powers 
of the federal government only.27 The Eleventh Amendment 
protects the states from suit by individuals in the federal 
courts. The Twelfth Amendment merely changed the mode 
of electing the President and Vice-President of the United 
States. Thus until 1865, when the Thirteenth Amendment 
was ratified, no amendment had been adopted interfering 
with the powers of the states. This is perhaps the explanation 
of the belief that the states' police power was exempt from 
constitutional diminution. The three Civil War Amend-
ments, however, clearly infringed upon the powers of the 
states.28 Slavery had formerly been a purely domestic in-
stitution which only the state itself could regulate. The effect 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to bring into the federal 
courts a tremendous number of cases arising out of the due 
process clause, and to vest the Supreme Court with a wide 
27 But it is a significant fact, noted in the early case of Jackson ex dem. 
Wood v. Wood, (1824) 2 Cow. (N.Y.) 819 at 82o, that the House of Repre-
sentatives at the first session of Congress adopted an amendment providing 
"that no state should infringe the right of trial by jury, in criminal cases, nor 
the right of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press." Cf. ANNALS 
OF CoNG., 1st Cong. 1st sess. (1789) 435· 
28 In a dissenting opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. 
(83 U. S.) 125, Swayne, ]., said: "These [reconstruction] amendments are a 
new departure, and mark an important epoch in the constitutional history of 
the country. They trench directly upon the power of the States, and deeply affect 
those bodies. They are, in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first eleven." 
In referring to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Strong,]., said in Ex 
parte Virginia, (188o) 100 U.S. 339 at 345, that "They were intended to be, 
what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements 
of the powers of Congress." The Fifteenth Amendment was held to be such a 
limitation in Guinn v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926. 
See also the Solicitor General's argument in the National Prohibition Cases, 
(1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588; United States v. Sprague, (1931) 
282 U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. uo. 
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supervisory power over state legislation. The Fifteenth 
Amendment forbade the states to deny the right to vote on 
account of race or color. Inasmuch as the power to determine 
their electorate is fundamental, this clearly was a limitation 
on the states. Since these amendments have never been held 
invalid, it would seem to follow that the Eighteenth Amend-
ment is valid though the states' police power is impaired. The 
briefs against the Eighteenth Amendment fully set out the 
argument as to police power, and the Supreme Court, never-
theless, held it valid. 29 In view of the nature of the Civil War 
Amendments, and of the holding of the Supreme Court as to 
the Eighteenth Amendment, it would seem conclusive that 
the amending power may alter the police power of the states 
at will. A final query for the proponents of implied limita-
tion is: if the powers of the nation may be limited as they were 
by the earlier amendments, why cannot the powers of the 
states be similarly cut down? Unless the powers of both 
may be altered, the utility of the amending process is greatly 
weakened. 
Does the proviso for equality of suffrage in the Senate 
imply other restrictions? Resort is sometimes had to the clause 
guaranteeing equality of suffrage in the Senate as an express 
limitation, or as a basis for deducing implied limitations. 30 The 
true character of the clause as simply a limitation on the pro-
cedure of amendment has already been pointed out. 31 This 
.. Natiooal Prohibition Cases, (192o) 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. 
80 Machen, "Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (1910) 23 HARV. L. REv. 
169 at 172-176, contends that the Senate cannot be abolished, or made an 
advisory body; nor may the states be abolished, nor altered in their composition 
as by adding negroes to the electorate, or by changing their boundaries. He also 
asserts that by "state" is meant the people of the state, not the physical territory 
thereof. See also Appellant's Brief in Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U.S. 1301 
42 S. Ct. 217; Appellant's Brief in Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U. S. 
368, 35 S. Ct. 932; Marbury, "The Limitations Upon the Amending Power," 
(1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 223 at 228; White, "Is There an Eighteenth Amend-
merttl" (1920) 5 CoRN. L. Q. 113 at II6. 
11 See supra, p. 84 et seq. 
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clause provides simply for the equal representation of each 
state in the Senate. It should be limited to its proper scope. 
It says nothing about the continued existence of the state 
itself, nor of the freedom of the state from a whole or partial 
loss of its powers through amendment. That it was not in-
tended to cover more than the single matter of equality in 
the Senate is evident from the history of its adoption by the 
Constitutional Convention. Sherman there expressed his fear 
that the amending power might do two things: destroy the 
states and deprive them of their equality in the Senate. He 
therefore moved the adoption of a proviso that no state 
without its consent should "be affected in its internal police, 
or deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." 32 Thus the 
first part of the proviso would protect the existence of the 
states, and the latter their equality in the Senate. His motion 
failed, but immediately thereafter Gouverneur Morris' pro-
posal of the present equality clause was adopted. It would 
therefore seem reasonable that historically at least the clause 
is confined to protecting the equality of the states in the Sen-
ate.33 
Historical considerations aside, it seems that a logical 
analysis of the words of the clause leads to a similar result. 34 
The clause purports to deal with the equal suffrage of a state. 
It makes no provision for the perpetual existence of the states, 
or of the police power of the states, or of the Senate. Seem-
ingly all three of these could be abolished. Theoretically, 
32 Supra, pp. 4 et seq.; 86 et seq. 
"'"The exception in favour of the equality of suffrage in the senate, was 
probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the states, im-
plied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the 
legislature; and was probably insisted upon by the states particular! y attached 
to that equality." Madison, in THE FEDERALIST, No. 43· Iredell, however, 
asserts that it was adopted "in order that no consolidation should take place." 
4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
(1937 reprint of 1836 2d ed.) 177 • 
.. Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," ( 1921) 30 YALE L. J. 321 
at 330. 
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even though the states or the Senate or both were abolished, 
a state would not be deprived of its equality as to suffrage in 
the Senate. If all the states were abolished, the relation of 
equality would be undisturbed, although the states them-
selves no longer existed. If simply a part of the states were 
abolished, it would scarcely be appropriate to speak of them 
as losing their equality in the Senate for they would lose their 
very existence. The possibility of equality of a state would 
seem to flow from the existence of the state, and not the ex-
istence of the state from the characteristic of equality in the 
Senate. In other words, the existence of the state seems to be 
the primary matter, and equality only a secondary possibility. 
Similarly, if the Senate were abolished, the equality of 
suffrage would not be disturbed, as each state would have no 
senators at all. 35 If the next step were to abolish the states 
themselves, it would seem absurd that reliance could be placed 
on the equality clause to prevent their abolition. Inasmuch 
as the equality clause had lost any subject-matter on which 
to operate with respect to its chief purpose, namely, the pres-
ervation of equality in the Senate, it would appear far-fetched 
to maintain that it continued to operate in such a way as to 
preserve the states themselves. 
The chief objection to a broad interpretation of the clause 
is that so much is made to hinge on so little. Not only are the 
states to continue to be equally represented in the Senate, 
but they themselves are to continue in perpetuity, and, on 
the same logic, the Senate is also to go on forever. It seems 
only reasonable that had the framers intended to guarantee 
the existence of the states and to impose similar implied limi-
tations deduced from the clause, they would not have left 
such weighty matters to implication. The conclusion seems 
inevitable that the implied limits deduced from the equality 
15 Lee, "Abolishing the Senate by Amendment," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 
364. 
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clause are hung on too small a peg. The stretching of this 
seemingly innocent and insignificant exception offends the 
intuitive sense of the limits of legal casuistry. 
Do the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
limit other amendments? To the layman, the Bill of Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment may be thought so funda-
mental in their nature as to be limitations on the amending 
power.36 But however significant they may be, they were not 
parts of the original Constitution. They may be repealed just 
as any other amendment and are no more sacred from a legal 
standpoint than any other part of the Constitution. As one 
authority has said: 
"Even these constitutional limitations, however, do not deny 
the group's right to revise the scale of values handed down 
to it from the past; they merely restrict the legal methods 
of their revision. The argument sometimes advanced that 
there are implied limits on the power to amend the federal 
Constitution is clearly untenable. There is, perhaps, no polit-
ically organized society whose legal system does not assume a 
right of such revision vested in some one or more of its organs. 
The only method which it would be at all logical for the law 
to deny is that by revolution." 37 
It is sometimes argued that the Bill of Rights was in reality 
a part of the original Constitution and was intended to con-
stitute a limitation on Article Five. 38 But the states adopted 
the Constitution unconditionally, and the obligation to in-
corporate the Bill of Rights was entirely moral, not legal. 
Even if it had been a part of the original Constituti'on, it 
would not necessarily limit the amending power. It contains 
86 }ESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS DESTRUCTION BY ALLEGED DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW (1927). 
""Rottschaefer, "Legal Theory and the Practice of Law," (1926) 10 MINN. 
L. REv. 382 at 393· 
38 Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amend-
ment," (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 213 at 22.1; JESSUP, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
AND ITS DESTRUCTION BY ALLEGED DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1927). 
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no express, nor even any reasonably implied, reference to 
Article Five. No other clauses of the original Constitution 
have ever been construed to limit the power. In the state de-
cisions no attempts have been made to construe a state bill 
of rights as a limit on the state's power to amend its consti-
tution, except in a single Arkansas case, and this case simply 
holds that the legislature, which was vested with the amend-
ing power, could not so amend. 39 In dictum it declared that 
the people in Convention might do so. An Oregon decision 
expressly held that the bill of rights might be altered.40 In a 
recent decision of a federal circuit court it was argued that the 
effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was to require the sub-
mission of all future amendments to the people, but the court 
rejected the contention.41 
Does the Tenth Amendment limit other amendments? 
In the opinion of many,42 a conclusive argument in favor of im-
plied limitations is the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not 
30 Eason v. State, ( I85 I) II Ark. 48I, overruling State v. Cox, ( I848) 8 
Ark. 436, which had held the bill of rights subject to the ordinary amending 
process. The case is explicable by the peculiar wording of the Arkansas Consti-
tution and the nature of the amending process. 
"'Ex parte Kerby, (I92.2.) I03 Ore. 612., zos P. 2.79. See also Woods' Ap-
peal, ( I8 74) 7 5 Pa. 59> holding that a constitutional convention could pro-
pose a constitution repealing the state bill of rights. Jameson sees no reason 
"why, in the absence of constitutional restriction, the legislature should not be 
at liberty to propose amendments to either part of the Constitution, the frame 
of government, or the Bill of Rights." JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVEN-
TIONS, 4th ed. (I887) 580. 
"'Peter Hand Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, I92.4) 2. F. (zd) 449· 
In Root's argument in the National Prohibition Cases, (I92.o) 2.53 U.S. 350, 40 
S. Ct. 486, 588, it is suggested that the due process clause is unalterable. 
'"z CURTIS, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (I896) I 54, I6o-I6z; STEVENSON, 
STATES' RIGHTS AND NATIONAL PROHIBITION (I92.7) 37-57; Skinner, "In-
trinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment," (I9I9) I8 
MICH. L. REV. 2.I3 at 2.I9; Appellant's Brief in National Prohibition Cases, 
(I92.o) 253 U.S. 350,40 S. Ct. 486, 588; Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment 
Affected the Fifth Article of the Constitution," (I930) I6 VA. L. REV. 77I. 
Contra: Taft, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution," ( I930) I6 VA. L. REV. 
647. Governor Haight of California recommended rejection of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, asserting that "It was clearly understood that a 'reserved power' 
was one withdrawn and excluded entirely from the operation of any and every 
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delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." 
First of all, it should be noted that the provision is not a 
part of the original Constitution. It is one out of several 
amendments and is itself subject to repeal. It is not a part of 
Article Five and makes no reference to that article. It did 
not reserve the amending power; it reserved only the non-
delegated powers, whereas the amending power had been 
previously delegated.43 The first ten amendments have invari-
ably been interpreted as limitations on the federal govern-
ment. The federal government is to be distinguished from 
the amending body, which is made up not only of Congress 
but of the state legislatures or state conventions. The distinc-
clause of the Federal Constitution, including the clause in reference to amend-
ments." CALIFORNIA SENATE JoURNAL, 1869-70, p. 144 at 149, cited in 
MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1909) 73· But see Feller, "The Tenth Amendment Retires," (1941) 
27 A. B. A. J. 223. 
"'The Tenth Amendment "disclosed the widespread fear that the National 
Government might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to 
exercise powers which had not been granted. With equal determination the 
framers intended that no such assumption should ever find justification in the 
organic act, and that if in the future further powers seemed necessary they 
should be granted by the people in the manner they had provided for amending 
that act." Brewer, J., in Kansas v. Colorado, (1907) 206 U.S. 46 at 90, 27 
S. Ct. 655. 
"Reserved powers are so called because they have never been surrendered. 
When the requisite number of states concur, the people surrender to the United 
States additional power." State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. 
Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334 at 342. 
"The tenth article of amendment, if not merely declaratory of what was 
necessarily implied in the Constitution as originally adopted, established that 
the undelegated powers were reserved to the several states or to the people. 
However, this residuum was not a fixed quantity, but would change, becoming 
less or greater, as an amendment increased or diminished the powers of the 
United States government." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. 
186 at 192. 
"It is evident that among the rights which are neither given to the federal 
government nor reserved to the separate states is the weightiest of all, yes, the 
one which embraces all the others, i. e., the right to change the Constitution 
and to partition power in whatever way is desired, between the federal govern-
ment and the states." VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, Masoned., (1887) 51. 
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tion is fundamental. The federal government is limited, 
while the amending body, which is the highest agent of the 
people and exercises sovereignty/4 is unlimited/5 except by 
the equality in the Senate clause. If the Tenth Amendment 
were to be construed as affecting the amending body, it would 
be a limitation on the states, which perform the most import-
ant part of the amending process, namely, ratification. 
A very practical argument against construing the amend-
ment as a limitation on the amending body is the fact that 
such a construction would operate to nullify the grant of the 
amending capacity or to seriously impair its usefulness. No 
change could be made in the national government except such 
as left it with its previous powers, or with less powers than it 
had before. That is, no new powers could ever be conferred 
on the national government, since any such powers would 
have to come from the residuum reserved to the states. New 
powers could be conferred on the states alone, and no powers 
could be taken from them. In view of the apparently natural 
growth of the activities of the national government not only 
in recent years but from the very beginning, a serious crisis 
might be developed if no new powers could be given it. The 
fact that since the Civil War the amendments have limited 
the states and given new powers to the national government 
clearly indicates the trend of the growth of the living Con-
stitution. Even if the Tenth Amendment were interpreted 
as an "invisible radiation" limiting the amending power, it 
should be noted that the powers not delegated or prohibited 
by the Constitution are reserved to the states, "or to the peo-
" See infra, chap. VI. 
'" "A fundamental error running through all these provoking essays is the 
confounding of government with sovereignty, a failure to distinguish between 
a political society or state and the active agencies or governmental organs which 
that society creates and endows with power." McGovney, "Is the Eighteenth 
Amendment Void Because of its Contents?" (1920) 20 CoL. L. REV. 499 at 
soo. 
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pie." By the people is meant the people of the United States. 46 
Since the people when acting in their highest capacity do so 
through the amending process, it would seem that their agent, 
the amending body, can redistribute the powers of the states 
and the nation at will. 
Is there a restriction that an amendment may not be legis-
lative in character? The amending process is not the regular 
legislative process of the federal government. Ordinarily it is 
the business of Congress to legislate for the nation, and of the 
state legislatures for the respective states. The Constitution 
confers all legislative powers on Congress. From this it has 
sometimes been deduced that an amendment may not be legis-
lative in character.47 In political science a distinction is made 
between constitutional content of an organic character and 
that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one 
of policy, not of law. 48 It would indeed be peculiar if the 
"'"The preamble of the Constitution declares who framed it, 'We the people 
of the United States,' not the people of one State, but the people of all the 
States; and Article X reserves to the people of all the States the powers not 
delegated to the United States. The powers affecting the internal affairs of the 
States not granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, and all powers of a national 
character which are not delegated to the National Government by the Constitu-
tion are reserved to the people of the United States." Brewer, J., in Kansas v. 
Colorado, ( 1907) 206 U. S. 46 at 90, 2 7 S. Ct. 6 55. 
von Holst says that if the phrase were intended to mean the people of the 
individual states the word "thereof" would have to be added. VON HoLsT, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Masoned. (1887) 51, 
note; see also }AMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887) 87, 
note I. Contra: CoOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
3d ed., (1898) 29; and 2 CuRTIS, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1896) 16o, 
note. The latter two say the phrase means the people of the individual states. 
"State ex rei. Halliburton v. Roach, (1910) 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. W. 689; 
Root's Brief, p. 3 ff., in the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 
40 S. Ct. 486, 588; Marbury, "The Limitations upon the Amending Power," 
(1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 223 at 230; Holding, "Perils to be Apprehended 
from Amending the Constitution," (1923) 57 AM. L. REV. 481 at 488; State 
ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, (1919) 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920. 
48 As between the three departments of government "the power to legislate 
is exclusive in the Congress; but there is no warrant here for the assumption 
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authority which can delegate to Congress the authority to 
legislate, could not itself legislate. The framers of the Con-
stitution seem to have contemplated amendments of a legis-
lative nature when they wrote in the twenty-year limitations 
as to the slave trade and the imposition of direct taxes without 
apportionment. It may be impolitic to write clauses which are 
legislative in their nature into the Constitution, but the legal-
ity of so doing apparently is not open to question. The wisdom 
of the Fifteenth and the Eighteenth Amendments may well 
be open to serious criticism, but their legality seems unassail-
able. 
Moreover, if the Eighteenth Amendment be invalid as be-
ing legislative in nature, it would seem that a number of 
earlier amendments must fall on the same ground. The Thir-
teenth Amendment legislated slavery out of existence, the 
Fourteenth Amendment legislated on several subjects, such 
as citizenship, the exclusion of rebels from office, and the re-
pudiation of debts of rebelling states. Yet it has not been seri-
ously pretended that these amendments are void because of 
their legislative content. 
A practical argument against differentiating between legis-
lative and non-legislative amendments is the fact that there 
is no satisfactory and clean-cut distinction between the two. 
Until the Supreme Court had put the stamp of approval. on 
each proposed ~mendment, there would be no way of ascer-
taining its legislative character. Power of a despotic nature 
would be vested in the Supreme Court, and the court might 
that, as between Congress and the people, in whom the ultimate right of sover-
eignty resides, only Congress could legislate. 
"The limitations upon the people's power to change their Constitution are 
no more than they have chosen to make them. In so far as article I of the Consti-
tution is concerned, there is no limitation upon the sovereign right of the people 
to legislate a rule, act, or principle into their organic law." Feigenspan v. 
Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. 186 at 191. See also Appellant's Brief in 
State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, (1910) 230 Mo. 4o8, 130 S. W. 689. But 
see JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNvENTIONs, 4th ed. (1887) 429. 
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be drawn into partisan controversy. It may perhaps be alleged 
that by a true amendment is meant a change in the structure 
of the government, or a change of extraordinary importance 
in the life of the nation. Perhaps the former test would not 
be impossible of application. Under it the first twelve amend-
ments, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth, which permits Congress 
to impose taxes on incomes without apportionment, the Seven-
teenth, providing for the popular election of Senators, and the 
Nineteenth, providing for woman suffrage, would all be valid. 
But the Thirteenth, parts of the Fourteenth, and Eight-
eenth Amendments would all be invalid. Moreover, the dif-
ficulties of applying this test are greater than at first appears. 
Almost every change in the structure of government involves 
some redistribution of power and is partially legislative in 
nature. On the other hand, almost every change of a legis-
lative character directly or indirectly involves a change in the 
structure of the government. 
The difficulties of the second test are even more manifest. 
When the inertia of the amending process has been over-
come, it is scarcely possible to say that the proposed amend-
ment is not of constituent importance. 49 When the Prohibition 
Amendment was adopted, despite some contrary beliefs, 
there seems to have been a tremendous public sentiment which 
had long favored it. The same may be said of the Civil War 
Amendments. In the United States, where the dogma of 
popular sovereignty is so firmly rooted, there would seem 
to be no valid legal objection to the people's writing their 
convictions into the Constitution on any subject they choose 
49 "There being no express inhibition in the Constitution of the United States 
against ordaining a final permanent law, what authority is there for implying 
one? ••. I fail to perceive anything in any part of the organic law that would 
justify a judicial interpretation forbidding the people to do so when they are 
convinced that on a given subject the time has come to prevent perennial changes 
in respect thereto." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920) 264 F. 
186 at 193. 
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in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. Many of 
the state constitutions are a standing witness of this fact, and 
the decisions seem to uphold amendments of every nature. 
Is there a restriction that an amendment must be germane? 
It has sometimes been suggested that an amendment must be 
germane.50 That is, a proposed amendment must relate im-
mediately to some specific clause in the Constitution, or must 
be in harmony with the "spirit" of the Constitution. Article 
Five gives no hint of such a limitation. The first twelve 
amendments and the Sixteenth and Seventeenth doubtless 
meet the test. But the Civil War Amendments and the Eight-
eenth and Nineteenth Amendments are not necessarily ger-
mane as respects any previous articles in the Constitution. As 
long as they are permitted to remain on the books it seems that 
little attention can be paid to any such objection. 
But assuming for the sake of argument that germaneness 
is a test of validity, it is difficult to see what would not be ger-
mane to the Constitution. The Constitution assumes to deal 
with all political power whatsoever, giving specific powers to 
the federal government, providing for changes by an amend-
ing power, and reserving all other power to the states or to the 
people. The general spirit and purpose of the Constitution, 
whatever they may be, cannot be isolated with scientific ac-
curacy. Perhaps the best statement of the purpose, though 
having no legal force, is that to be found in the Preamble: 
"We the People of the United States, in order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Wel-
fare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
""Root's Brief in the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 
S. Ct. 486, 588; Campbell, C. J., dissenting in People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 
(1903) 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167; speech of Uriah Tracy in the Senate on the 
Twelfth Amendment, ANNALS OF CoNGRESS, 8th Cong., xst sess. (1803) 163; 
Morris, "The Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution," (1909) 189 
No. AM. REV. 82; Emery, "The 18th Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States," (April, 1920) 13 ME. L. REv. 121 at 122. 
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Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America." 
The statement of purposes is thus very broad. Among them 
is the promotion of the general welfare. If an amendment is 
conducive to the general welfare, it is then germane.51 It 
would seem that a court could not set up its own notion of 
what the general welfare was, and would have to assume that 
what Congress and three-fourths of the states have approved 
promotes the general welfare whether or not in reality it ac-
tually does. With such a broad test it would seem that no 
amendment can be annulled for not being germane. 52 That 
its makers entertained broad views of the purposes of the Con-
stitution there can seem little doubt. 53 Realizing the imper-
fections of their work, it is not reasonable to surmise that they 
intended that future generations should not make such altera-
tions as they thought best. Today, at a time when absolutes 
are discredited, it must not be too readily assumed that there 
are fundamental purposes in the Constitution which shackle 
the amending power and which take precedence over the gen-
eral welfare and needs of the people of today and of the fu-
ture. 
111 State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, 1919) 257 F. 334· 
50 "When the people place limitations upon their power to modify the Consti-
tution, these limitations cannot be extended by what others may think or be-
lieve to be a purpose. Purpose or no purpose, the way to amend is pointed out; 
that way must be followed, and, when followed is sufficient. Whatever may be 
the result, or however confusing or perplexing, or even useless may be the 
consequences, the Constitution becomes the will of the people when it is adopted 
by their vote in the method provided." Crane, J., concurring in Browne v. City 
of New York, (1925) 241 N.Y. 96 at u6, 149 N. E. 211, See also, Miller, 
"Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made More Difficult?" 
(1926) 10 MINN. L. REV. 185 at 199. 
03 
". • • the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, 
is the supreme object to be pursued . • • no form of government whatever has 
any other value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were 
the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would 
be, Reject the plan. Were the union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, 
it would be, Abolish the union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the 
state cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good 
citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter." Madison, in THE 
FEDERALIST, No. 45· 
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Is there a restriction that an amendment cannot add but 
only alter? An argument very much like the foregoing 
is that an amendment may alter, but may not add. This con-
tention is largely a quibble on the definition of the word 
"amendment." It is asserted that' by amending the Consti-
tution is meant the changing of something that is already in 
the Constitution, and not the addition of something new and 
unrelated. Cases prescribing the very limited meaning of 
amendment in the law of pleading are cited as authoritative. 54 
It would seem improper, however, to accept such a definition, 
as amendments to constitutions have always been construed 
more liberally and on altogether different principles from 
those applied to amendments of pleadings. A mere glance at 
the Civil War and the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments, as well as at many amendments made to state constitu-
tions, is enough to show that by an amendment is meant an 
addition as well as an alteration.55 The United States Senate 
.. For example, Machen, "Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?" (I9Io) 23 
HARV. L. REV. I 69 at I 70, note, cites the following cases holding that an 
amendment to a pleading cannot substitute a new case: Shields v. Barrow, 
(I854) I7 How. (58 U.S.) I30 at I44; Goodyear v. Bourn, (D. C. N.Y. 
I855) 3 Blatchf. 266, F. Cas. No. 556I; Givens v. Wheeler, (I882) 6 Colo. 
I49· He also cites 2 MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 2d ed. (I 886) 
§ I096, which merely states that a reserved power to amend a charter of in-
corporation does not extend to the substitution of a new charter. In Livermore 
v. Waite, (I894) I02 Cal. II3, 36 P. 424, the court says that an amendment 
must not fundamentally alter the Constitution, and must improve, or better 
carry out its purpose. See also Morris, "The Fifteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution," (I909) I89 No. AM. REV. 82; Appellant's Brief in Na-
tional Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. · 
55 McKenna, ]., dissenting on other issues in the National Prohibition Cases, 
supra, 253 U.S. at 40I, states that the references in Article Five and in Article 
Six, sec. 2, to "this Constitution" do not forbid an amendment inconsistent with 
a clause in the Constitution before amended, and are not a limitation on the 
amending power. "What other purpose could an amendment have?" 
"The Constitution is the organic and fundamental law, but that law may be 
changed, added to, or repealed, if that is done by the states and the people them-
selves in the way provided. Their power to better it, as they think, is not to be 
hamstrung by mere rigidity of definition of words. Adding something new to 
the organic law is an amendment of the organic law, in the judgment of this 
court." State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenhrecher v. Cox, (D. C. Ohio, I9I9) 257 
F. 334 at 343· 
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under its power to amend revenue bills may substitute en-
tirely new bills. In fact, the amending process would be largely 
futile if no additions could be incorporated. The fathers of the 
Constitution neither expressly nor by reasonable implication 
gave ground for any such understanding of the process. Per-
haps the best evidence of contemporary construction is to be 
found in the heading of the joint resolution of Congress sub-
mitting the first ten amendments commencing, "Articles m 
addition to and Amendment of the Constitution." 56 
Is there a law above amending power and the Constitution? 
In surveying the arguments as to implied limitations, it seems 
necessary to consider a doctrine which has proved peculiarly 
attractive to some, namely, that there is a law higher than 
the written Constitution which is inviolable and constitutes 
a limitation on the power to amend. Strange bedfellows are 
to be found adhering to this view. It is likely to be urged by 
the most naive man in the street and also by learned lawyers 
and philosophers. Large masses of the people of the United 
"The Constitution is a mere grant of power to the federal government by the 
several states and any amendment which adds to or in any manner changes the 
powers thus granted comes within the legal and even within the technical 
definition of that term." Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal. 1920) 262 F. 563 at 567 
a1f'd Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) 256 U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510. 
"'Words in the Constitution of the United States do not ordinarily receive 
a narrow and contracted meaning, but are presumed to have been used in a 
broad sense with a view to covering all emergencies.' . . . The definitions of 
the word 'amendment' include additions to, as well as correction of, matters 
already treated; and there is nothing in its immediate context (article V) which 
suggests that it was used in a restricted sense." Feigenspan v. Bodine, 
(D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. 186 at 19o, quoting from In re Strauss, (1905) I97 
U. S. 324 at 330, 25 S. Ct. 535· 
"A Constitution has an organic life in such a sense, and to such a degree 
that changes here and there do not sever its identity." Cardozo, J., in Browne 
v. City of New York, (I925) 24I N.Y. 96 at III, I49 N. E. 2II. 
56 "An amendment to the Constitution, which is made by the addition of a 
provision on a new and independent subject, is a complete thing in itself, and 
may be wholly disconnected with other provisions of the Constitution; such 
amendments for instance as the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. These were therein referred to as articles in addition to and 
amendment of the Constitution." State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, (1919) 99 
Ohio St. 168, I24 N. E. I 72. 
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States view the Constitution as something sacrosanct and pro-
tected from serious alteration. The language of the Declara-
tion of Independence as to inherent and inalienable rights is 
unhesitatingly accepted by many as having a legal as well as 
a political and ethical significance. 57 Seward, Secretary of State 
under Lincoln, once said that "there is a higher law than the 
Constitution which regulates our authority," but he was care-
ful to add that he would "adopt none but lawful, constitu-
tional and peaceful means to secure even that end." 
The view of unlimited internal sovereignty of the state 
has undergone serious criticism during the last century at the 
hands of the political pluralists, who deny the absolute and 
indivisible sovereignty of the state, as viewed internally and 
apart from international law. Since the state is not supreme, 
neither is the amending body, for the amending body is virtu-
ally the state, or at least its most powerful agent. The theories 
of pluralism of the last century were mainly developed by 
Gierke in Germany, and by Maitland, Figgis, and Laski in 
England, by Duguit in France, and by Krabbe in the Neth-
erlands. Krabbe, like many of the other pluralists, views the 
state as the creature of law, and law alone is sovereign. Per-
haps their whole position is best summed up in the words of 
Duguit: 
"The more I advance in age and seek to penetrate the prob-
lem of law, the more I am convinced that law is not a creation 
of the state, that it exists without the state, that the notion of 
law is altogether independent of the state, and that the rule 
rn Abbott, "Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment," (I92o) 20 
CoL. L. REv. I 8 3 at I 84, says that "the question is not whether we can take a 
drink now and again, but whether in this federal Union of ours there resides 
any power which is literally absolute, that is, without even those ultimate 
limitations which we are accustomed to speak of as the constitutional guarantees 
of our liberties ••.. For the first time in the history of the American Union 
an amendment to the Constitution has been adopted, or claimed to have been 
adopted, which attempts to limit the personal liberties of the people. • • • 
There are a number of constitutive principles of private rights which have been 
so wrought into the fabric of our institutions that they cannot be abrogated." 
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of law imposes itself on the state as it does upon individ-
uals."58 
The theories of pluralism have found little support in the 
United States among the political scientists and scarcely any 
among the lawyers.59 Professor Mcilwain states that plural-
ism is "equivalent to a repudiation of all control over the in-
dividual citizen except that which he voluntarily imposes upon 
himself." 60 Many pluralists concede the legal sovereignty of 
the state. Our legal views are of course traceable to those of 
the English common law. The analytical view of the law as 
a body of rules laid down by the sovereign or recognized and 
enforced by the courts runs back to Hobbes, Blackstone, 
Bentham, and Austin. Their views and those of Holland and 
Salmond, and of John Chipman Gray in the United States, 
are representative of the prevalent view of the law held by 
lawyers in this country. It is true that in the United States the 
strictly analytical view is considerably modified by the large 
proportion of the law to be found in the cases rather than in 
statutes, and also by the doctrine of judicial review. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has the last word in the 
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but of the Con-
stitution itself, and if it laid down implied limitations on the 
amending power, such limitations would doubtless be ac-
cepted as constitutional. Theoretically, however, the Consti-
tution is supreme over all, including the Supreme Court, 
whose members take an oath to support it. In looking for 
limitations on the power to amend, it is therefore the duty 
118 1 DucuiT, TRAITE DE DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed. (1921) 33· 
"" "The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes 
law." Holmes,]., in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909) 213 
U.S. 347 at 358, 29 S. Ct. 511. 
"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and 
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the 
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom 
and for whom all government exists and acts." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (r886) 
118 U.S. 356 at 370,6 S. Ct. 1064. 
80 "A Fragment on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL. Scr. Q. 94 at 105. 
112 AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
of the Court to look to the Constitution itself. The Constitu-
tion does not recognize any such type of law as Natural Law, 
or the Law of God, or the Law of Reason. 61 The medieval 
sovereigns were regarded as being subject to Natural Law 
and the Law of God. The Law of God has since been relegated 
to theology. The growth of the modern independent nations 
of Europe meant the emergence of a national law govern-
ing each nation, and the disappearance of natural law. In Eng-
land some isolated cases decided or intimated that an act of 
Parliament "contrary to common right and reason" was 
void. 62 Blackstone at times suggests that all laws are subject 
to natural law and at other times maintains that there is noth-
ing superior to an act of Parliament. Since his time Austin and 
Bentham quite definitely gave the bent to Anglo-American 
legal theory, so that today natural law is regarded as non-
61 "The theory that laws may be declared void when deemed to be opposed 
to natural justice and equity, although they do not violate any constitutional 
provision, has some support in the dicta of learned judges, but has not been 
approved, so far as we know, by any authoritative adjudication, and is repudi-
ated by numerous authorities ..•. no law can be pronounced invalid, for the 
reason simply that it violates our notions of justice, is oppressive and unfair in 
its operation, or because, in the opinion of some or all of the citizens of the 
State, it is not justified by public necessity, or designed to promote the public 
welfare." Bertholf v. O'Reilly, (I878) 74 N.Y. 509 at 5I4-5I6. 
In Buckner v. Street, (C. C. Ark. I87I) I Dill. 248 at 25I, F. Cas. No. 2098, 
it is said, however, that there are no limitations on the sovereign people of the 
United States, "if we except those imposed by the Deity." To the same effect, 
see 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (I829), 
Appendix 64. In Booth v. Town of Woodbury, (I864) 32 Conn. II8 at I27, 
it is asserted that the people are "under no restraint except that imposed by the 
principles of natural justice." 
62 "Is the right of the people of the United States to do this thing questioned? 
It could be questioned only on the grounds advanced by Lord Coke, in Bonham's 
case, that the common law controlled acts of parliament, and adjudged them 
void when against common right and reason. But all the judges since his time 
have said that it was for parliament and the king to judge what common right 
and reason was; and Lord Campbell styles what was said by Lord Coke in this 
case, 'nonsense still quoted by silly people .••. ' A stronger epithet than that 
applied by the Lord Chancellor to those who quote Lord Coke's dictum in 
Bonham's case as authority, might justly be applied to those who question the 
power and authority of the people of the United States, by amendment of their 
constitution of government, to abolish slavery •••. " Buckner v. Street, (C. C. 
Ark. I87I) I Dill. 248 at 255, F. Cas. No. 2098. But cf. Plucknett, "Bonham's 
Case and Judicial Review," (I926) 40 HARV. L. REV. 30. 
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existent or as ideal law and is relegated to ethics and political 
philosophy. While there are ever-recurring revivals of a be-
lief in natural law, and while sound philosophic reasons may 
perhaps be offered in its behalf, it seems that such a view of 
the law has little chance in the interpretation of American 
constitutional law. In the words of one, both judge and phi-
losopher: 
"If there is any law which is back of the sovereignty of the 
state, and superior thereto, it is not law in such a sense as to 
concern the judge or the lawyer, however much it concerns 
the statesman or the moralist. The courts are creatures of the 
state and of its power, and while their life as courts continues, 
they must obey the law of their creator."63 
Is there an implied limitation that amendments taking away 
individual liberties must be ratified by state conventions? In 
the decade of the thirties there were some interesting devel-
opments with respect to the scope of the amending power. 
The first of these was in 1931 in the case of United States v. 
Sprague. 64 There the assailants of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment, instead of asserting that such amendment was beyond 
the scope of the amending power, took the narrower ground 
that there were limitations on the scope of amendments which 
could be ratified by state legislatures. That is to say, while 
63 CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (I 92.4) 49· McGovney says: "Against 
a sovereign organized political society an individual member of it has no legal 
rights. That, at least, is the situation under the present state of organization or 
unorganization of the human race into separate, independent, sovereign societies. 
There is no law superior to their wills governing their relations with their own 
members. On the other hand, as against government, in the United States, our 
political society has secured to the individual many privileges and immunities. 
What society has thus created, cannot society take away or alter? Legally cer-
tainly society may do so." McGovney "Is the Eighteenth Amendment Void 
Because of its Contents?" (192.0) 2.0 CoL. L. REv. 499 at 501. 
"Certainly no successful attempt has been made to indicate why a constitu-
tion might not originally command or prohibit anything physically possible." 
Radin, "The Intermittent Sovereign," (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 514 at 52.1 • 
.. (1931) 2.82. U.S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 2.2.0, noted (1932.) 2.7 ILL. L. REV. 72.; 
(1931) 2.9 MICH. L. REV. 777; (1931) 79 U. PA. L. REv. 8o7; Creekmore 
"The Sprague Case," (1931) 3 MISS. L. J. 2.82.. 
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there were no limitations as to what might be ratified by state 
conventions, there were such limitations as to state legisla-
tures. The legislative ratifying power could not deal with an 
amendment conferring upon the federal government new 
direct powers over individuals. It could deal only with such 
proposals as involved a change in the machinery of the fed-
eral government. It was argued that the original Constitution 
had been ratified by state conventions because the legislatures 
were deemed incompetent to surrender the liberties of the 
people to the new government to be established by the Consti-
tution. The Tenth Amendment, reserving to the states or to 
the people the powers not delegated to the federal govern-
ment, was alleged to have removed whatever doubt there 
formerly existed under the original Constitution.65 The trial 
court rejected these theories, yet on the basis of a strange mix-
ture of "political science" and "a scientific approach to the 
problem of government," it held the amendment void because 
not ratified by conventions. 66 But the Supreme Court gave 
no weight to either of these theories and held unequivocally 
that the choice of the method of ratification rested "in the 
sole discretion of Congress." 67 Thus the scope of the amend-
ing process seems to be the same no matter what the method 
of ratification. And though there are no cases on it, probably 
the scope is the same no matter what the method of proposal, 
whether by national convention or by Congress. In fact, rea-
soning backwards, since as seen in Chapter III, on the pro-
cedure of amendment, a national convention has very broad 
powers of proposal, it follows that Congress also has. 68 
""Bacon, "How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the 
Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 771. Contra: Taft, "Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution," (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 647. 
""United States v. Sprague, (D. C. N.J. 1930) 44 F. (zd) 967 at 98z, 984. 
e'1 z8z U. S. at 730. 
118 See chap._ III, p. 44 et seq. To carry out the reasoning still further, since the 
Sprague case holds that a state legislature has the same power as a state con-
vention in ratifying amendments, Congress has the same powers as a national 
convention in proposing amendments. 
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C. GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST IMPLIED LIMITATIONS 
In addition to the arguments against specific alleged lim-
itations, there are a number of general arguments refuting 
the existence of implied limitations altogether. 
Expressio uniu.s· est exclusio alterius. Perhaps the most ob-
vious and at the same time the most powerful argument 
against the existence of any implied limitations is the pres-
ence within the amending clause itself of the explicit limita-
tions which have previously been described. The existence 
of these limitations shows that the makers of the Constitution 
evidently gave some thought and consideration to limitations 
on the power to amend. The slave trade, direct taxes, and 
equality of representation in the Senate were all matters of 
great controversy in the Constitutional Convention, and each 
was settled by compromise. Three limitations were plainly set 
forth in the same clause of the Constitution that granted the 
amending power. Several proposed limitations offered at the 
Constitutional Convention, one of them of vital importance, 
in that it proposed to exempt the police power of the states 
from interference, were rejected.69 The makers of the Consti-
tution seemingly intended to provide for a broad power of 
amendment. 70 As Madison suggested, if limitations of one 
kind were adopted, limitations of another kind would also be 
demanded. 71 Certainly no power conferred in the Constitu-
tion is ultimately of more importance than the amending 
power. If the fathers were careful in the drafting of any clause 
09 Supra, p. 4 et seq. 
70 "The rejection of most of the proposed limitations on this power and the 
inclusion of but one permanent disability or restriction is strong evidence that, 
save as to the included exception, it was intended that the legislative depart-
ments of the governments of both the United States and the several states, acting 
in a special capacity for such purpose, should be practically unlimited in their 
power to propose and adopt amendments." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 
I 9zo) z64 F. I 86 at I 9 5· See also, Pillsbury, "The Fifteenth Amendment," 
(I909) .I6 ME. ST. B. A. PROC. I7· 
n 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
(I937 reprint of I836 zd ed.) ssz. See supra, p. 4 et seq. 
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of the Constitution, it would seem that certainly nothing would 
be left to implication concerning the bounds of the amending 
power. The issue would seem to be a proper case for the ap-
plication of the maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.72 
This maxim admittedly is not of universal application. In-
stances may well be cited where it would be improper to ap-
ply it. As Chief Justice Taft said in a recent case: "This maxim 
properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas 
in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over 
by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the 
contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which 
is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary 
treatment." 73 The application varies with the circumstances. 
The maxim is not limited to the law of property, or to con-
tracts, or to statutory law. It may be and has been applied in 
the construction of a constitution.74 The setting out of the ex-
press limitations in Article Five with no suggestion or impli-
cation of any other limitations, and the grant of the power to 
amend in broad and general terms would fairly seem to be 
a case where the maxim may appropriately be applied. 
View of framers of Constitution as to its imperfect nature. 
Additional support for the broad view of the power to amend 
72 In Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 at 191, Marshall, 
C. J ., said: "It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions 
from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except 
from a granted power, that which was not granted .••. " 
'"Ford v. United States, (1927) 273 U.S. 593 at 6ll, 47 S. Ct. 531. 
" It was applied to amendments of state constitutions in In re Constitutional 
Convention, (1883) 14 R.I. 649 at 651; Carton v. Secretary of State, (19o8) 
151 Mich. 337, ll5 N. W. 429; Tax Commission Case, (1923) 68 Mont. 450, 
219 P. 817. Applied to other parts of state constitutions: Head v. Head, (1847) 
2 Ga. 191; People v. Angle, ~I888) 109 N.Y. 564, 17 N. E. 413; State ex rel. 
Banker v. Clausen, (1927) 142 Wash. 450, 253 P. 805. It has also been applied 
to construction of a treaty: Matter of Washburn, (1819) 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 
106 at ll4. Jameson advocates its use with caution. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL 
CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. (1887) 602-610. See also Barto v. Himrod, (1853) 
4 Seld. (N.Y.) 483 at 493; Woods' Appeal, ( 1874) 7 5 Pa. 59; BROOM, LEGAL 
MAXIMS, 7th Am. ed. (1874) 653. 
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is found in the fact that the framers of the Constitution 
regarded their work as far from perfect and consequently 
anticipated a wide use of the power to amend. 75 The Constitu-
tion is the product of several great compromises. A consider-
able group in the Constitutional Convention and a large 
minority of the people were opposed to the adoption of the 
Constitution as submitted. Even those members of the Con-
vention who favored it were lukewarm in their support, and 
defended it solely on the ground of expediency. Such members 
as Benjamin Franklin expressed their unenthusiastic opinion 
75 Mason said at the Convention: "The plan now to be formed will certainly 
be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments, 
therefore, will be necessary; and it will be better to provide for them in an 
easy, regular, and constitutional way, than to trust to chance and violence." 
5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1937 
reprintofr8362ded.) 182. 
Iredell, later a Supreme Court justice, declared before the North Carolina 
ratifying convention: "Mr. Chairman, this is a very important clause .... 
The misfortune attending most constitutions which have been deliberately 
formed, has been, that those who formed them thought their wisdom equal to 
all possible contingencies, and that there could be no error in what they did. 
The gentlemen who framed this Constitution thought with much more diffi-
dence of their capacities, and undoubtedly, without a provision for amendment 
it would have been more justly liable to objection, and the characters of its 
framers would have appeared much less meritorious. This, indeed, is one of the 
greatest beauties of the system, and should strongly recommend it to every 
candid mind." 4 ibid. 176. 
"In regard to the Constitution of the United States, it is confessedly a new ex-
periment in the history of the nations. Its framers were not bold or rash enough 
to believe, or to pronounce it to be perfect. . . . They believed, that the power 
of amendment was, if one may so say, the safety-valve to let off all temporary 
effervescences and excitements; and the real effective instrument to control and 
adjust the movements of the machinery, when out of order, or in danger of self-
destruction." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 3d ed. (1857), § 1828. 
"As to individual states and the United States, the Constitution marks the 
boundary of powers. . . . If the Constitution is found inconvenient in practice 
in this or any other particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed out for 
amendment." Cushing, J., in Chisholm v. Georgia, (r793) 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 
419 at 468. 
"The people who adopted the Constitution knew that in the nature of things 
they could not foresee all the questions which might arise in the future, all the 
circumstances which might call for the exercise of further national powers than 
those granted to the United States, and after making provision for an amend-
ment to the Constitution, by which any needed additional powers would be 
granted, they reserved to themselves all powers not so delegated." Brewer, J., 
in Kansas v; Colorado, ( r 907) zo6 U. S. 46 at 9o, 27 S. Ct. 655. 
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of it. One of the arguments asserted in its favor was that it 
was capable of alteration. In fact, many state conventions 
adopted it on the tacit understanding that a Bill of Rights 
would be immediately incorporated. Altogether it seems un-
reasonable that its framers regarded the Constitution as ex-
empt from alteration except when expressly so provided. As 
Mr. Justice Holmes has said, the Constitution "is an experi-
ment.m6 It is only in the generations since the Constitution 
was adopted that a sort of halo of sanctity has been attached 
to it. People have sought certainty in political affairs only 
in a somewhat lesser degree than they have in religion. The 
Constitution has come to have a significance to the people of 
the United States such as has never become attached to the 
written constitution of any other state. Gladstone's dictum 
that "the American Constitution is the most wonderful work 
ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of 
man" is a shibboleth of American politics. Many appear to 
have forgotten 
"that the Constitution is not an end in itself, but rather a 
means, or an instrument, if you please, adopted for the spe-
cific purpose of regulating the public affairs and preserving 
the individual rights of the nation. But it would 
be asking the impossible to expect one generation to plan a 
government that should endure through all time and through 
revolutionary changes in every aspect of life."77 
Article Five as sui generis. A third important consideration 
in favor of the view that the power to amend is unlimited ex-
cept as to the equal suffrage in the Senate clause is the peculiar 
status of Article Five. The article seems to be sui generis.78 
78 Abrams v. United States, (1919) 250 U.S. 616 at 6301 40 S. Ct. 171 dis-
senting opinion . 
.,., Bates, "How Shall We Preserve the Constitution?" (I 926) 44 KAN. S. B. A. 
PROC, 128 at 143. 
18 The view of Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional 
Amendment," (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 213 at 221, that Article Five is 
limited by the provisions of the original Constitution, including in this the :Bill 
of Rights, seems to have found little support. .. 
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No other articles of the Constitution are to be looked to when 
the legal status of an amendment is in question. This seems 
to be true in the procedure of amendment. Congress when 
proposing and the states when ratifying are not bound by the 
rules of legislative action. 79 A simple compliance with Article 
Five is enough and no limitations are read in from other 
clauses of the federal Constitution. The proponents of im-
plied limitations forget that Article Five is as much a part of 
the Constitution as any other part of it. Admittedly, limita-
tions on the scope of an amendment are more fundamental 
than those on the procedure. Since limitations gathered from 
other clauses and from the general character and "spirit" of 
the Constitution have not been generally implied as to pro-
cedure, it would seem illogical and a serious matter to imply 
limitations as to substance. Article Five, the sole fountain 
head of the power to amend, is silent and appears to confer 
the power in broad and sweeping terms. Suggested limitations 
must be critically viewed, and compared with its provisions, 
and not the provisions of the remainder of the Constitution. 
Danger of limiting the scope. An argument of tremendous 
practical importance is the fact that it would be exceedingly 
dangerous to lay down any limitations beyond those ex-
pressed. 80 The critics of an unlimited power to amend have 
too often neglected to give due consideration to the fact that 
79 Supra, pp. 48, 6z-63. But Congress may derive additional power from the 
power under Article One to pass all necessary and proper laws. RoTTSCHAEFER, 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (1939) 387. 
80 "The Constitution of any government which cannot be regularly amended 
when its defects are experienced, reduces the people to this dilemma-they must 
either submit to its oppressions, or bring about amendments, more or less, by 
civil war." Iredell before the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, 4 ELLIOT, 
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1937 reprint 
of I 836 zd ed.) I 76-I 77· 
"If the plaintiff is right in its contention of lack of power to insert the 
Eighteenth Amendment into the United States Constitution because of its subject-
matter, it follows that there is no way to incorporate it and others of like char-
acter into the national organic law, except through revolution. This, the plain-
tiff concedes, is the inevitable conclusion of its contention. This is so startling 
a proposition that the judicial mind may be pardoned for not readily acceding 
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alteration of the federal Constitution is not by a simple ma-
jority or by a somewhat preponderate majority, but by a 
three-fourths majority of all the states.81 Undoubtedly, where 
a simple majority is required, it is not an especially serious 
matter for the courts to supervise closely the amending proc-
ess both as to procedure and as to substance. But when so large 
a majority as three-fourths has finally expressed its will in 
the highest possible form outside of revolution, it becomes 
perilous for the judiciary to intervene. This may account for 
the resort to the doctrine of political questions in the child 
labor amendment cases of 1939.82 In fact, the amending 
process in the past has been so difficult that it may perhaps 
be said that amendment in effect has been brought about by 
judicial interpretation. 83 It is of course the business of the 
judiciary to enforce the law. But it is, and probably always 
has been, an unformulated ground of action in the judicial 
mind never so to act as to come squarely in conflict with the 
executive and legislature and a large group of the people. 
In the last analysis, self-preservation is perhaps as basic a 
motive in judicial action as in any other type of human acJ 
tivity. 
It would seem, however, that there is no necessity to re-
sort to the ground of self-preservation as a reason for the 
to it, and for insisting that only the most convincing reasons will justify its 
acceptance." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. 186 at 189-190. 
When passing on the validity of amendments, "The court may, and should, 
and must, on such great occasions, look to effects and consequences." Marshall, J., 
in State ex rel. Postel v. Marcus, (1915) 160 Wis. 354 at 357, 152 N. W. 419. 
In the National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588, 
Hughes points out in his brief that judicial construction has always been open 
to change through amendment, but if the court itself limits the amending power, 
the subject is taken beyond the reach of popular control. 
81 Such critics assume "that the ultimately sovereign people have inferentially 
deprived themselves of that portion of their sovereign power, once possessed 
by them, of determining the content of their own fundamental law." RoTT-
SCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 9· See also ibid. 398. 
82 Chandler v. Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992; Coleman v. 
Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. See supra, p. 18 et seq. 
88 See Coudert, "Judicial Constitutional Amendment," (1904) 13 YALE L. J. 
331. 
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courts refraining from limiting the power to amend. As has 
been iterated and reiterated, the court is bound by no express 
limitations except the equal suffrage clause, which limits only 
the method of amendment. If the judiciary in the absence 
of such limitations go ahead and deliberately lay them down, 
it would seem that they are positively courting disaster.84 
In refusing to lay down restrictions, the court is not affirm-
atively violating any express clause of the Constitution. It is 
not violating any broad general provision, nor the "spirit" of 
the Constitution. In the absence of any other express limita-
tions and in view of the reasonable conclusion that there are 
no other limitations, it seems that the court is merely doing 
its plain duty in refusing to discover any new restrictions. 
Considering the danger of implying such restrictions, and 
the unreasonableness of any such implications, it would seem 
that the onus is on the protagonists of the view of limited 
power to demonstrate clearly the legal basis of their view. 
Rejection of implied limitation by the courts. It is a fact of 
no little importance that the Supreme Court of the United 
States and the inferior federal courts have given no encourage-
ment to the view that there are implied limitations. To be 
sure, the Supreme Court has not categorically declared that 
"'"Impressive words of counsel remind us of our duty to m~intain the in-
tegrity of constitutional government by adhering to the limitations laid by 
the sovereign people upon the expression of its will .•.. Not less imperative, 
however, is our duty to refuse to magnify their scope by resort to subtle implica-
tion ..•. Repeated decisions have informed us that only when conflict with 
the Constitution is clear and indisputable will a statute be condemned as void. 
Still more obvious is the duty of caution and moderation when the act to be 
reviewed is not an act of ordinary legislation, but an act of the great constitu-
ent power which has made Constitutions and hereafter may unmake them. 
Narrow at such times are the bounds of legitimate implications." Cardozo, J., 
in Browne v. City of New York, (r925) 241 N.Y. 96 at ru, 149 N. E. zrr. 
"Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for 
niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning 
or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. • • • The 
people make them; the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read 
them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them 
any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss." r STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 3d ed. (r8s8) § 451. 
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there are no such limits. 85 But it has either expressly or tacitly 
rejected every limitation urged upon it. The court did not 
pass on the question of restrictions in an opinion until the 
validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was adjudicated. The 
Fifteenth Amendment seems to have been the first that was 
ever attacked on that ground as exceeding the scope of the 
amending power. Even that attack was made only in compar-
atively recent years. But though the briefs of the appellant 
asserted the existence of limitations, the court completely 
ignored the contention in its decision. 86 When the legality of 
the Eighteenth Amendment was tested, the opinion was a 
mere syllabus statement that the amendment was "within the 
power to amend." Chief Justice White criticized the absence 
of any reasoning, and Justice McReynolds expressed himself 
as unable to come to any conclusion. 87 The scope of the power 
of amendment was first discussed by the court at any length 
in Leser v. Garnett88 when the Nineteenth Amendment was 
attacked. In that case, too, the court upheld the amendment 
as against any implied restrictions. Manifestly the doctrine 
of implied limitations will have to rear its structure on some-
thing else than court decisions. 
"Abuse" of the amending power an anomalous term. The 
proponents of implied limitations resort to the method of 
80 The Supreme Court "has not • • . ever decided or stated that there are 
no implied limits on the amending power. It is a practical certainty, that, if it 
ever passes on that question, it will hold that there are no such implied limits 
upon that power." RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 398. 
88 Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U.S. 368, 35 S. Ct. 932. The lower court, 
Anderson v. Myers, (C. C. Md. 1910) 182 F. 223, expressly rejected the argu-
ment in favor of implied limitations. 
87 National Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. 
Other cases passing on the scope are Buckner v. Street, (C. C. Ark. I 8 7 I) I Dill. 
248, Fed. Cas. No. 2098; State of Ohio ex rei. Erchenbrecher v. Cox, (D. C. 
Ohio, I9I9) 257 F. 334; Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. ]. 1920) 264 F. 
I86; Carson v. Sullivan, (192o) 284 Mo. 253, 223 S. W. 571 • 
.. (1922) 258 u.s. IJO, 42 s. Ct. 2I7. 
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reductio ad absurdum in pointing out the abuses which might 
occur if there were no limitations on the power to amend. The 
Supreme Court might be abolished. A monarchy might be 
set up. The women of the nation might be nationalized. In 
reply it should be pointed out in the first place that the fact 
that a power may be abused does not necessarily militate 
against the existence of the power.89 The Supreme Court has 
declared over and over again that the possibility of abuse is 
not to be used as a test of the existence or extent of a power.90 
Thus the postal and taxing powers of the federal government 
may be abused, but that does not affect their existence or their 
scope. The possibility of abuse of intergovernmental taxation 
has not prevented the Supreme Court from recently permit-
ting it.91 Moreover, there seems to be no consensus as to what 
is and what is not an abuse of the amending power. 
In the second place the amending power is a power of an 
altogether different kind from the ordinary governmental 
powers. If abuse occurs, it occurs at the hands of a special 
organization of the nation and of the states representing an 
extraordinary majority of the people, so that for all practical 
80 "The fear that sustaining the right of the people to extinguish the traffic in 
intoxicating liquors opens the door to a like prohibition of other business, there-
fore, is not well founded. But, if it were, it would be of little force in dealing_ 
with the question of power. The right to exercise power inevitably carries with 
it the possibility of abuse, but abuse in the exercise of power is no argument 
against its existence. The line between a proper use and abuse of power cannot 
be settled in advance; but it may be said, and that is as far as the present inquiry 
warrants, that whenever any other business produces like evils it may be disposed 
of in the same way." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 1920) 264 F. 186 
at 192. 
90 1n re Rapier, (1892) 143 U.S. uo, 12 S. Ct. 374; McCray v. United 
States, (1904) 195 U.S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769. 
"'James v. Dravo Contracting Co., (1937) 302 u.s. 134, s8 s. Ct. 208; 
Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, (1937) 302 U.S. 186, 58 
S. Ct. 233; Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, {1938) 304 
U.S. 439, 58 S. Ct. 98o; Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., (1938) 303 
U. S. 376, 58 S. Ct. 623; Helvering v. Gerhardt, (1938) 304 U. S. 405, 58 
S. Ct. 969; Graves v. People ex rei. O'Keefe, {1939) 306 U.S. 466, 59 S. Ct, 
595· 
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purposes it may be said to be the people, or at least the highest 
agent of the people, and one exercising sovereign powers. 92 
Thus the people merely take the consequences of their own 
acts, whereas where the abuse of a governmental authority 
occurs, there is abuse by a mere governmental agent of the 
people, and the people suffer the consequences of the arbi-
trary acts of individuals. It seems natural that somewhere 
there resides within the nation the power to do anything, and 
logically this authority resides in the amending body. It 
seems anomalous to speak of "abuse" by such a body. Unless 
the view be adopted that the people of the United States are 
not sovereign and that they are not to be trusted to alter their 
fundamental institutions but are to be carefully safeguarded 
by a small group of men who know or think they know what 
is best for the people, it seems necessary to conclude that they 
have a full capacity to amend, free from any implicit limits, 
no matter what abuses may result. 
The consequences of the view just stated are not as ominous 
as they may appear at first blush. No abusive assaults on our 
constitutional system have as yet been made by amendment. 
92 "In this connection it should not be overlooked that the ultimate power to 
amend the United States Constitution is not given to the federal government, 
but to the people of the several states. The power of Congress in that respect 
ends with its proposing the amendment to the states. The ultimate and control-
ling act is by the people themselves, acting through their chosen representatives." 
Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N.J. 1920) 264 F. r86 at 195. 
"Has it ever been pretended that the limitations of the power of the states 
were also limitations on the whole people of the United States, when acting in 
their aggregate, sovereign capacity in amending or altering their constitution 
or government?" Buckner v. Street, (C. C. Ark. r87r) r Dill. 248 at 249, Fed. 
Cas. No. 2098. 
"An amendment, which has the deliberate judgment of two thirds of 
Congress, and of three fourths of the states, can scarcely be deemed unsuited to 
the prosperity or security of the republic. It must combine as much wisdom 
and experience in its favor, as ordinarily can belong to the management of 
any human concerns." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 3d ed. (r858) § 1830, 
"I grant that if three-fourths should make the chief magistrate hereditary, 
it would be a gross abuse of power. Against this, and other abuses, we have 
provided, by requiring so large a majority as three-fourths, and this is the 
only guard we have thought necessary. The right in the one-fourth to correct 
the abuse, is revolutionary, not sovereign." Argument of Blanding in State ex 
rel. McCready v. Hunt, (r834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) 1 at 172. 
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The language used in attacking the Fifteenth, Eighteenth, 
and Nineteenth Amendments has been much stronger and 
more suggestive of violence than the occasion warranted. 
However inexpedient negro suffrage and prohibition may be, 
it cannot be seriously pretended that they have weakened or 
seriously altered the general tenor of the Constitution. It may 
be that serious abuses may occur in the future; it can scarcely 
be said that they have occurred up to this time. It may be ob-
jected that the possibility of abuses in the future should be 
provided for. In reply, it may be said that the nation has not 
been threatened by the absence of such implied limitations 
thus far, and that there have been no wanton abuses. The 
generation of today cannot know the needs of the generation 
of tomorrow. Any restrictions which might be laid down now 
might easily turn out to be futile, while such as might prove 
beneficial may not be known or suggested by the leaders of the 
present era.93 It seems best in this matter to permit each gen-
eration to take care of itself. In the last analysis, political ma-
chinery and artificial limitations will not protect the American 
people from themselves. "The perpetuity of American in-
stitutions will depend not upon special mechanisms or de-
vices, nor even upon any particular legislation, but rather 
upon the good conscience and intelligence and the attitude 
of the American people themselves."94 
Political questions. A recent development, though not di-
rectly dealing with the scope of the amending power, is the 
doctrine of "political questions" developed in the cases deal-
98 "The framers of the Constitution could not foresee the form or character 
of amendments which might become necessary in the future and wisely left all 
such questions in the hands of those who might be charged with official duty 
when the necessity for the change and the character of the change to be made 
became apparent." Ex parte Dillon, (D. C. Cal. 1920) 262 F. 563 at 567-568. 
•• Bates, "How Shall We Preserve the Constitution?" (I 926) 44 KAN. 
S. B. A. PROC. 128 at 147: "Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up, 
but constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances, 
and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will be done." See also 
Holmes, J., in Blinn v. Nelson, (x9xx) 222 U.S. 1 at 7, 32 S. Ct. 1. 
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ing with the child labor amendment. 95 If the time limit 
for ratification and the effect of prior rejections by states and 
possibly the right of the lieutenant governor of a state to cast 
a deciding vote when the state senate was equally divided, 
were political questions, why would not the scope of the 
amending power be a political question? The practical dangers 
of limiting the scope and the difficulties in laying down im-
plied limitations might well justify the Supreme Court in dis-
posing of the problem by calling it a political question. In the 
opinion of the writer, however, it would be more straightfor-
ward and courageous and less confusing to rule that there are 
no implied limitations . 
.. Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v. 
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992. 
CHAPTER v 
Sovereignty and the Federal 
Amending Clause 
A. DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
I T has frequently been asserted that the most important and at the same time the most controverted topic of po-litical science is that of sovereignty. It is significant in con-
stitutional law and in international law only in a somewhat 
lesser degree. In fact, in its first development it seems to have 
been a juristic conception.1 Its first modern exponent, Jean 
Bodin, was a French lawyer.2 Its chief theorist of the common 
law was John Austin, another jurist.3 The problem is of pe-
culiar importance in a federal state such as the United States, 
since its location is not an obvious fact as it is in a unitary state. 
The Civil War was fought largely over conflicting concep-
tions of sovereignty and its location. 4 Even today the question 
of states' rights is not a merely speculative matter. The in-
1 For the history of the concept of sovereignty, see EMERSON, STATE AND 
SOVEREIGNTY IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928); HOLDSWORTH, SOME LESSONS 
FROM OuR LEGAL HISTORY (1928) u2-141; WARD, SovEREIGNTY (1928) 
1-48; EASTWOOD AND KEETON, THE AUSTIN IAN THEORIES OF LAW AND 
SOVEREIGNTY (1929) 38-61; CoHEN, RECENT THEORIES OF SoVEREIGNTY 
(1937) 7-128; Mcilwain, "A Fragment on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL. 
Scr. Q. 94· 
• For the view that Bodin was not such an absolutist after all, but that he 
supposed the sovereign to be subject to natural law, international law, and the 
constitutional laws of monarchy, see Shepard, "Sovereignty at the Cross Roads: A 
Study of Bodin," (1930) 45 PoL. Sci. Q. 580. Accord: Mcilwain, "A Fragment 
on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL. Sci. Q. 94· For the more usual view of Bodin, 
see Hearnshaw, "Bodin and the Genesis of the Doctrine of Sovereignty," TUDOR 
STUDIES (1924) 109 at 124-125. 
• For a short summary of Austin's theories, see Smith, "The English Analytical 
Jurists," (1887) 21 AM. L. REV. 270. 
• "For this question of loyalty to a sovereign is one which, more than any 
other, has divided men in their political, social, and even domestic relations." 
HURD, THE THEORY OF OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE (1881) 537· 
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creased activities of the federal government have revived the 
controversy over sovereignty, if in truth it may be assumed 
that the issue had ever become obsolete. The I 9 3 9 cases 
treating certain phases of the amending process as political 
questions may further revive the question. 5 The problem in 
the United States seemingly may be regarded as perennial. 
Hence efforts at its reanalysis can never be regarded as super-
fluous or futile. 
The problem of sovereignty may be approached from the 
viewpoints of law, of political science, and of philosophy. It 
is one of the chief technical terms of each of these fields of 
knowledge. Each has given the term a meaning with a con-
tent different from that of the other sciences. In fact, the same 
science has at different periods of time defined the word in 
a varying manner. In the words of Bryce: 
"As the borderland between two kingdoms used in unset-
tled states of society to be the region where disorder and con-
fusion most prevailed, and in which turbulent men found 
refuge from justice, so fallacies and confusions of thought 
and language have most frequently survived and longest 
escaped detection in those territories where the limits of con-
terminous sciences or branches of learning have not been ex-
actly drawn. The frontier districts, if one may call them so, 
of Ethics, of Law, and of Political Science have been thus 
infested by a number of vague or ambiguous terms which 
have produced many barren discussions and caused much 
needless trouble to students. 
"No offender of this kind has given more trouble than the 
so-called 'Doctrine of Sovereignty.' " 6 
Before plunging into one of the most fiercely controverted 
subjects of both legal and political theory, it becomes neces-
sary to make clear the purpose of this discussion and the at-
titude of the writer towards the concept of sovereignty. The 
writer has no new definition of the term to offer. Nor does 
• See Chapter II, supra. 
6
BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (1901) 503-504. 
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he subscribe to the views of any particular publicist or school 
of legal philosophy. He does not believe that there is any one 
specific, precise conception which undebatably deserves the 
appellation of sovereignty. This discussion will accept as the 
definition of sovereignty and as the list of its chief character-
istics those which most authorities at the present time appear 
to adopt. The writer thoroughly agrees with Dean Edwin D. 
Dickinson, who says: "Probably nowhere in law, private 
or public, is there to be found a more tyrannical phrase than 
'the sovereignty of the state.' " 7 This discussion is not in-
tended to give new emphasis to the importance of sovereignty. 
But the subject has been so constantly discussed that a treat-
ment of the federal amending process would be incomplete 
without it. In the words of Professor Mcilwain: 
"It requires considerable courage, or presumption, as some 
might prefer to style it, to ask a reader's attention once more 
to so well-worn a topic as sovereignty. Few political concep-
tions have been the subject of so much discussion amongst us 
in the last hundred years. But this very fact is proof of its 
vital importance in our modern world; and the wide variety 
of the views held concerning its essence, as well as the conflict-
ing conclusions to which these views still lead, may furnish 
sufficient excuse for another attempt to clarify some of our 
ideas touching this central formula under which we try to 
rationalize the complicated facts of our modern political 
life." 8 
One is confronted also with Professor Mcilwain's chal-
lenge: "Our theory, such as it is, has been mainly a theory of 
lawyers who were usually content to accept their explanation 
of government as secondhand from later English legal sources 
such as the Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone .... " 9 
7 Dickinson, "New Avenues to Freedom," (1931) 25 MICH. L. REV. 6zz at 
623. Carl J. Friedrich is "inclined to discard for political science the concept 
of sovereignty (as well as that of the state) as of no scientific value for a realistic 
approach .... "Book Review, (1937) 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. z66. 
8 Mcilwain, "A Fragment on Sovereignty," (1933) 48 PoL. Sci. Q. 94· 
• Ibid. at 105• 
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It is the purpose of this discussion to deal with sovereignty 
from the point of view of law. It therefore becomes necessary 
to distinguish between what have been respectively called 
legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. A person or body 
is said to have legal sovereignty when he or it has unlimited 
law-making power, and when there is no person or body 
legally superior to him or it.10 Perhaps it would be correct to 
say that the possession of unlimited law-making power is 
enough, for it is difficult to see how there can be any superior 
to a group which can make laws on all subjects since that group 
could pass a law abolishing the powers of the supposed su-
perior. In other words, sovereignty is legal absolutism. By 
the political sovereign, on the other hand, is meant the group 
within a state which in actual fact determines the bent of gov-
ernmental action. Legal sovereignty is consciously exercised; 
political sovereignty generally is not. In a normally peaceful 
state the legal sovereign and the political sovereign will gen-
erally be coincident. But in time of disturbance political 
sovereignty may rest in the army, or in the Church, or in 
labor unions, or in other groups. The proper relation of the 
10 "It should, however, be carefully noted that the term 'sovereignty,' as long 
as it is accurately employed in the sense in which Austin sometimes uses it, is a 
merely legal conception, and means simply the power of law-making unrestricted 
by any legal limit." DICEY, LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (r9r5) 70. 
See also, r AusTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (1873) 226; BROWN, THE AUSTIN-
IAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) §§ 539, 545; BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND 
JURISPRUDENCE (1901) 505, 509; Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sov-
ereignty: I," (1927) 42 PoL. Sci. Q. 524 at 532; Harrison, "The English 
School of Jurisprudence," (r878) 30 FoRTNIGHTLY REV. 475 at 492; LEWIS, 
REMARKS ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF SoME PoLITICAL TERMS (r8p) 40; 
MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW, 6th ed. (1905) § 31; MERRIAM, HISTORY OF 
THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE RoUSSEAU (r9oo) 155, 218; POLLOCK 
A FIRST BooK OF JuRISPRUDENCE, 6th ed. (1929) 272; Ritchie, "On the Con-
ception of Sovereignty," (r89r) rAM. AcAD. PoL. Sci. ANNALS 385 at 392; 
WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 291; Mcilwain, "Sover-
eignty Again," (1926) 6 EcoNOMICA 253 at 256; COHEN, RECENT THEORIES 
OF SOVEREIGNTY (1937) 36, 84; EASTWOOD AND KEETON, THE AUSTINIAN 
THEORIES OF LAW AND SoVEREIGNTY (1929) 62, 67; EMERSON, STATE AND 
SoVEREIGNTY IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928) 255, 259; Chafee, Book Review, 
(r919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 979 at 980. 
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legal and the political sovereigns is one of the chief problems 
of a sound legal system and of good government. 
Much confusion might have been avoided if the term sov-
ereignty had been treated as an exclusively legal conception. 
It was first developed in the law. It has a genuine and, in most 
modern governments, an indispensable utility in describing 
the legal system of the state. It meets the need for certainty 
and precision as to the authoritative source of rules of law. 
Its use in political science has no particular value. The term 
"public opinion" or some similar phrase would be fully as 
descriptive, and would enable the student to grasp the mean-
ing of the word without the careful reading of the context 
which is now necessary. 
Sovereignty as a legal conception has sometimes been 
viewed as having two aspects: one external and one internal. 
The external sovereignty is the independence of the state in 
relation to other nations. The internal sovereignty is the re-
lation of the sovereign within the state to the individuals and 
associations within the state. The purpose of this discussion 
is to consider the latter type of sovereignty. As a matter of 
strict legal theory it seems hard to regard a mere internal or 
external sovereignty as a full sovereignty. From the point of 
view of constitutional law, the so-called internal sovereign 
has unlimited law-making power. Hence as a question of 
municipal law, the lawyer will concern himself only with the 
rules laid down by the internal sovereign irrespective of their 
compliance with international law. Only in a case before an 
international tribunal would the lawyer look to the limita-
tions on the so-called internal sovereignty laid down by in-
ternational law. Viewed as a question of constitutional law, 
the internal sovereign would be regarded as supreme both 
externally and internally by the English and American law-
yers. As J ellinek says, the so-called external sovereignty is 
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merely a reflex of the internal sovereignty.11 Thus from the 
point of view of constitutional law an amendment relating to 
territory outside of the nation would be valid. 
As a matter of fact, it is sometimes confusing to admit the 
use of the term sovereignty in international law. Etymologi-
cally the word means "superiority." Historically it is de-
scriptive of the relation existing between a state and its sub-
jects. "Properly interpreted, sovereignty is a term of consti-
tutional law and political science and not of international law, 
and it implies nothing more than the legal right of the state 
to determine its own internal life, regulate its own purely 
domestic affairs and make laws for its own subjects within its 
own territory." 12 
11 DIE LEHRE VON DEN STAATENVERBINDUNGEN (r 882) 23-24. Oppenheim 
says: "Sovereignty in the strict and narrowest sense of the term implies, there-
fore, independence all round, within and without the borders of the country." 
I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4th ed. (1928) § 64. 
As to the relation between municipal law and international law, most Anglo-
American writers assert the ultimate supremacy of the former as viewed from 
the standpoint of constitutional law. PICCIOTTO, THE RELATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(1915) j WRIGHT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH 
MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1916). The Continental writers 
are divided. See ANZILOTTI, IL D!RITTO INTERNAZIONALE NEI GIUDIZI INTERN! 
(1905); KAUFMANN, DIE RECHTSKRAFT DES INTERNATIONALEN RECHTS UND 
DAS VERHALTNITZE DER STAATSGESETZGEBUNGEN (1899) j KELSEN, DAS PROB-
LEM DER SOUVERANITAT UND DIE THEORIE DES VoLKERRECHTS (1928) 120 ff.; 
KRABBE, THE MoDERN IDEA OF THE STATE, translation (1922) 233 ff.; 
TRIEPEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT INTERNE (1920) 132-I52. A de-
cade ago the German, Austrian, and Esthonian constitutions provided that inter-
national law should form a part of the national law. See also MATTERN, CoN-
CEPTS OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928) 71; COHEN, 
RECENT THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (I937) 57-92. 
12 Garner, "Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations," 
(1925) I9 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. I at 6; Willoughby, "The Juristic Conception 
of the State," (I 9 I 8) I 2 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. I 92 at 202, takes the same view. 
Clark points out that "as a matter of juristic literature, independence ab extra 
has often been confused under the same title with the notion of a permanent 
internal superior, probably because of the practical indispensability of the latter, 
which I have previously pointed out, to any lasting external relations whatever." 
CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE (I883) I7J-I74· "As a substantive, sover-
eign is a term expressing the relation between part of a given political society, 
or state, and the remainder ...• " Ibid. I 74· "Indeed, the term sovereignty 
altogether, as used to express external independence of a state, is going out of 
use." Ibid. I75· Unfortunately, almost fifty years after the above statements were 
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Legal sovereignty, or simply sovereignty, as it will here-
after be designated, it seems to the writer, has perhaps five 
leading characteristics. In the first place, it is a matter of fact, 
or of fact and law (although admittedly this tends to confuse 
the distinction from political sovereignty). The law of a 
state may expressly or impliedly recognize the sovereign as 
such, but such recognition is not essential. The sovereign of a 
state exists as such as a matter of fact, although in the long 
run it also exists as a matter of law. For example, in England 
Parliament is sovereign, although there is no law to that effect. 
To say that sovereignty rests on law would be inconsistent, 
since the sovereign is the creator of law. 
A second characteristic ascribed to the sovereign by many 
writers is that it is absolute. It can pass a law on any subject 
it chooses, and such a law will be regarded as valid, in the 
sense that the courts of the state will enforce it. From the 
point of view of the lawyer, qua lawyer, it is sufficient that 
the sovereign has passed the law, and he will look no further 
as to its authority. If the body thought to be sovereign can 
legislate only on a limited range of subjects, it is not sovereign. 
In fact, the chief content of sovereignty is that its scope is un-
limited.13 That is, the sovereign is distinguished from any 
other legislative body in that it determines the limits of its 
own competence. If there is any other superior body or group 
written the term is still much used in international relations, as shown for 
example in the objections raised in the Senate to the League of Nations and the 
Permanent Court. 
From the point of view of international law, an internal limitation on the 
legal capacity of the state or its organ does not impair its independence in relation 
to other states. But from the point of view of constitutional law, there would 
seem to be a real limitation on sovereignty if the limitation is regarded as en-
forceable. As Salmond says, "all questions as to civil and supreme power are 
questions as to what is possible within, not without, the limits of the constitu-
tion." SALMOND, JuRISPRUDENCE, 7th ed. (1924) 531. 
13 "The theory of sovereignty says nothing about the content of the command. 
The only question is whether it issues from a proper source; an imperative issu-
ing from an authoritative source is law." KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF THE 
STATE (1922), p. xlvi of the Introduction by Sabine and Shepard. 
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which can repeal or modify the laws it passes, or which can 
take away or even alter the limits of its competence, it is not 
sovereign, even though the superior group seldom acts. The 
mere potentiality of its action is enough to strip the inferior 
body of its claim to sovereign powers. Sovereignty is defined 
as unlimited legislative power. If power is given to another 
group to legislate with respect to certain topics, the original 
sovereign no longer has absolute law-making powers. It can 
legislate only in the fields which it did not give up, and this 
violates the essence of sovereignty, that the extent of its ac-
tion has no limits as to subject matter.14 It may be that the 
first group and the latter group each has a range of powers 
which the other cannot disturb. But that alone is insufficient. 
What each group has is simply governmental power, and not 
sovereign power. Otherwise it would be proper in certain 
cases to speak of municipal corporations as being sovereigns, 
when the Constitution provides for "Home Rule," as in some 
state constitutions in the United States. 
In the third place, sovereignty is generally asserted to be 
indivisible. There is no inherent reason why this should be the 
case. It is a unit merely by definition. Sovereignty is an ab-
stract conception and not a universal found in all countries at 
all times. 
The fourth characteristic of sovereignty is that from the 
point of view of the lawyer the law passed by the sovereign 
need not be enforced, in particular cases at least. Looked at 
from a strictly juristic standpoint, the promulgation of a rule 
by the sovereign is enough to make the rule good law. Austin 
seems to have made obedience a prime factor in his definition 
of sovereignty: "If a determinate human superior, not in the 
habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedi-
"Willoughby seems to have underestimated the distinction between govern-
mental and constituent power when he says that they are "two classes of func-
tions that differ not as to kind, but only as to the subject matter with which they 
deal." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 206. Yet he later 
admits that "the amending clauses may fairly be said to be the most important 
clauses of any constitution." Ibid. 40 I. 
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ence from the bulk of a given society, that determinate su-
perior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including 
the superior) is a society political and independent.m·5 But 
jurists since Austin seem to have given less emphasis to en-
forcement, and regard it as a problem outside of the law. It 
is indeed the chief distinguishing mark of the political sov-
ereign, but only a postulate of the legal sovereign.16 In the 
long run, the legal sovereign must receive obedience to be such, 
but isolated violations of its laws do not detract from its char-
acter as sovereign. 
The fifth characteristic attributed to the sovereign by most 
writers is that it is determinate. Who the political sovereign 
is, is generally not determinate, since public opinion is a force 
which operates indirectly and circuitously. But unless the 
alleged legal sovereign can be ascertained, it must be con-
cluded that there is no such sovereign. To Austin must go 
the credit for having made determinateness a requisite of the 
sovereign.17 The Anglo-American lawyer is accustomed to 
viewing law as something commanded or permitted by the 
"'1 AUSTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (1873) 226. 
16 "Sovereignty is authority, not might." Mcilwain, "Sovereignty Again," 
(1926) 6 EcoNOMICA 253 at 256. 
The lawyer's "sole and ultimate standard of good law is the formal command 
of sovereign force supposed to be irresistible and unlimited." Harrison, "The 
English School of Jurisprudence," (1878) 30 FoRTNIGHTLY REv. 475 at 485. 
"The consideration of the limits on the sovereign power carries us outside of 
law courts, and therefore outside of law. If the sovereign be really sovereign, 
it will be able to compel its own law courts to enforce its own laws. Therefore, 
to t!te lawyer, and /or purposes of law, the sovereign is unlimited. Any limita-
tions on this sovereignty lie wholly outside the lawyer's province." Ibid. 490. 
John Dickinson says: "Legally a sovereign may well promulgate laws which 
actually he is unable to enforce." Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sover-
eignty: II," (1928) 43 PoL. Scr. Q. 32 at 43· See also BRYCE, STUDIES IN His-
TORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (1901) 509; HARRISON, ON JURISPRUDENCE AND 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1919) 24, 
17 "But Austin not only serves us by presenting in a typical form one theory of 
sovereignty, with its logical consequences worked out; he also, as it seems to me, 
points in the right direction in his emphasis upon determinateness." Dewey, 
"Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," (1894) 9 PoL, Sci. Q. 31 at 51, "Except 
as sovereignty secures for itself definite and definable modes of expression, sover-
eignty is unrealized and inchoate, Constitutional development has consisted pre-
cisely in creating definite ways in which sovereignty should exercise its powers." 
Ibid. 52. 
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sovereign. Unless this sovereign can be isolated, one cannot 
be sure that a law is valid, since it may turn out that it was not 
prescribed by the sovereign. In the words of Frederic Har-
nson: 
"But there are no limits to the absolute power of the sovereign 
within the range of municipal law; or, in other words, to the 
lawyer, there are none. Law, for the purposes of 
the lawyer, is a species of command issued by such a political 
supreme authority, to its political inferiors or subjects habit-
ually obeying it. Nothing that is not a command is law; and 
nothing commanded by anything but the supreme authority, 
as already defined, is law." 18 
Sovereignty and law are thus inseparably linked. The sov-
ereign having been located, the lawyer simply accepts his 
orders as law, without further consideration. This makes for 
simplicity and certainty in the law, and reduces sovereignty 
to a comparatively simple proposition as it relates to the prob-· 
lem of law. 
The meaning of determinateness is not to be too narrowly 
circumscribed. It may mean a single person or a group of 
persons. Austin himself attributed sovereignty to a specific 
person, or a specific group; or to the person or group which 
comes within a certain class. Thus in England sovereignty 
rests in the King in Parliament, that is in those persons who at 
the time happen to be the King, the members of the House 
of Lords, and the members of the House of Commons. Where 
the sovereign is a single person, it is easier to understand the 
18 Harrison, "The English School of Jurisprudence," (I 8 7 8) 3 o FoRTNIGHTLY 
REV. 475 at 484. Laski, "The Theory of Popular Sovereignty," (I9I9) I7 
MICH. L. REv. 2oi at 2I4, says: "For the lawyer, all that is immediately neces-
sary, is a knowledge of the authorities that are legally competent to deal with the 
problems that arise. For him, then, the idea of sovereignty has a particular and 
definite meaning. It does not matter that an act is socially harmful or unpop-
ular or morally wrong; if it issues from the authority competent to act, and is 
issued in due form, he has, from the legal stand-point, no further problems." 
See also, Ritchie, "On the Conception of Sovereignty," (I89I) I AM. ACAD. 
PoL. SCI. ANNALS 385; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (I928) 
293-294· 
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fact of his being sovereign. But a group, as long as it is def-
initely ascertainable, no matter how numerous, may also be 
sovereign according to the writers. Although it is combined 
for action according to artificial rules, it nevertheless is sov-
ereign. When the group acts, it acts corporately. This would 
seem to answer the objection of Dewey, who asks: "Ad-
mit, however, that sovereignty can be thus latent, then is 
every individual who composes this possible electorate a 
sharer in sovereignty?" 19 The sovereign may regulate the 
individual members of the group at will, and still be sov-
ereign, as each person when acting does not exercise an in-
dividual bit of sovereignty but the corporate sovereignty which 
belongs to the whole group. 
It has been seen that by sovereignty is meant unlimited 
law-making power. There have been many who have asserted 
that such a power must reside somewhere within every state.20 
Instead of being an abstract conception, applicable only to 
certain types of modern states, it has been thought to be a 
universal. Sovereignty has been placed in the King or Em-
peror. In England it is asserted to be in Parliament. In France 
(up to I 940 at any rate) it has been thought of as being in 
the Constituent Convention. In the United States it is con-
19 Dewey, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," ( r894) 9 PoL. Sci. Q. 31 at 39· 
John Chipman Gray also seems to have overlooked the corporate nature of the 
exercise of sovereignty. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) 
§ 176. And likewise, BLiss, OF SoVEREIGNTY ( r88 5) 125. 
20 "However they began, or by what right soever they subsist, there is and 
must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, 
in which the jura summa imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside." r BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ( r 7 56) 49· See also Ritchie, "On the Conception of 
Sovereignty," ( 1891) r AM. ACAD. PoL. SCI. ANNALS 3 8 5; WILLOUGHBY, THE 
NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 183, 195, 206. 
John Dickinson rests sovereignty not on an imperative theory of law, but "on 
the need for a single source of authoritative formulation." Dickinson, "A Work-
ing Theory of Sovereignty," ( 1927) 42 PoL. Sci. Q. 524 at 525, note. "Sover-
eignty in the legal sense is after all nothing more or less than a logical postulate 
or presupposition of any system according to law." Ibid. 525· See also, MARKBY, 
ELEMENTS OF LAW, 6th ed. (1905) § 36; EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY 
IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928) 272; CoHEN, RECENT THEORIES OF SOVER-
EIGNTY (1937) 145• 
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stantly reiterated that it is in the people of the United States. 
A group of French publicists of the early nineteenth century, 
Cousin, Guizot, and Constant, asserted the sovereignty of 
reason.21 
Closer analysis reveals, however, that there is no inherent 
necessity that a sovereign exist within a state. A study of early 
civilization reveals that many states have existed where there 
was no unlimited law-making power, and where custom or 
religion furnished the chief sources of the law. The kings and 
emperors of the Middle Ages regarded themselves as sub-
ject to the Law of God and the Law of Nature. With the 
establishment of the modern independent states of Europe, 
however, there came to be a real sovereign within each state. 
But the federal or composite state still presented the possibil-
ity of there being no sovereign in the state. If the framers of 
the Constitution had omitted any provision for amendment, 
as they might have done, it is difficult to see that there would 
be any sovereign in the United States.22 Possibly an implied 
power to make amendments in the same manner that the 
Constitution was adopted would be inferred. But even this 
possibility might have been anticipated by an express provi-
sion of the original Constitution that there should never be 
any amendments. Under this state of affairs the federal gov-
ernment would be confined to the powers granted to it, and 
the states to all other powers except those expressly denied 
to the states or those reserved to the people. Thus there could 
21 MERRIAM, HISTORY oF THE THEORY oF SovEREIGNTY SINCE RoussEAU 
(1900) 75-79. Bliss would eliminate the concept of sovereignty altogether. 
Buss, OF SovEREIGNTY (1885) 571 173, 175. Edwin D. Dickinson says that 
sovereignty "has been an excuse for vanity, a subterfuge for selfish ambition, and 
a screen for ignorance in international relations. Rarely if ever has it expressed 
a legal principle or standard unmistakably relevant to the substance of the par-
ticular problem or controversy." Dickinson, "New Avenues to Freedom," 
(1931) zs MICHL. REv. 6zz at 6zs. 
22 DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 8th ed. (1915) 143; BROWN, THE 
AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) 157, note; EASTWOOD AND KEETON, THE 
AUSTINIAN THEORIES OF LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY (192.9) 70. 
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be no redistribution of powers among the states and the fed-
eral government and the people. Inasmuch as the essence of 
sovereignty according to the usual definition consists in the 
ability to fix the sovereign's own competence, and that of the 
inferior groups, there would demonstrably be no sovereign. 
B. LOCATION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
It is conceivable that there might be no sovereign in the 
United States. But if there be one, it is a matter of the first 
importance to the lawyer to locate it, since it lies within the 
theoretical power of that sovereign to alter every rule which 
he is accustomed to regard as law. In the United States, 
powers are first divided between the federal government and 
the states. These powers in turn are subdivided between the 
executive, legislative, and judicial departments of each gov-
ernment. Outside of all these are the powers forbidden to 
the federal government, or to the state governments, and the 
powers reserved to the people. Apart even from these is the 
amending capacity itself, which can only be exercised by the 
federal government and the states jointly. 
A theory which seems to have been the prevalent one dur-
ing the period immediately after the Constitutional Conven-
tion was that sovereignty was divided between the states and 
the nation. 23 But sovereignty by definition is indivisible. The 
states and the federal government simply had plenary powers 
"" I STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
3d ed. (I858) §§ 207, 208; Cooley, "Sovereignty in the United States," (I892) 
I MICH. L. J. 8 I. Willoughby refers to all the legislative organs of the state, 
as well as the amending body, as exercising sovereign powers. He says that 
"all organs through which are expressed the volitions of the State, be they 
parliaments, courts, constitutional assemblies or electorates, are to be considered 
as exercising sovereign power, and as constituting in the aggregate the depository 
in which the State's Sovereignty is located." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF 
THE STATE (I928) 307. See also BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND }URIS-
PRUDENCE (I90I) 507. It would seem more accurate, however, to say that 
ordinary legislative bodies merely exercise powers which have been delegated 
·to them by the sovereign. 
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as to specific matters, and neither party could interfere with 
the powers of the other. Neither could determine its own 
legal competence. Both were subject to the amending body. 
Both the states and the federal government began later to 
claim exclusive sovereignty, and in the end all the disputants 
came to agree that sovereignty was a unit and indivisible. 
A second theory, made popular chiefly through the efforts 
of John Calhoun, was that sovereignty resides in the states. 
So firmly was the theory held that it largely brought on the 
Civil War. But when the tests of sovereignty described above 
are applied, it becomes evident that the view has no sound 
basis. The clauses of the original Constitution itself show the 
limitations which were placed on the so-called sovereignty 
of the states. Article One, section IO, forbids the states to make 
treaties, coin money, emit bills of credit, pass any bill of at-
tainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts, to lay duties on imports or exports, to lay tonnage 
duties, to keep troops or warships in time of peace, to enter 
into any agreement with another state, or with a foreign 
power, or to engage in war unless actually invaded. The Civil 
War Amendments and the recent amendments stripped them 
of further powers. A single state cannot amend the Constitu-
tion. The amending body is superior to it, and the state is 
bound by an amendment even though it does not ratify it.24 
24 It has frequently been pointed out that the subjection of the states to the 
amending power makes the United States a nation, instead of a confederacy. 
State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt, (r834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) rat 171, 172, 179 
(argument of Blanding); Madison in the debates of the Virginia Convention 
ratifying the Constitution, 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION (1937 reprint of 1836 2d ed.) 93-97; r CURTIS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (r899) 613; 2 ibid. 19, 
note; 9 DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 
( r 829), Appendix 38; r BuRGEss, PoLITICAL SciENCE AND CoMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1891) 144; HART, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
FEDERAL GovERNMENT (r89r) r8; JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNvENTIONS, 
4th ed. (r887) §§ 38, 57; PoMEROY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, roth ed. (r888) 
§III; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 263. The same 
argument was made as to the status of the states in Germany. EMERSON, STATE 
AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY (1928) 99· 
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The state therefore fails as to both tests of sovereignty: it has 
no unlimited law-making power, and it is subject to a supe-
rior, the amending body. 
During and immediately after the Civil War, the theory 
of sovereignty veered to the other extreme, and it was alleged 
that sovereignty was in the nation or in the federal govern-
ment. Assuming that there is such a thing as external sover-
eignty, it is perhaps substantially correct to say that it is vested 
in the federal government. Yet the treaty-making power is 
subject to limitations, so that the government does not have 
even a complete external sovereignty. As to internal powers, 
the federal government has only the powers expressly or 
impliedly conferred on it, and all other powers not prohib-
ited to the states are reserved to the states or to the people. 
Thus from one point of view the federal government has 
even less power than the states. Moreover, the federal gov-
ernment, like the states,-cannot amend the Constitution, and 
is itself subject to the amending body. It should be noted, 
however, that the recent decisions on the child labor amend-
ment look in the direction of making Congress in effect the 
sovereign by an application of the doctrine of political ques-
tions.25 
The doctrine of the Supreme Court and of many of the 
leading commentators on constitutional law has been, and 
still seems to be, that sovereignty is located in the people. 26 
This doctrine is ambiguous, perhaps conveniently so. As 
someone has pithily remarked, its "only force lies in the repu-
tation of its advocates." Savigny has pointed out that in gen-
.. Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v. 
Wise, (1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992. 
"" ". . . the people, in their collective and national capacity, established the 
present constitution. It is remarkable, that in establishing it, the people exercised 
their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and conscious of the plenitude 
of it, they declared with becoming dignity 'We, the people of the United States, 
do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Here we see the people acting as 
sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of sovereignty, establish-
ing a constitution by which it was their will, that the state governments should 
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eral "people" may have at least four meanings.27 It may in 
its broadest sense include all the persons living within the 
state during the whole time of the existence of the state. Ob-
viously it is difficult to view a legal rule as proceeding from 
such a group. In the second place, it may mean the sum of all 
the individuals as an organized group living within the state 
be bound, and to which the state constitutions should be made to conform." Jay, 
C. J., in Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793) 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 at 470-471. See 
also the opinion of Wilson, J., at 454· 
"The people of the United States, as one great political community, have 
willed that a certain portion of the government • • . should be deposited in 
and exercised by a national government; and that all matters of merely local 
interest should be deposited in and exercised by the state governments." Bradley, 
J., dissenting in Keith v. Clark, (1878) 97 U.S. 454 at 476. 
"The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different 
departments of its government; but in the people from whom the government 
emanated, and who may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then, in this 
country, abides with the constituency and not with the agent." Spooner v. 
McConnell, (C. C. Ohio 1838) r McLean 337 at 347, F. Cas. No. IJ245· 
"But in the last analysis the people are the sovereigns, and both the states and 
the United States are only serving instrumentalities. \Vhatever limitations are 
on such sovereignty are self-imposed." Feigenspan v. Bodine, (D. C. N. J. 
1920) 264 F. r86 at 191. 
See also McCulloch v. Maryland, (r8r9) 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316; Cohens 
v. Virginia, (r82r) 6 Wheat. (r9 U.S.) 264 at 413; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
(r886) 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. ro64. Sovereignty was asserted to be in the 
people of the states and not of the nation by McLean, J., in Worcester v. 
Georgia, (r832) 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 515; and Taney, C. J., in Ableman v. Booth, 
(r858) 21 How. (62 U.S.) 506 at 524. Jameson asserts that the view of 
popular sovereignty is accepted by "nearly all the writers, judges and lawyers 
who have expressed opinions on the subjects in the United States." Jameson, 
"National Sovereignty," ( r89o) 5 PoL. Sci. Q. 19 3 at 194. This is also the 
view of WooDROW WILSON, THE STATE (r9o6) 6ro. See also Willis, "The 
Doctrine of Sovereignty under the United States Constitution," ( 1929) 15 VA. L. 
REV.437· 
If sovereignty be dropped as a legal term and viewed solely as a term of 
political science and philosophy, the views of the Supreme Court and the writers 
are doubtless correct. It has been asserted that state sovereignty "is primarily 
not a legal, but a philosophical conception." Brierly, "The Shortcomings of 
International Law," BRITISH YEAR BooK (1924) 4 at 12. Pittman B. Potter 
says that it was a doctrine "which political scientists invented." Potter, "Political 
Science in the International Field," (1923) 17 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 381 at 385. 
Walter Thompson states that "it is doubtful if sovereignty can be retained as 
a purely legal concept." Book Review, (1938) 32 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 128 at 
129. 
"'r SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN KOMISCHEN RECHTS (r84o) § ro; see 
also Briggs, "Sovereignty and the Consent of the Governed," (r9or) 35 AM. 
L. REv. 49· 
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at the same time. The third view is that it means the latter 
individuals with the exception of the government. In the 
fourthplace, it may mean in republican states that particular 
organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the 
Constitution, the highest power really exists.28 Possibly this 
is what the Supreme Court has meant when it referred to the 
people as being sovereign. But its language has been alto-
gether too indefinite to make this clear. 
With particular reference to the United States, by people 
may be meant either the people of the United States or the 
people of the individual states. The view of the Supreme 
·Court has been that it means the former. Even accepting the 
former as being correct, it is not clear whether that means 
simply the electorate, or all citizens of the United States/9 or 
the people as a politically organized mass,30 or the people as . . 
an morgamc mass. 
The Constitution nowhere expressly refers to the people as 
sovereign. The assertions in the Declaration of Independence 
of the inalienable rights of the· people to liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness and the right to alter and abolish the gov-
ernment are nowhere repeated. Virtually the only mention 
of the people is in the Preamble and in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments. According to the Preamble the people of the 
28 "In the United States, indeed, the 'people' are the one original source of law, 
but it is the people in their entirely definite, aggregate, political, that is consti-
tutional organization that is meant here." 2 VON HoLsT, CoNSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1879) 75· 
"""The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous 
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, 
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the 
power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are 
what we call familiarly the 'sovereign people' and every citizen is one of this 
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty." Dred Scott v. Sanford, 
(r8s6) 19 How. (6o U.S.) 393 at 404. 
30 "But who are the people? In the true sense of the term, it means the 
political society considered as a unit, comprising in one organization the entire 
population of the state, of all ages, sexes, and conditions." }AMESON, CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed. (r887) § 568. 
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United States ordain and establish the Constitution. But it is 
a remarkable fact that the Preamble as originally drawn 
named each of the thirteen states individually and that a 
change was made only because it was not known which states 
would ratify the Constitution.31 Moreover the Preamble has 
no legal force. Even if the people were sovereign when they 
drew up the Constitution, they must be regarded as having 
given up their sovereignty when they provided for amend-
ment by others than themselves. The Ninth Amendment 
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people." The Tenth provides: "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people." Neither amendment confers any 
affirmative powers on the people, nor clarifies the meaning 
of the word. Sovereignty or the power to amend can scarcely 
be derived from them. The Supreme Court has recently de-
nied the right of popular referendum on amendments. 32 
It would seem clear that sovereignty does not lie in the 
corporate mass of the people of the United States, or in the 
organized citizenry. They have not the power to amend the 
Constitution. They do not even participate in the election 
of those who do have the amending power. The only sov-
ereignty which they can be said to have is of a strictly non-
legal character, that of the force of public opinion and phys-
ical force. If such a test is adopted, there is no state now, and 
there has been no time in history when the people were not 
soveretgn. 
It is, to be sure, somewhat closer to the truth to speak of the 
electorate as sovereign. But even that group does not meet the 
test of sovereignty. It cannot determine its own competence, 
81 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES (1836) 376. 
12 Hawke v. Smith, (19zo) z53 U.S. zz1, 40 S. Ct. 495· 
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and it is subject to a superior power. It simply elects those 
who do exercise the amending capacity. But election does 
not take place by a simple majority of the nation, or by a 
three-fourths majority. The election occurs within the limits 
of each state, and it is three-fourths of the states and not of 
the aggregate people that adopt amendments. The amending 
body is not the agent or the trustee of the electorate. 33 Once 
elected, the members of Congress and the state legislatures 
are free to adopt what amendments they will. They are ulti-
mately politically accountable to the people, but not legally 
so. The mere act of voting for those who exercise the amend-
ing capacity is not the passing of a law. It is a mere ministerial 
act at the most and does not bring into being a rule of law. 
Even the exercise of the voting capacity occurs in most cases 
biennially.34 In the event of the proposal of amendments by 
a national convention or ratification by state conventions, the 
electorate would as a matter of fact exercise considerable in-
fluence on particular constitutional changes, since election 
would be on the basis of the candidate's attitude towards the 
proposed amendments. But when proposal is by Congress and 
ratification by the legislatures, so many issues are involved 
in the election that the candidate's attitude concerning pro-
posed amendments is likely to be overlooked or ignored. 
Only in the event that Article Five was amended so that the 
33 DrcEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (I 9I5) 45; Ritchie, "On 
the Conception of Sovereignty," (1891) I AM. ACAD. PoL. Scr. ANNALS 385 at 
392; LEWIS, SOME REMARKS ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF SoME POLITICAL 
TERMS (I832) 43; BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (I 9oi) 
510,538. D. 0. McGovney seems in error when he argues that sovereignty "re-
sides in the whole people of the United States conceived of as one nation" since 
the amending "machinery consists throughout of representatives of the people." 
McGovney, "Is the Eighteenth Amendment Void Because of Its Contents?" 
(I 920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 499 at 506. Bruce Williams adopts the same line of 
reasoning in "The Popular Mandate on Constitutional Amendments," ( 192 I) 
7 VA. L. REV. 28o at 283. 
34 "How can a people be sovereign when, e. g., they may pass upon public 
matters only once in four years, or may have their legislative acts revoked by 
juristic review/" WARD, SOVEREIGNTY (I928) 32. 
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electorate actually voted on a proposed amendment could it 
be said that the electorate was sovereign; and if each state 
were counted as a unit, as it is now, sovereignty would be re-
garded as in the electorates of the states and not of the nation. 
Even then it would be necessary to say that sovereignty is 
in the electorate together with the body which proposed the 
amendment. Not until the electorate is given both the initi-
ative and the referendum on amendments will it be strictly 
accurate to speak of it as sovereign.35 Even then, if the other 
modes of proposal and ratification are retained, there will re-
main the possibility of the exercise of sovereignty by other 
groups besides the people. 
The people of the United States as an aggregate mass may 
perhaps be regarded as having been truly sovereign at only 
one time. This was when they adopted the Constitution. 36 
This act of sovereignty was, however, a revolution and had 
no legal basis. Under the Articles of Confederation sover-
eignty was located in each state, and amendment of the Arti-
cles was valid only when every state concurred through rati-
fication by its legislature after proposal by Congress. The 
Constitution was proposed by a Convention, was ratified by 
conventions, and was considered as established between the 
ratifying states when nine states had ratified. The people of 
the United States may be regarded as having acted in a sov-
ereign capacity by having ignored the Articles of Confedera-
tion and perhaps their own state constitutions. When critically 
"""The legal assumption that sovereignty is ultim.ately vested in the people 
affords no legal basis for the direct exercise by the people of any sovereign power 
whose direct exercise by them has not been expressly or impliedly reserved. 
Thus the people possess the power of legislating directly only if their constitution 
SO provides." ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 8 .. 
86 "The people themselves in their natural, inherent sovereignty, but rarely 
interpose and decide,-never but in making or altering a constitution." 9 DANE, 
A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW (1829), Appendix 
65. It has been asserted that the true sovereign has acted only three times in the 
United States: when it adopted the Declaration of Independence, the Articles 
of Confederation, and the Constitution. Radin, "The Intermittent Sovereign," 
(1930) 39 YALE L. }. 514 at 525· 
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examined, however, their alleged acts of sovereignty dwindle 
in scope. The electorate which participated in the elections 
of the state ratifying conventions was perhaps about a twentieth 
of the entire population. 37 Moreover, Congress and the state 
legislatures gave their stamp of approval to the Constitution. 
Thus the sole revolutionary act was ratification by less than a 
unanimous vote. Even the effect of this violation was consid-
erably mitigated by providing that the Constitution should 
be binding only on those states which ratified it. It should also 
be noted that the members of the Constitutional Convention 
were elected by states and voted by states during its session. 
Ratification also occurred by states, and not by an aggregate 
popular vote or by a national convention of the people of the 
United States. 
If the people of the United States ever had sovereignty, 
they must be regarded as having surrendered it by the adop-
tion of Article Five. 38 All future changes were to be made not 
by the people but by the amending body. The original sover-
37 BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1935) 250. I AUSTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (1873) 329-
3 3 o, says: "In a few societies political and independent (as, for example, in the 
Anglo-American States), the sovereign political government has been deter-
mined at once, and agreeably to a scheme or plan. But, even in these societies, 
the parties who determined the constitution (either as scheming or planning, or 
as simply voting or adopting it) were merely a slender portion of the whole 
of the independent community, and were virtually sovereign therein before the 
constitution was determined; insomuch that the constitution was not constructed 
by the whole of an inchoate community, but rather was constructed by a fraction 
of a community already consummate or complete." See also BROWN, THE 
AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) §_417, 
08 The Constitution "is supreme over the people of the United States, aggre-
gately and in their separate sovereignties, because they have excluded themselves 
from any direct or immediate agency in making amendments to it, and have 
directed that amendments should be made representatively for them .• , ." 
Dodge v. Woolsey, (r855) r8 How. (59 U.S.) 331 at 348. When the people 
adopted the Constitution, "they delegated the power of amendment to their 
representatives, designating them and prescribing the function of each ..•• 
This delegated power the people have never retaken. Having so delegated 
the power of amendment, it cannot be executed in any way other than prescribed, 
nor by any instrumentality other than there designated." Feigenspan v. Bodine, 
(D. C. N. ]. 192o) 264 F. 186 at 199. 
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eign created a minor sovereign, the amending body, some-
what lesser than itself. This amending body was subjected to 
three limitations, two of which have expired, so that today the 
only limitation on the power is the equal suffrage clause. On 
the view that the power which may impose such a limitation is 
sovereign, the people may be regarded as the sovereign and 
the amending body as the agent of the original people. But 
even this limitation may be destroyed by a unanimous vote 
of the states, and in the case of the deprivation of a particular 
state of equality in the Senate by the consent of that state. 
Perhaps even this would not be necessary if the doctrine of 
political question were applied. Thus it is difficult to see how 
a body so powerful as the amending body can be regarded 
as the legal agent of the people. Even on the assumption that 
it can be regarded as the agent of the people, this can only 
mean the agent of the original people, and as they are all dead, 
the agency can have no practical importance. The present 
amending body, which theoretically can strip the people of 
any of the rights which they have, political, property, or 
personal, must be regarded as an independent body, and the 
people as mere subjects in strict legal theory. 
It has sometimes been thought that sovereignty resides in 
the Supreme Court of the United States. There is no question 
that, except in the case of political questions, the acts of the 
other branches of the federal government and of all branches 
of the state governments are subject to ultimate review by it 
when such acts are in conflict with the Constitution. The Su-
preme Court has been called the master of the Constitution.39 
It exercises a power not included within the jurisdiction of 
the English courts, that of reviewing the acts of the legisla-
ture. But the alleged difference between the Supreme Court 
and the courts of other nations is not so great as at first blush 
appears. Congress is not sovereign; Parliament is. If an act 
89 DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 8th ed. (1915) 170-171. 
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of Congress violates a clause in the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court may declare it invalid when a case is brought before it. 
But when the amending body changes a clause in the Consti-
tution, the Supreme Court has no power in the matter. True 
enough, the amendment must have been adopted according 
to the proper procedure. But where the proper procedure has 
not been followed, it cannot be said that the sovereign has 
acted. An alleged act of Parliament would not be regarded as 
law by an English court unless Parliament actually adopted 
it in its regular mode. The Supreme Court may also ascertain 
the conformity of the amendment to the equal suffrage clause, 
but this is probably its only power as to the content of the 
amendment. It would not even have this power where every 
state ratified, or when the state deprived of its equal suffrage 
ratified the amendment so depriving it. 
The amending body may nullify a decision of the Supreme 
Court. Such was the effect of the Eleventh and the Sixteenth 
Amendments. Such would be the effect of the child labor 
amendment. It might even abolish the Supreme Court itself. 
John Dickinson asserts: 
"Should the Supreme Court declare a law unconstitutional, 
it remains open to the amending power to reverse this re-
sult by so changing the Constitution as to bring the law into 
conformity therewith. But even in case this is done, the last 
word remains with the Court through its power to establish 
authoritatively the validity and meaning of the amend-
ment."40 
Perhaps this is true in actual practice. But as a matter of legal 
theory it is not. The justices of the Supreme Court take an 
oath to support the Constitution. The court is a mere agent 
of the United States like the President and Congress. It de-
rives its being from the Constitution, and hence must con-
.., Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty," (I 927) 42 PoL. Sci. Q. 
P4 at 540-541. 
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form its action to the terms of the instrument. An amendment 
adopted according to the proper procedure and not in viola-
tion of the equality clause is as much a part of the Constitu-
tion as any other clause in the original document. An amend-
ment in unequivocal terms abolishing the Supreme Court 
would be as binding on it as any other amendment. It would 
seem to be a case of clear usurpation should the court regard 
as invalid an amendment which clearly came within the scope 
of the amending power. The members of the Supreme Court 
are subject to impeachment. The membership of the court 
may be increased by Congress. Its decisions may be reversed 
by a later court. It has greatly limited its own jurisdiction 
by laying down the doctrine of "political questions." In fact, 
it has recently done so as to certain phases of the amending 
process in the child labor amendment cases. 41 As a matter 
of fact, though not of law, the Supreme Court would be very 
chary in running counter to the will of the amending body. 
As yet it has never set up its view as against that of the amend-
ing body. 
The tremendous prestige enjoyed by the Constitution may 
lead some to think that the document itself must be regarded 
as sovereign. Harrington's aphorism about "government of 
laws and not of men" is almost a banality in the law of Great 
Britain and the United States. But sovereignty, by definition, 
must be vested in a person or in a group. Consequently, to say 
that sovereignty is in the Constitution is equivalent to saying 
that no sovereignty exists. The Constitution was not handed 
down on a mountain top like the Ten Commandments. A 
determinate group adopted it, and they must at the time, at 
least, have been its superior and the then sovereign. The death 
of its makers did not leave the Constitution sovereign, because 
41 Coleman v. Miller, ( 1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972; Chandler v. Wise, 
(1939) 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992. 
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it at once became subject to alteration by the amending body. 
The Constitution itself cannot redistribute the powers of the 
federal and the state governments, and being subject to a 
superior power, fails in all respects to meet the tests of sov-
ereignty. The Constitution by itself is incapable of action. 
Just as the so-called unwritten constitution of Great Britain 
is subject to change by Parliament, so the written Constitution 
of the United States may be reviewed or abolished by the 
amending body. Thus, in one sense, it is as proper to speak of 
the Constitution of the United States as having only the force 
of morality as it is to speak thus of the constitutional law of 
Great Britain. 
The development of the theory of the corporate personality 
of the state has resulted in the location by some of sovereignty 
in the state. W. Jethro Brown says: 
"The possibility of the location of the sovereignty in the State 
itself is implicitly recognized in all modern theories which 
state legal limitations upon the power which ranks highest 
in the hierarchy of State institutions. The sovereign is the 
source of all law, and so cannot be limited by law; where a 
legal limitation is held to exist upon a power claimed to be 
sovereign, we are compelled to infer that legal theory looks 
beyond the pretended sovereign to the State itself as true sov-
ereign and ultimate source of law." 42 
But this theory does not seem to be especially helpful. In the 
first place it necessitates a definition of a ~tate. A bog of con-
troversy must be waded through before agreement can be 
reached on its juristic meaning. Austin says: 
"The state is usually synonymous with 'the sovereign.' It de-
notes the individual person, or the body of individual per-
.. BRowN, THE AuSTINIAN THEORY OF LAw (1906) § 541. See also EAST-
wooD AND KEETON, THE AUSTJNJAN THEORIES OF LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY 
(1929) 67, 76; WARD, SoVEREIGNTY (1928) 39-44; EMERSON, STATE AND 
SovEREIGNTY IN MoDERN GERMANY (1928) 51-59; Rockow, "The Doctrine 
of the Sovereignty of the Constitution," (1931) 25 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 573 at 
580. 
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sons, which bears the supreme powers in an independent po-
litical society." 43 
The state is thus made identical with the sovereign. But to 
say that the state is the sovereign manifestly does not help 
in the search for the sovereign, and merely begs the question. 
Gray attacks Austin's definition, asserting that the sover-
eign is merely an organ of the state. 44 But to view sovereignty 
as vested in the abstract conception of the state is, so far as 
law is concerned, to make sovereignty an even more meta-
physical conception than it now is. Sovereignty can only be 
exercised through concrete organs. Unless there is some organ, 
either in being or dormant, which can legally pass a given 
measure, it is futile to look to a mere legal fiction to accom-
plish the result. It is not difficult to conceive of a constitution 
with so limited an amending capacity that certain measures 
can only be passed by revolutionary methods. Doubtless it 
43 I AusTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. (I873) 249, note. Burgess says that "in 
the transition from one form of state to another, the point of sovereignty moves 
from one body to another, and the old sovereign body, i.e. the old state, becomes, 
in the new system, only the government, or a part of the government." I BuR-
GEss, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE 'CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (I 89I) 68. 
The amending clause has a very important bearing on the juristic theory of 
the state from the point of view of constitutional law. It is sometimes maintained 
by those who have viewed the state in its internal as distinct from its external 
aspect that an essential characteristic of the state is that it have a sovereign. 
Willoughby says: "But to speak of a State as not being completely organized in 
its government, seems as much an absurdity as to say that a man is not completely 
organized in his physical frame." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE 
(I 928) 206. "An organized community of men either constitute or do not 
constitute a State, according to whether there is or is not to be discovered a 
supreme will acting upon all persons or other bodies within its limits." Ibid. 224. 
The existence of the amending capacity thus supplies the sovereignty which is 
necessary to the full and perfect existence of the state. As Burgess says: "The 
state, however, was not organized in the confederate constitution; i. e., it could 
not legally speak the sovereign command." I BuRGEss, PoLITICAL SciENCE AND 
CoMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw (I89I) Ioi. 
44 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoURCES OF THE LAW (I909) § ISO. Willoughby, 
who stresses the juristic status of the state, almost concedes that the state and the 
sovereign are identical. "In fact, it is almost correct to say that the sovereign 
will is the State, that the State exists only as a supreme controlling will, and that 
its life is only displayed in the declaration of binding commands, the enforce-
ment of which is left to mere executive agents." WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF 
THE STATE (I928) 302, 
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would be convenient to have a body which could legally adopt 
any proposed measure according to legal forms. But from the 
point of view of the lawyer this is not at all a necessity. In a 
federal state such as the United States where it is so difficult to 
ascertain what the state is, it seems better for the law to ignore 
the conception of a state and to emphasize the existence of a 
sovereign in the form of an amending body, which, if need be, 
may possibly be viewed as the juristic state. 
Another theory which once attracted considerable support 
was the view that sovereignty is in the states united. By this 
is not meant sovereignty in the states severally, nor sover-
eignty in the federal government, but sovereignty in the ag-
gregate of the states. This was the view of Austin: 
"And, lastly, I believe that the sovereignty of each of the 
states, and also of the larger state arising from the federal 
union, resides in the states' governments as forming one ag-
gregate body: meaning by a state's government, not its or-
dinary legislature, but the body of its citizens which appoints 
its ordinary legislature, and which, the union apart, is prop-
erly sovereign therein." 45 
John C. Hurd has written a bulky volume in support of this 
view.46 The theory is, however, subject to two criticisms. It re-
gards the electorates of the states united as sovereign. As has 
been pointed out, this is a confusion of political sovereignty 
with legal sovereignty, inasmuch as the voters have no direct 
voice in the creation of constitutional law. In the second place, 
it omits Congress from the sovereign power. It is a mistake 
to regard the states as sovereign simply because amendments 
are ultimately ratified by them.47 The power of Congress in 
'" 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. ( 1873) 268. 
'"HURD, THE THEORY OF OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE (r88r), esp. 140, 374• 
This book is "Dedicated in Homage to the Sovereign: Whoever He, She, or 
They, May Be." The same view is taken by BROWNSON, THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (1866) zzo-221. See also Richman, "From John Austin to John 
C. Hurd," (1901) 14 HARV. L. REv. 353· 
17 Dicey omits to include Congress as a part of the Sovereign. DICEY, THE 
LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed. (1915) 144-145· 
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the matter is at least equal to that of the states. An amend-
ment is never brought about without prior initiation by Con-
gress. Even when a constitutional convention is applied for by 
the state legislatures, the call must go forth from Congress. 
Congress, moreover, has the power to select the mode of rati-
fication. Looked at from one angle, Congress has a dual ca-
pacity in proposing amendments. It actually initiates the 
amendment, while, at the same time, its vote in favor of it 
is in a way a vote of ratification, inasmuch as, without it, the 
amendment cannot even go before the states. It is in Congress 
that amendments have been buried. The initiatory powers of 
the state legislatures have never as yet been brought to a suc-
cessful fruition. It thus appears that the powers of the federal 
government with reference to amendments are fully equal to 
those of the states. A true sovereign must therefore embrace 
both governments. The states are sovereign neither indi-
vidually nor aggregately. 
In the last analysis, one is brought to the conclusion that 
sovereignty in the United States, if it can be said to exist at 
all, is located in the amending body. The amending body has 
often been referred to as the sovereign, because it meets the 
test of the location of sovereignty.48 As Willoughby has said: 
"In all those cases in which, owing to the distribution of 
governing power, there is doubt as to the political body in 
48 "In a government controlled and limited by a written Constitution as is ours, 
the test of actual sovereignty is to be found in the power to amend the Consti-
tution. When you ascertain where, and how, and by whom that power is exer-
cised, you have located the source of sovereignty." Potter, "The Method of 
Amending the Federal Constitution," (1909) 57 U. PA. L. REv. 589 at 592. See 
also State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt, (1834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) 1 (an early case 
with a valuable discussion of the relation of sovereignty to the amending power) 
at 61 (argument of Grimke), 127 (of M'Willie), at 165, 166, 169, 172 (of 
Blanding), at 108 (of Smith, Attorney General), at 221 (opinion of O'Neall, 
J.), at 259, 26o1 263 (dissenting opinion of Harper, J.); BLiss, OF SovER-
EIGNTY (1885) 114, 124 ff.; Dewey, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," 
(1894) 9 PoL. Sci. Q. 31 at 39; DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th 
ed. (1915) 51 I44-I45; HART, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF FEDERAL 
GoVERNMENT (I 89 I) 12; Lansing, "Notes on Sovereignty in a State," (I 907) 
I AM. J. INT. LAW I05 at 126, who says, however, that the English doctrine 
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which the Sovereignty rests, the test to be applied is the de-
termination of which authority has, in the last instance, the 
legal power to determine its own competence as well as that of 
others." 49 
In Germany, where the problem of the location of sover-
eignty has also been complicated by the existence of a com-
posite state, the publicists have similarly developed what is 
known as the Kompetenz-Kompetenz theory.50 Hobbes, the 
first Englishman with whom the theory of sovereignty is 
prominently associated, expressed the same view when he 
said that "the legislator is he, not by whose authority the law 
was first made, but by whose authority, it continues to be a 
law." 51 
Applying the criteria of sovereignty which were laid down 
at the beginning of this chapter, the amending body is sover-
eign as a matter of both law and fact. Article Fiveexpressly 
creates the amending body. Yet in a certain manner of speak-
ing the amending body may be said to exist as a matter of fact 
since it could proceed to alter Article Five or any other part 
of the Constitution. While it is true that the sovereign cannot 
act otherwise than in compliance with law, it is equally true 
that it creates the law in accordance with which it is to act. 
of sovereignty is incapable of "being usefully applied" to constitutions like that 
of the United States; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 7th ed. (1924) 531, note k; 
PoLLOCK, A FIRST BooK OF JuRISPRUDENCE, 6th ed. (1929) 278; SIDGWICK, 
THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS ( 1891) 17, 6o2; Williams, "The Popular Mandate 
on Constitutional Amendments," (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 28o at 293, who asserts 
that the implication of Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495, 
is "that legal sovereignty in the United States rests in those bodies which are 
capable of altering or amending the Constitution"; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE 
OF THE STATE (1928) 260 :ff., 304. 
'"'WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 197· See also Radin, 
"The Intermittent Sovereign," (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 514 at 523, 526; Pen-
nock, "Law and Sovereignty," (1937) 3I AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 617 at 632; 
Uhl, "Sovereignty and the Fifth Article," (I 9 3 6) I 6 SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL 
SCI. Q., No.4, p. I at IS· 
150 MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU 
(1900) 19o-196. See also EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN 
GERMANY (19z8). 
01 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), C. xxvi, par. 9· 
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And the doctrine of political questions in effect lessens the 
legal restraints on sovereignty. In practice most sovereigns 
come into being as a matter of fact. Thus originally the Con-
stitution was adopted as a revolutionary act, and the amend-
ing body, resting as it does on a part of the Constitution, was 
at first a de facto sovereign. The passage of time has made 
people forget that the Constitution was in its origin anything 
but legal, so that today the amending body may be viewed 
as sovereign in law and in fact. 
In the second place, the amending body has absolute law-
making power, unless factual limitations be also viewed as 
legal limitations. At any rate it is possible to go as far as 
Bentham, who says that the sovereign has indefinite law-
making power. 52 The amending body may strip the federal 
government of all its powers, or it may consolidate all the 
states into a single unitary state. It may place the powers of 
all three departments of government in a single department. 
It may legislate, as by passing a prohibition amendment. It 
may act as a court, as by overruling a decision of the Supreme 
Court. It may add to or subtract from the powers reserved to 
the people. It may alter the very amending body itself. It may 
revise not only the rules of constitutional and criminal law, 
but those of property and contract. It may strip the individual 
of personal liberty which he may have regarded as inalienable. 
That it will attempt to do all or even a small part of these 
things is unlikely. The outcome doubtless would be a revolu-
tion. But that it has an indefinite power to do any particular 
one of these things cannot be denied. As DeLolme says of 
Parliament, so it may be said of the amending body, that it 
"can do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a 
woman." 
112 BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, 1st ed. (1776), c. iv, 
par. xxiii. 
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From one point of view, the power of the amending body is 
even more despotic than that of the British Parliament. The 
common view is that one Parliament is not bound by the laws 
of a previous Parliament. That is, in actuality, there is an 
implied limitation on sovereignty with reference to time. But 
in the United States the amending body might arguably by 
express provision forbid any future change of a clause in the 
Constitution. For instance, the Corwin amendment provided 
that the Constitution should never be amended so as to abolish 
slavery. 53 However, this, like the equality provision, could 
probably be repealed by a unanimous vote of the states. The 
original Constitution forbade any amendment with reference 
to the slave trade or the imposition of a direct tax without ap-
portionment prior to I 8o8. The equal suffrage clause is still 
a limitation on the ordinary amending power. The amending 
body might amend the amending clause or might arguably 
abolish itself, so that legally there would be no possibility of 
amendment. It might provide for an altogether different type 
of amending body, so that an entirely different kind of sover-
eign would come into being. Sovereignty, viewed in the broad-
est sense, may be regarded as the power to make a law on any 
subject binding for all time in all places. This capacity the-
oretically exists in the amending body. However inexpedient 
such an amendment might be, it would seem that that would 
be the view of many American lawyers. 54 There are not many 
who assert that the ordinary amending body could abolish 
the equal suffrage clause. It would seem that under the pre-
vailing legalistic interpretation of the Constitution an absolute 
prohibition against amendment could be overcome only by 
revolution. 55 
03 H. J. R. 8o, CoNG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., zd sess. (I 86I) 12.63. 
"'Austin, however, is of the view that the sovereign cannot bind its successor. 
I AUSTIN, JuRISPRUDENCE, 5th ed. (I88s) 2.63-2.64. 
56 But Professor RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (I939) 9-Io, states: 
"There has been found no case in which the power to amend has been employed 
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From a legal standpoint it is not a necessary concomitant 
of this absolute law-making power that every amendment be 
enforceable. The lawyer is interested only in the source of the 
act, and that source being authoritative, he will ask no more 
questions. The lack of enforcement of the Fifteenth and Eight-
eenth Amendments did not detract from their legal character. 
Of course, if the whole Constitution was ignored over a con-
siderable period, there would probably be a change in the 
sovereign. But for ordinary purposes, when the amending 
body has acted, the lawyer accepts its command as law. 
The amending body is determinate. It has been pointed out 
that sovereignty may reside in a group as well as in a person. 
Moreover, this group need not be a single organized body 
meeting at one place, but may be composed of several groups 
viewed as a corporate unit. As John Dickinson says, "sover-
eignty can be exercised by a system of organs properly geared 
together no less than by a single organ." 56 Hence it is that 
sovereignty may be regarded as being in the amending body 
though that body is composed of both federal and state units 
meeting at forty-nine different places. All the units are viewed 
as one single corporate or collegiate body, and each when it 
acts does not exercise its own sovereignty but exercise_s the 
corporate sovereignty. Doubtless the three-fourths majority 
of the states that combine to adopt one amendment will be di-
to directly or indirectly modify a constitutional provision expressly excepted 
from that power. The issues that such an attempt would raise could not be 
settled by any reasoning derived by logical processes from prevailing con-
ceptions of sovereignty, and those based on considerations of convenience and 
expediency point to the solution that such attempts to limit the power of 
amendment should be held futile. The necessities of orderly government do 
not require that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all 
future generations." 
50 Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty," (1927) 42 PoL. Sci. 
Q. 524 at 539· This would seem to meet the objection of Bliss, who argues 
that an amendment requires "the action of the federal State and of the several 
local States, each in its own sphere. There is no one sovereignty, or one sovereign 
people, or aggregate of peoples, that can make the change." BLiss, OF SOVER-
EIGNTY (188 5) 114. 
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vided as to another. But this does not detract from the sover-
eign character of the amending power any more than in the 
case of Parliament, which also acts by a majority.57 Sover-
eignty is not in any specific three-fourths of the states, but it 
is clear that it always is in any three-fourths of them that unite 
in ratifying an amendment. Similarly it is never clear whether 
proposal of amendments will be by Congress or by a conven-
tion, nor whether ratification will be by the state legislatures 
or by conventions. Yet when these have acted, it appears that 
the sovereign has acted. The sovereign is a real sovereign, 
though one fluctuating in its composition. It is known only 
after it has acted. The groups in whom the possibility of 
amending resides are the potential sovereign, and in that sense 
it may be said that sovereignty resides in the full quota of all 
possible amending groups. But the exercise of sovereignty, 
which is of more interest to the lawyer than its residence, is by 
the actual amending power at a given time. The larger group 
is merely a container of the smaller, and there is no difference 
as to the legal effects of their acts. The larger group is merely 
the political group from which over a long period every state 
at some time or other will be a part of the amending power. 
There· is one type of situation where prima facie it seems 
that a minority is sovereign in the United States. A minority 
of the states may block an amendment. A single state may 
defeat the abolition of the equal suffrage clause. But a true 
sovereign must have no superior and must have affirmative 
law-making power. A minority is superior only in a negative 
way. As Gray admits, "this minority cannot be called Sover-
eign; except as an obstacle to amending the Constitution, it is 
powerless." 58 
57 "The Austinian sovereign acts only by a majority, never in fact by its 
total membership. . • ." Jameson, "National Sovereignty," (189o) 5 PoL. 
SCI. Q. 193 at 200. See also MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1888) 
J51-J52. 
158 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) § 177. 
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It is a peculiarity of the American sovereign that who it is 
can never be known precisely until it has acted. 59 This does 
not detract from its sovereign character, as it is enough that it 
is definitely known when it has acted. There are four possible 
combinations of the amending body in the United States. In 
every instance except one the power has been made up of 
Congress and the state legislatures. In the case of the Twenty-
First Amendment it was made up of Congress and the state 
conventions. It may also be made up of two-thirds of the state 
legislatures applying for a convention, Congress in calling the 
Convention, the Convention, Congress in selecting the mode 
of ratification, and the state legislatures in ratifying. A fourth 
possible combination is of the legislatures in applying for a 
convention, Congress in calling it, the Convention, Congress 
in selecting the mode of ratification, and state conventions in 
ratifying. Congress thus must participate in any amendment, 
and has the power of selecting which group shall be the ratify-
ing part of the sovereign. The group within the group that 
acts as part of the sovereign may also fluctuate. The two-
thirds of Congress which proposes one amendment will vary 
from the group which proposes another. Similarly the three-
fourths majority of the states which ratifies one amendment 
will differ from the majority which ratifies another. 
The amending body as a corporate unit is responsible to no 
one. But the groups of which it is composed have no such 
freedom. The amending body may abolish or strip any of the 
groups of its powers. The result of abolishing either the fed-
eral or the state groups would, however, be to destroy the 
federal character of the United States. If the state groups were 
destroyed, the United States would in effect become a unitary 
state. On the other hand, if the federal group were abolished, 
.. "We come here, as before to an insoluble contradiction; sovereignty is not 
determinate until after it has been exercised-until the vote has been taken." 
Dewey, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," (x 894) 9 PoL. Scr. Q. 3 x at 40. 
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the Union would be on its way to a mere confederation. While 
it would be legal to change the composition of the sovereign, 
the suggested changes would mean the destruction of the 
federal status. 
It has sometimes been thought that the sovereign must be 
constantly in session or must act frequently. 6° From a legal 
standpoint this is not necessary. A latent potential sovereign is 
enough. The dissolution of the House of Commons makes 
Parliament nonetheless the sovereign. An Asiatic despot is 
sovereign even when asleep. A half a century elapsed between 
the passage of the Twelfth and the Thirteenth Amendments, 
so that the amending power was regarded as so dormant a 
sovereign as not to be worthy of the name. The three Civil 
War Amendments were adopted within a five-year span. 
Forty years passed with no further changes. But within the 
seven-year period from I 9 I 3 to I 920, four amendments of 
outstanding importance were adopted, and a child labor 
amendment was shortly thereafter proposed to the states. 
The Twentieth and Twenty-First Amendments were adopted 
in the early I 9 30's. The sovereign has become so vigorous that 
there are now many who would seek to curb it. The formerly 
prevalent view as to the weakness of the sovereign has now 
either swung to the opposite extreme, or maintains that it has 
just the proper degree of strength. During periods of non-
action it may perhaps be said, with some equivocation, that 
"""Suppose a generation has passed away since any amendment has been passed, 
or since any legislature has acted upon any amendment proposed by Congress; 
where is the portion or class constituting the sovereign to be found?" Dewey, 
ibid. at 39· "Under a federal as under a unitarian system there exists a 
sovereign power, but the sovereign is in a federal state a despot hard to rouse. 
He is not, like the English Parliament, an ever-wakeful legislature, but a 
monarch who slumbers and sleeps. • . . But a monarch who slumbers for 
years is like a monarch who does not exist." DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTI-
TUTION, 8th ed. (1915) 145· See also BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF 
LAW (1906) 148, note at 153; BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND }URIS-
PRUDENCE (1901) 539; WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 
305; EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY (1928) 271 1 
note 6; Chafee, Book Review, (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV. 979 at 98o, 
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the sovereign commands what it permits. 61 Legal sovereignty 
may be in abeyance. The theory of sovereignty does not have 
the same significance in the United States as it does in Eng-
land, inasmuch as it is an organization behind that of the 
regular government and because so large a majority is re-
quired for it to act. Under such circumstances it is easily ex-
plicable why so little thought is devoted to the alleged sover-
eign and why so much attention is given to the powers of the 
organs of government as distributed under the existing Con-
stitution. The events of recent American history are likely 
to result in the study the subject deserves. 
Perhaps the leading obstacle to the recognition of sover-
eignty in the amending body is the limitation imposed by the 
equal suffrage in the Senate clause.62 In reply it must be noted 
that the proviso has no practical significance as to most amend-
ments that might be proposed. Strictly speaking, it is doubt-
less correct to say that the existence of the clause precludes the 
ordinary amending body from being regarded as sovereign. 
But even that clause is not an absolute limitation on the 
amending power, as has been pointed out in Chapter IV. The 
two earlier absolute limitations which existed until r 808 are 
61 S!DGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS ( 189 I) 6o2, says: "Suppose that 
the body which can dismiss the otherwise supreme government does not dismiss 
it and gives no directions. Is it still supremel-assuming that its inactivity 
is not due to fear. I think we must say that the power of dismissal-or any 
other power of giving orders--is still possessed though it is not exercised; 
assuming that the inactive organ would be obeyed if it gave orders. • • • I 
think we must attribute supreme power to any individual or body completely 
capable of corporate action, which admittedly can withdraw power at will 
from a government otherwise supreme." Markby says that though "the ulti-
mate sovereign power was generally dormant, and was only called into active 
existence on rare and special occasions," this is "not inconsistent with sovereignty, 
or with our conception of a political society; but it is a peculiarity." MARKBY, 
ELEMENTS OF LAW, 6th ed. (I905) § 33· 
82 BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (I 90 I) 540; GRAY, 
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (I909) §§ I78-I8o; LASKI, THE 
PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY (I 9 I 7) 267i Ritchie, "On the Conception of 
Sovereignty," (I89I) I AM. AcAD. PoL. Sci. ANNALS 385 at 397; SALMOND, 
JuRISPRUDENCE, 7th ed. (I924) SJI, note k; State ex rei. McCready v. Hunt, 
(I834) 2 Hill L. (S.C.) I at 84 (argument of Finley). 
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gone, so that today there is no limitation whatever on the 
amending power when every state is included. 63 The require-
ment of unanimous consent makes the sovereign no less such. 64 
Moreover, possibly the doctrine of "political questions" ap-
plies so that even the ordinary amending body could act with-
out restraint. The provisions of Article Five as to procedure 
are not to be regarded as limitations, since the sovereign can-
not be said to be acting when the proper procedure is not 
followed. 65 Here again the doctrine of "political questions" 
applies, at least to some phases of the amending procedure. 
In conclusion it seems well to consider what should be the 
attitude of the lawyer to the sovereign in the form of the 
amending body. First of all, it seems that the lawyer should 
welcome its definite location, since he as much as anyone 
should be interested in the body which has in its power the 
ultimate determination of what shall be the law. At first blush 
it may seem to hark back to the days of despotism to accept 
a body with such unlimited power. But if there be such a 
power it is desirable to know in whom it is vested. When the 
force of public opinion can be focused on a body with definite 
powers, it may perhaps be more readily held morally ac-
countable.66 Moreover, as W. Jethro Brown points out, "one 
63 Ritchie, "On the Conception of Sovereignty," (I 89I) I AM. AcAD. PoL. 
Sci. ANNALS 385 at 398, says that "Austin, in his search for determinate persons, 
must wander about till he finds George Washington, James Madison, and a 
large number of other persons who (a Scotchman may be permitted, and ex-
pected, to remark) are now dead." But the possibility of amendment by all 
the states avoids the necessity of imputing sovereignty to the makers of the 
Constitution. 
•• "But the fact that it is so formally limited does not mean that the power 
does not exist, any more than it is claimed that the Polish assembly had not 
the legislative power because of the existence of the liberum veto." WIL-
LOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (I92.8) 2.64. 
65 "Even the manner in which, or the determination of the person by whom, 
the Legal Sovereign is chosen is a matter distinct from the nature and scope of 
his authority. He is none the less Sovereign in the contemplation of law because 
he reigns not by his own right but by the choice of others. • • ." BRYCE, 
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JuRISPRUDENCE (I90I) 5IO. 
66 "It is much better that the law in all its harshness and its makers in all 
their legal irresponsibility should stand out clearly before the eyes of those who 
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of the great advantages of having a legal sovereign is to make 
a revolution under the forms of law possible." 67 
In the second place, there need be no fear of possible 
tyrannical acts of the sovereign. An extraordinary majority is 
required for it to act. Both the federal governments and the 
states are represented in all its acts, and each holds an abso-
lute veto over the other. Moreover, the electorate which 
chooses Congress and the state legislatures has constantly in-
creased in the ratio of its number to that of the people as a 
mass.68 Election takes place so frequently that while those 
who exercise the amending capacity cannot be held legally 
responsible, they are held politically accountable. 
Finally it must be seen that the status of the amending 
body has an important bearing on the controversy over the 
nature and extent of the powers of the federal government 
and the states, and on the general doctrine of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty rests in neither the federal government nor in the 
states, but, if it may be said to reside anywhere, in the amend-
are required to obey. For then there is most likelihood of the moral responsibil-
ity of the legal sovereignty being stringently enforced." Ritchie, "On the 
Conception of Sovereignty," (r891) r AM. ACAD. PoL. Scr. ANNALS 385 
at 401. 
67 BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) 167, note at 168. 
Willoughby says: "The value of constitutional government is not that it 
places Sovereignty in the hands of the people, but that it prescribes definite 
ways in which this sovereign power shall be exercised by the State." WIL-
LOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE (1928) 302. Radin states: "revolu-
tion is the sovereign act par excellence." Radin, "The Intermittent Sovereign," 
(1930) 39 YALE L. ]. 514 at 526. 
68 "Lawyers are apt to speak as though the legislature were omnipotent, as 
they do not require to go beyond its decisions. It is, of course, omnipotent in 
the sense that it can make whatever laws it pleases, inasmuch as a law means any 
rule which has been made by the legislature. But from the scientific point of 
view, the power of the legislature is of course strictly limited. It is limited, so 
to speak, both from within and from without; from within, because the legis-
lature is the product of a certain social condition, and determined by whatever 
determines the society; and from without, because the power of imposing laws 
is dependent upon the instinct of subordination; which is itself limited. If the 
legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preserva-
tion of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; but legislature must go mad before 
they could pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they could submit to 
it." STEPHEN, THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS (r882) 143· 
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ing body. The amending capacity demonstrates neither the 
supremacy of the states nor of the federal government. At one 
time it may operate in favor of the states, and at another in 
favor of the federal government. That the rights of neither 
will be impaired is guaranteed by their joint action in the 
amending process. Both are but agents of the composite states. 
In the amending body we discover both the sovereign and the 
state. 
The nature of the federal amending process demonstrates 
the futility of the concept of sovereignty. It has been pointed 
out that its use in international law is doubtful, and that its 
use if proper at any time is only so in constitutional law. Its 
use in constitutional law has resulted in great confusion in the 
United States. It has been seen that the only body to which the 
characteristic can logically be attributed is the amending body. 
The chief time when the question of sovereignty becomes im-
portant is when the validity of the substance of an amendment 
is challenged. It is this fact alone which has induced the ex-
tensive discussion of the subject. For other purposes it is suf-
ficient to examine the powers which have been conferred on 
the federal and state governments and their departments. 
The involved explanations made necessary and the meta-
physical difficulties encountered in ascribing sovereignty to 
the amending body show the barren aridity of the term. The 
equality in the senate clause prevents a strictly correct applica-
tion of the term to the ordinary amending body. The original 
limitations expiring in I 8o8 show that there was no sovereign 
whatever up to that year, though possibly unanimous action 
by the states would have sufficed. The excessive majorities 
required for proposal and adoption of amendments prevent 
frequent action by the sovereign. During two periods of ap-
proximately half a century each no amendments were adopted. 
Until the amending body acts it can never be known in advance 
who the sovereign will be. Forty-nine bodies meeting at dif-
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ferent places act on the matter, and each of these bodies in turn 
is divided, except in Nebraska, into a lower and upper house. 
Unless the procedure of amendment prescribed in Article 
Five is pursued, the sovereign has not acted at all, and the 
action of the amending group is mere brutum fulmen. The 
recent doctrine as to political questions perhaps somewhat 
alters this, however. Each part of the amending body is sub-
ject to law, and may be altered or abolished. The amending 
body itself may be altered through the amending process, and 
limitations on the future amending capacity may be imposed. 
The amending body is an artificial sovereign deriving its 
being from a law in the form of Article Five. The amending 
groups hold office for but a short time, and may be supplanted 
by others in the elections in which an increasingly larger 
electorate participates. The theory of sovereignty, moreover, 
presupposes the continued orderly existence of the govern-
ment. In case of a revolution the commands of the sovereign 
would be disregarded, and authority could not longer be as-
cribed to the amending body either in fact or in law. The 
moral, religious, physical, and other factual limitations on the 
supposed sovereign are so important that it may perhaps be 
correct to say that they are also legal limitations, as there 
comes a time when law and fact shade' into one another. Fi-
nally, when it is remembered that throughout all history, 
American as well as European, there never has been a con-
sensus as to the meaning of sovereignty, it seems that the term 
should be used only with the greatest circumspection. 69 
'"' Saying all this, we should still bear in mind the words of the great English 
historian, W. S. Holdsworth: "The great achievements of the doctrine of 
sovereignty were the mastering of the lawlessness of the mediaeval state, and 
the provision, in the modern territorial state, of an organism which, by keeping 
the peace, has made social and political progress possible. The measure of its 
achievement is the contrast between the state of Europe in I soo and in 1700. 
We are so 'accustomed to the efficient manner in which lawlessness and crime 
are suppressed, that we are apt to forget that this result has been achieved 
through the ceaseless efforts of the ministers of the state, using powers and 
machinery which owe their origin and their force to the sovereignty of the 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE AMENDING CLAUSE 167 
state. I think that those who go about to deny or minimize this sovereignty 
have forgotten this fact. They have forgotten that in the smaller matters of 
government, which concern the daily intercourse of man and man, it is the 
fact of the state's sovereignty which causes the machinery to run smoothly; 
and that in a time of crisis they may have reason to be thankful for its existence. 
As Dicey, writing in 1914, has well said, 'Crises arise from time to time in the 
history of any great state when, because national existence or national inde-
pendence is at stake, the mass of a whole people feel that the authority of the 
nation is one patent and one certain political fact.' At the present 
day, when some have maintained that the doctrine of sovereignty should be 
discarded as an outworn doctrine, English law firmly maintains the sovereignty 
of the king in Parliament.'' HoLDSWORTH, SOME LESSONS FROM OuR LEGAL 
HISTORY (19z8) 137-I39, 140, quoting from DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoN-
STITUTION> 8th ed. (I 91 5) xliii. 
Also to be remembered are the words of Rupert Emerson: "That actual 
highest power may temporarily rest elsewhere than with the normatively defined 
sovereign is a fact which is too obvious to require statement; but on the other 
hand there can equally be no doubt that the modern constitutional State has 
brought about a closer practical coincidence between the legal sovereign and 
the actual possessor of and wielder of highest power than has ever before been 
possible. • To discard the principle of sovereignty is to accept the 
contingent threat of chaos that appears whenever two or more formally equal 
powers stand opposed to each other with no highest power authorized to decide 
between them." EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY 
(19z8) Z57> Z7Z• 
CHAPTER VI 
The Reform of the Amending Clause 
I
NCREASINGLY in recent years, culminating in 1938 
in extensive hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 1 proposals have been made 
to alter and improve the process of amending the federal Con-
stitution. The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment stimu-
lated much discussion concerning the ease or difficulty of 
amendment. The proposed Wadsworth-Garrett amendment 2 
of Article Five received much attention in the I 92o's. Presi-
dent Roosevelt's proposal in I 9 3 7 concerning an increase in 
the size of the Supreme Court attracted attention to the 
efficacy of the amending process. The uncertainties arising 
from the doctrine of political questions laid down in the I 9 3 9 
decisions of the Supreme Court may cause a movement for 
clarification.3 From I9I I to I928 eighteen amendments were 
offered in Congress to change Article Five, and in the I937 
sessions five such amendments were offered.4 
The various proposals may best be discussed as t~ey affect 
the two methods of proposal and the two methods of ratifica-
tion provided under Article Five of the Constitution and dis-
cussed in Chapter III. 
A. REFORM OF PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS 
I. Proposal by National Convention 
There has been comparatively little discussion of the re-
form of proposal of amendments by a national convention. 5 
1 HEARINGS ON S. ]. REs. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938) 1-85 ("Ratifica-
tion of Constitutional Amendments by Popular Vote"). 
• See citations in note 72, infra. 
8 (1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 393 at 406. 
4 HEARINGSONS.J.RES.IJ4, 75thCong., 3dsess. (1938) 37· 
• An account of the efforts up to 1889 to obtain a national convention is set 
out in AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE 
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Of the four modes of proposal and ratification this has seemed 
the one most likely not to be used. While there has been agi-
tation for individual amendments, and such individual amend-
ments have sometimes been of great importance, there have 
been no widespread tangible evidences of a desire for com-
plete or even substantial revision of the Constitution.6 It is 
true that under the wording of Article Five such a conven-
tion might propose ordinary individual amendments. In fact, 
Article Five provides for the call of a "convention for pro-
posing amendments," and does not refer in express terms to 
a revision or to the adoption of an entirely new constitution. 
It has, however, been usual both in the experience of the states 
and of the nation to view the initiation of specific amendments 
as the function of a legislative body and that of revision as 
the function of a convention. Moreover, because of the addi-
tional expense and because of the increased legal complica-
tions and delays involved, it is unlikely that the convention 
method will often be resorted to for ordinary amendments. 
Assuming, however, that there is a popular demand for 
revision of the Constitution, is the present machinery ade-
quate? Probably the true reason that there has been no na-
tional convention since the Constitutional Convention itself 
is that there has been no real demand for it. But at least a 
partial reason may be the difficulty of obtaining applications 
from the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. It would 
seem that the applications must be reasonably contemporane-
ous in time. It is by no means easy to obtain applications by 
thirty-two legislatures for a convention within approximately 
the same interval. Possibly, too, the applications must be ad-
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY (1897) 2.81-
2.84. The recent attempts are discussed by Wheeler, "Is a Constitutional Con-
vention Impending/" (192.7) 2.1 ILL. L. REV. 782.; "How Long is a State Pe-
tition for a Constitutional Convention Goodl" (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 143, 
embodying a report to the New York State Bar Association also appearing in 74 
CoNG. REc. (1931) 2.92.4 and S. Doc. 78, 71st Cong. zd sess. 1930). 
8 A somewhat plausible, though not convincing, argument is m~de in MAc-
DoNALD, A NEw CoNSTITUTION FOR A NEw AMERICA (1 92.1). 
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dressed to the calling of a convention for general revision. 
Hence if one application is for the purpose of securing an 
amendment to abolish polygamy and another to achieve 
woman suffrage, perhaps these applications cannot be counted 
together, especially where, as has been the case, the latter is 
afterwards obtained under the usual amending process. 7 
The suggested number of reforms of this part of Article 
Five has not been large. Most of them have looked in the 
direction of making it easier to secure the call of a convention. 
During the Civil War period and previously, although there 
was much discussion of holding a convention, the constitu-
tional difficulties of securing such a convention were too great. 
It has been suggested that application by the legislatures of 
a majority of the states should be suffi.cient.8 Some have advo-
cated an even lesser number of applications, such as those of 
twelve states.9 In defense of these changes it may be said that 
whereas proposal by Congress is one important step of two, 
involving the initiation of an actual specific amendment, the 
application of the legislatures is simply one step of three, the 
others being the call of a convention which really proposes the 
amendment, and the subsequent ratification by the states. 
Gouverneur Morris suggested at the Constitutional Conven- • 
tion that Congress be permitted to call a federal. convention 
whenever it chose.10 Another change which might be desirable 
7 See supra, chap. III. 
8 Senator Henderson, of Missouri, S. J. R. 16, 38th Cong., 1st sess. (1864) 
CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st sess. (1864) 145, 553 (committee report), 1313 
(debated); Rep. Berger of Wisconsin, H. J. R. 71, 62d Con g., 1st sess. ( 1911); 
Senator Owen of Oklahoma, 58 CoNG. REc., (1919) 57oo; Rep. Lea of Cal-
ifornia, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929), and Tuller, "A Convention 
to Amend the Constitution-Why Needed-How It May be Obtained," ( 1911) 
193 No. AM. REV. 369 at 385; Rep. Porter of Virginia, H. J. R. 18o, 42nd 
Cong., 3d sess. ( 18 73) (or the application of legislatures of any number of 
states embracing three-fifths of the enumerated population of the several states). 
"Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 315, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (1916), 
one-fourth of the states. 
10 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION, 
2d ed. (1937) (reprint of 1836 ed.) 498. It has been suggested that Congress 
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would be to provide some method to force Congress to issue 
the call when the requisite number of states have applied, or 
to drop out Congress and provide that some executive official 
issue the call, since there seems to be no legal remedy if Con-
gress fails to act. Under the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, 
the convention would also be empowered to select the mode 
of ratification, whether by legislatures or by conventions, 
whereas under Article Five this power is vested in Congress. 
Burgess has proposed that in view of the tendency of legis-
lative bodies to confuse matters of a statutory nature with 
matters of fundamental constitutional law, the legislative 
mode of proposing amendments should be done away with 
entirely and only a national convention should be allowed to 
propose.11 It has been suggested that it might be desirable to 
have federal conventions periodically to revise the Constitu-
tion.12 Former Attorney General Homer Cummings regards 
the national convention method as too cumbersome for prac-
already has this power. MACDONALD, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A NEW 
AMERICA (1921) 225. It was held, however, in Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 
253 U.S. 221 1 40 S. Ct. 495, that the modes of ratification stipulated in Article 
Five are exclusive, and the same reasoning would probably apply to the modes 
of proposal. Rep. Porter of Virginia, H. J. R. 18o, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (1873), 
proposed that a three-fifths majority of Congress should be empowered to call 
a convention. Rep. Berger of Wisconsin would allow a majority of each 
House of Congress to call a convention, H. J. R. 246, 68th Cong., 1st sess. 
(1924); H. J. R. 2741 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1926), and H. J. R. 281 1 7oth 
Cong., 1st sess. (1928). 
11 BURGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
(1923) 107 and 112. The first proposal at the Constitutional Convention was 
to leave Congress out of the process, for fear that it might ignore the wishes 
of the people. 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES (1836) 128. The committee of detail, in 
its first draft of the instrument, proposed that a convention should be called by 
Congress upon application of two-thirds of the states. Ibid. 3 81. But nothing 
was said as to whether the legislatures were to propose and the convention to 
adopt, or whether the convention was to do the whole thing. Lincoln in his 
first inaugural address stated that proposal by a convention was preferable to 
that by Congress, since the people should have the power to originate as well 
as to approve amendments. 
12 Needham, "Changing the Fundamental Law," (1921) 69 U. PA. L. REv. 
:i.23 at 236 (every ten years). Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 315, 
64th Cong., 2d sess. ( 1916), proposed that conventions be held every thirty 
years. 
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tical service.13 Senator George W. Norris proposed in I 9 3 7 
to abolish the method altogether, though considerable ob-
jection was taken at the hearings on his proposal.14 
2. Proposal by Congress 
Until recent years most of the amendments offered to 
Article Five have been directed at the mode of proposing 
amendments by Congress. This is easily understandable in 
view of the fact that it is at this stage that most proposed 
amendments have failed. 15 Of some three thousand amend-
ments introduced in Congress only twenty-six were actually 
submitted to the states and only five of these failed of ratifica-
tion in the states. The obstacle of having to pass both houses 
of Congress has resulted in the failure of comparatively few 
amendments up to 1923, sixteen having passed the Senate and 
not the House, and the same number having passed the House 
and not the Senate. Relative to the total number of amend-
ments adopted, however, this total is high. The criticism is 
often made that the excessive majority required for proposal, 
namely, two-thirds of each House, is an insuperable barrier. 
In fairness, however, two things should be observed. In the 
, first place, it has been held that only two-thirds of a quorum 
and not two-thirds of the members elected is sufficient.16 Of 
even greater importance is the fact that many of the amend-
ments offered would not command even a majority of Con-
,. Cummings, "Nature of the Amending Process," (I938) 6 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 247 at 250. Former Attorney General Mitchell suggests that a con-
vention is suitable only for general revision of the Constitution. Mitchell, 
"Methods of Amending the Constitution," (I932) 25 LAWY. & BANKER 265. 
14 HEARINGS ON S. J. R. I34, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (I938) 3-4, 65, 79> 84. 
15 The amendments proposed from I 7 8 9 to I 8 8 9 are set out in AMES, THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (I897), while those offered 
after that date up to July 2, I926, are to be found in S. Doc. 93, 69th Cong., 
Ist sess. (I926) (Tansill, "Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States"). See Ames, "The Amending Provision of the Federal Con-
stitution in Practice," (I924) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc. PROc. 62 at 63. 
16 National Prohibition Cases, (I92o) 253 U.S. 350, 40 S. Ct. 486, 588. 
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gress.17 That is to say most of the amendments offered have 
been killed in committee and have never come to a vote of the 
entire house sitting as such. Such liberals as Senator Norris 
have found no objection to the present mode of proposaP8 
Nevertheless it is entirely conceivable that amendments 
desirable in every respect will fail to obtain the necessary 
two-thirds majority, although a simple majority might be 
obtained. Certainly it is clear that, in the case of the ratifica-
tion of treaties by the Senate and the overriding by Congress 
of the presidential veto, there are numerous instances of 
failures where there would have been approvals if only a 
simple majority had been required. The matter of amending 
the Constitution is not so fundamentally different from these 
matters that, over a long period of time at least, the same 
failures will not occur: Even under the Articles of Confeder-
ation apparently a majority might propose. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that there have been many proposals, both in 
Congress and by commentators, that a lesser majority be 
required.19 Most of the alternatives offered have agreed on a 
simple majority of each House of Congress as enough.20 The 
17 Of more than 1 8oo proposals introduced from 1789 to 1889 more than 
half never got beyond their reception and reference to a committee. The rest 
were either reported or received further discussion, but only a very small per-
centage of these were brought to a vote. 
18 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4942; letter of June 10, 1931, to the author of this 
book; S. J. R. 134, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937). 
19 A simple majority in two successive sessions of -Congress:-Smith, "Shall 
We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (1911) 194 No. AM. REv. 657 at 667; 
Johnstone, "An Eighteenth Century Constitution," ( 1912) 7 ILL. L. REV. 26 5 
at 283. A simple majority of Congress as an aggregate group in two successive 
sessions: 1 BuRGEss, PoLITICAL SciENCE AND CoMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1891) 152. See also Cummings, "The Nature of the Amending Process," 
(1938) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 247 at 253. 
20 Senator Henderson of Missour4 S. J. R. 16, 38th Cong., 1st sess. (1864); 
Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 42, 62d Cong., 1st sess. (191I); Rep. 
Crumpacker of Indiana, H. J. R. 375, 62d Cong., 3d sess. (1913); Senator 
Thompson of Kansas, S. J. R. 9, 63d Cong., 1st sess. (I9I3); Senator Owen, 
S. J. R. 20, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (19I3); Rep. Lafferty of Oregon, H. J. R. 6o, 
63d Cong., ISt sess. (I9I3); Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, S. J. R. 24, 63d 
Cong., I st sess. ( 19 I 3) (or upon application of ten states) ; Rep. Chandler of 
New York, H. J. R. 95, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I913) (or by one-fourth of the 
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state constitutions generally permit proposal by a simple ma-
jority of each house of the legislature. Sometimes the proposi-
tion is that a simple majority of a quorum of each house shall 
be the required majority, while at other times it is that it be a 
majority of the members elected to each house. Possibly it 
would be wise to safeguard the amending process by departing 
from the rule governing the passage of ordinary legislation 
that only a majority of a quorum is necessary, and laying 
down the latter rule.21 However, that might, on occasion, 
make the amending process even more difficult than it now 
is, since two-thirds of a quorum may be less than a majority of 
all the members elected to Congress. To illustrate, two-thirds 
of a quorum of the Senate would be thirty-three, whereas a 
majority of the members elected to the Senate would be forty-
mne. 
Under the present system each house of Congress votes 
separately as to proposal. Burgess has suggested that the two 
houses sit together as a single body when proposing amend-
ments, a majority of the aggregate group to be sufficient to 
adopt.22 In France the constitution up to 1940 was actually 
states having at least one-fourth of population of United States) ; Rep. Bryan 
of Washington, H. J. R. 422, 63d Cong., 3d sess. (1915); Senator Owen, 
S. J. R. 9, 64th Cong., rst sess. (r9r5) (or upon application of legislatures of 
majority of states); Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 315, 64th Cong. 
2d. sess. (r9r6); Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 8, 65th Cong., rst sess. 
(r9r6), S. J. R. 33, 66th Cong., rst sess. (1919), S. J. R. 14, 67th Cong., ISt 
sess. (1921), and S. J. R. 27, 68th Cong., ISt sess. (I923). A proposal by 
Senator Brookhart was voted down in the Senate, 65 CoNe. REc. (I924) 4929, 
and see speech at 4556. See also, Potter, "The Method of Amending the 
Federal Constitution," ( 1909) 57 U. PA. L. REv. 58 9 at 609; Thompson, "The 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution," ( r 91 2) 3 A cAD. PoL. Sci. PRoc. 
6 5 at 7 5, with alternative of proposal by a majority vote of one house in two 
successive Congresses; Edward S. Corwin, letter of May 27, 193I, to the 
author of this book. 
21 Senator Henderson of Missouri, S. J. R. I6, 38th Cong., rst sess. (r864); 
Senator Owen of Oklahoma, 58 CoN G. REC. (I 919) 5700; Senator Brookhart 
of Iowa, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4564. Rep. Porter of Virginia introduced 
an amendment for proposal by three-fifths of Congress-H. J. R. I 8o, 42d 
Cong., 3d sess. (I87J). EdwardS. Corwin, in a letter of May 27, I9JI, to 
the author of this book, favors the former rule. 
22 
I BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(r89I) I52. 
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amended by such a joint session. The wisdom of adopting 
such a plan in the United States, however, is questionable 
because of the federal nature of our government. The states 
are represented according to population in the House of 
Representatives and as states in the Senate. Hence to combine 
the two bodies for amending purposes would be to decrease 
the influence of the less populous states. Moreover, Article 
Five provides that no state shall be deprived of its equal suf-
frage in the Senate without its consent. It is therefore argu-
able that such a provision would be in violation of the equal 
suffrage clause. Since, however, Congress might be dropped 
out of the amending process, since each state would still have 
its two senators, and since under the Twelfth Amendment 
the two houses sit jointly to count the electoral vote, this 
argument is not thoroughly convincing. The more funda-
mental objection, then, is that already stated,-the violation 
of the federal concept. 
Because of the difficulties of obtaining the concurrence of 
both houses of Congress, it has occasionally been suggested 
that a proposal by one house should be effectual. These pro-
posals almost invariably contemplate that the resolution must 
pass the house proposing twice, in two consecutive sessions, 
before the amendment can go to the states.23 It prevents hasty 
action, it permits an indirect popular referendum by requir-
ing action by a subsequently elected house, and it prevents · 
the dominance of one house of Congress over another, espe-
cially where the house not concurring is affected by the amend-
ment. For example, the Seventeenth Amendment providing 
for the popular election of Senators passed the House of 
Representatives several times before it was finally approved 
by the Senate. As has been previously pointed out, sixteen 
.. Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. zo, 63d Cong., 1st sess. (1913), and 
58 Cong. Rec. (1919) 5700; Thompson, "The Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution," (19xz) 3 AcAD. PoL. Scr. PRoc. 65 at 75; Carman, "Why and 
How the Present Method of Amending the Federal Constitution Should be 
Changed," (1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. Ioz. 
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resolutions have passed the Senate but failed in the House, 
and a similar number have passed in the House but failed in 
the Senate. Such a provision is not found in the state constitu-
tions, but it is employed in another federal constitution, that 
of Australia. Under the Australian Constitution if an amend-
ment twice passes one house of Parliament and is twice rejected 
by the other house, the second rejection occurring at least three 
months after the first one, the amendment is then to be sub-
mitted by the Governor-General to the states.24 
Under the present Article Five, Congress is vested with a 
considerable degree of power in connection with both the sub-
mission and adoption of amendments. As was seen in the dis-
cussion of national conventions, there have been a number of 
suggestions looking in the direction of taking away some of 
those powers. The seeming lack of any way to compel Con-
gress to call a convention, even though there have been ap-
plications by the requisite number of legislatures, has been the 
subject of strictures.25 Objection has also been raised to the 
power of Congress to select the mode of ratification even 
though proposal is by a convention. It has been suggested 
that the only mode of proposal should be by convention. 
Under the decision of Dillon v. Gloss,26 Congress may pre-
scribe a reasonable time limit for the ratification of an amend-
ment by the states, although the decision of the court was 
really dictum since the amendment there involved itself con-
tained a time limit proviso. In Coleman v. Miller,21 it was 
held that the time limit involved a political question. There 
have been numerous suggestions that Article Five be amended 
24 Constitution of Commonwealth of Australia, § 128. 
20 On Jan. 19 and z8, 1861, Mr. Florence of Pennsylvania proposed that 
"the power of the people in three-fourths of the states to call and form a con-
vention to alter, amend, or abolish the Constitution . • • shall never be 
questioned." CoNG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., zd sess. (r861) 479, 598. 
06 (1921) 256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, commented on by Freund, "Legis-
lative Problems and Solutions," (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 656. 
"'(1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. 
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so as to fix a definite time limit, such as six, eight or ten years. 
A provision for automatic proposal of an amendment has been 
made by Representative Doolittle of Kansas that whenever 
any law of the United States be declared invalid by the de-
cree of any court the law shall be submitted along with a pro-
posed constitutional amendment covering the same, accept-
ance of the law and amendment to be by the legislatures of 
three-fourths of the states.28 It has recently been suggested 
that the legislatures of the majority of the states be permitted 
to propose an amendment. 29 
3· Proposal by Initiative 
While most of the suggestions looking toward direct popu-
lar participation in the amending process have been with 
respect to ratification, there have been a number of proposals 
that the people themselves should be allowed to initiate 
amendments or that the legislatures should be allowed to 
apply for specific amendments as well as for a national conven-
tion.30 It is claimed that the people participated, at least in-
28 H. J. R. 221, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (r914). 
"" Carman, "Why and How the Present Method of Amending the Federal 
Constitution should Be Changed," (1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. 102. 
80 Senator Cummins of Iowa in r 9 r 3 suggested proposal by legislative reso-
lutions of sixteen states, certified to the President of the United States, or on the 
petition of fifteen per cent of the voters in twenty-four states. His proposal was 
adversely reported to the Senate by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1914. 
51 CoNG. REc. (1914) r56o; S. J. R. 26, 63d Cong., xst sess. (r913). See 
later proposal, S. J. R. 33, 64th Cong., rst sess. (r9r5). Senator LaFollette of 
Wisconsin the same year advocated proposal on the application of ten state 
legislatures, or by the application of ten states through a popular vote provided 
a majority of the electors voting on the question favored the amendment or by 
a majority of both houses of Congress, in addition to the existing modes of 
proposal. S. J. R. 24, 63d Cong., rst sess. (x9q). Previously on Aug. s, 
1912, S. J. R. qr, 62d Cong., 2d sess., he had advocated proposal on the 
application of ten states. Rep. Jackson of Kansas suggested proposal on the 
application of the legislature of one state, H. J. R .. 35o, 62d Cong., 2d sess. 
(r912). See also Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 95, 63d Cong., rst 
sess. (1913) (one-fourth of the states having at least one-fourth of population 
of United States); Rep. Doolittle of Kansas, H. J. R. 220, 63d Cong., 2d sess. 
(1914) (legislature of one state); Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 9, 
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directly, when the Constitution itself was proposed by a na-
tional convention instead of by Congress. The use of the 
initiative among the states, not only with respect to statutes 
but also constitutional amendments, has naturally resulted in 
a demand for its use in national politics. It has been suggested 
that a petition signed by some such number as soo,ooo voters 
should operate as the proposal of an amendment to be voted 
on at the next general election, while a petition signed by a 
somewhat larger number, such as a million voters, should be 
acted on even earlier.31 This plan ignores the federal scheme 
by neglecting to provide that such petitions must be somewhat 
uniformly scattered throughout the states, though this is not 
particularly serious since the amendment still remains to be 
voted on. A number of other proposals require that the peti-
tions be concurred in by a certain percentage of the voters in a 
certain number of states.32 It is notable that another federal 
country, Switzerland, provides for the use of the constitutional 
initiative; its experience has shown that, while the initiative is 
not a universal panacea, on the other hand it has not been pro-
ductive of serious ills. The experience of the states in our own 
64th Cong., 1st sess. (1915) (legislatures of majority of states); Rep. Gray of 
Indiana, H. J. R. 294, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (legislatures of two-thirds 
of states, or majority vote in two-thirds of states); Senator Owen, S. J. R. 27, 
68th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (majority of state legislatures); Rep. Lea of 
California, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929) (majority of state legis-
latures). 
81 Rep. Gray of Indiana, H. J. R. 294, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (majority 
vote in two-thirds of states); Senator Pomerene of Ohio, S. J. R. zz, 66th 
Con g., 1st sess. ( 1919) (proposal on petition of 5oo,ooo voters) ; Rep. Emer-
son of Ohio, H. J. R. 6o, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919) (proposal on petition of 
5oo,ooo voters), and H. J. R. 123, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919) (proposal on 
petition of 5 oo,ooo voters, to be submitted at next congr!!ssional election, or 
proposal on petition of 1 ,ooo,ooo voters to be submitted to voters at special 
election); Rep. Morin of Pennsylvania, H. J. R. IIo, 67th Cong., 1st sess. 
(1921), the same; Rep. Berger of Wisconsin, H. J. R. 281, 7oth Cong., 1st 
sess. ( 1928), the same . 
.. Rep. Berger of Wisconsin, H. J. R. 79, 62d Cong., 1st sess. (1911) (five 
per cent of the voters in each of three-fourths of the states) ; Rep. Igoe of 
Missouri, H.]. R. 319, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (1914) (ten per cent of voters of 
rna j ority of states). 
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country has not been such that one can lay down dogmatically 
that the popular initiative is either desirable or undesirable.83 
Doubtless in some states at some times the use of the initiative 
has resulted in hasty, ill-considered and excessive constitu-
tional changes. Recent use in connection with labor legislation 
has not been wholly satisfactory. 34 On the other hand, one can 
point to many cases where it has been used but moderately and 
in a deliberate way and for desirable reforms. Certainly no 
state which does not provide for its use can claim to be truly 
democratic. The possibility of a resort to it means that there 
can be no real weight to the charge that it is impossible to 
secure changes which the people really want, and may spur 
Congress to act more promptly than it otherwise would. After 
all the evidence is in, it seems hard to conclude that the ex-
perience of the states with the initiative has been so unsatis-
factory that its introduction into the federal system would 
work great mischief. In fairness it should be said, however, 
that the problems of a nation as large and heterogeneous as 
the United States may be so different that the experience of 
the states, limited and controversial as it has been, may hardly 
serve as a fair basis for recommending its introduction into the 
federal system.35 For instance, the federal initiative might re-
sult in lack of deliberation. Possibly recent world events indi-
cate that there are practical limits on democracy. If the people 
are given a vote on the ratification of amendments, it may be 
argued that that is a sufficient degree of democracy for practi-
38 Donn, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CoNSTITUTIONS (1910) 
292: "The popular initiative is open to many objections, both theoretical and 
practical, but the people should have power independently of the legislature, 
to force changes in their constitutions when such changes are desired. Perhaps 
the greatest value which the initiative will have is not the direct results which 
may come from its use, but in its influence in causing legislatures to act upon 
matters upon which action is desired by the people." See also Radin, "Popular 
Legislation in California," (193.9) 23 MINN. L. REv. 559· 
"' See Preliminary Report of Committee on Labor, Employment and Social 
Security, (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 531 at 545, 568. 
85 AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1897) 286. 
1 So AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
cal purposes. If Congress be given the power to propose 
amendments by a simple majority, that, too, would seem 
fairly to assure the submission of measures desired by the 
people. 
B. REFORM OF RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS 
1. Ratification by State Conventions 
Next to proposal of amendments by a national convention, 
the least discussed phase of Article Five is that providing for 
ratification of amendments by state conventions at the option 
of Congress. Congress thus far has but once chosen to select 
this mode of ratification, though the original Constitution was 
thus ratified. An Illinois constitutional convention sought to 
ratify the Corwin amendment although Congress had sub-
mitted it to the state legislatures.36 It has been asserted that 
certain types of amendments, such as those impinging on the 
police power of the state or impairing alleged inalienable in-
dividual rights, must be ratified by state conventions. The 
Supreme Court, however, in I93I decided that all amend-
ments are on the same basis with respect to the mode of ratifi-
cation. 37 Hence it now is clear that conventions may ratify 
only when Congress sees fit to select that mode of ratification. 
There has until recently been no substantial criticism of the 
convention mode of ratification. In fact, efforts were made 
00 Senator Adams of Colorado, whose general conclusions are favorable, how-
ever, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4804, said: "The weakness is this, that the initia-
tion of measures submitted under the initiative comes from small groups, groups 
having no authority whatsoever. That is, one may sit down in his office and frame 
an amendment to the Constitution, or a law, and then, through the process of 
petition circulation, initiate it." 
'"United States v. Sprague, (1931) 282 U.S. 716, so S. Ct. uo, overruling 
(D. C. N. ]. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 967, noted in (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 72; 
(1931) 29 MrcH. L. REv. 777, and (1931) 79 U. PA. L. REv. 807. See also, 
United States v. Panos, (D. C. Ill. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 888; United States v. 
Thibault, (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 169; speech of Rep. J. J. McSwain, 
74 CoNe. REc. (1931) 3002; brief of Edmund B. Dunford, 74 CoNe. REc. 
(1931) 5819· 
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when the recent amendment's were submitted to induce Con-
gress to make use of this mode. Likewise at the time when the 
Civil War Amendments were proposed in Congress, attempts 
were made to secure their submission to direct popular vote-
quite clearly unconstitutional under Hawke v. Smith 38-or 
at least submission to conventions. In all of these cases it 
seems, however, that the reason prompting such demands was 
not so much that of consulting the wishes of the people as of 
securing the defeat of the amendments. 
It seems desirable at this point to consider the arguments 
in favor of and against the use of the state convention method 
of ratification. First to be considered are the defects, for de-
fects there admittedly are. Precedent is against its use, since 
it has been used only once, namely, with respect to the 
Twenty-First Amendment. It is more expensive than the 
legislative mode since special machinery must be set up. It is 
likely to involve more delay than the legislative mode for 
the same reason. It is likely to involve certain legal complica-
tions not found in the legislative mode, as, for example, 
whether the power to regulate the election, place of 
meeting, procedure, etc. of state conventions is in Congress 
or the state legislatures. It is not likely to secure such full and 
careful deliberation as the legislative method; the experience 
with respect to the Twenty-First Amendment showed that 
convention members felt themselves bound by the popular 
will.39 It should be noted, however, that many persons feel 
that legislators should vote the way they think the majority 
of their constituents wish them to, and that in these days of 
straw votes and mass writing to legislators, the legislators 
do not need to wait for an election to find out what the people 
back home think. Finally, if the object of reforming the 
88 (I92o) 253 U.S. 22I, 40 S. Ct. 495· 
89 BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
CoNSTITUTION (I 9 3 8) 6; Martig, "Amending the Constitution," (I 9 3 7) 35 
MICH. L. REV. 1253 at 1284. 
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amending process is to secure more democracy, the logical 
procedure is to provide directly for a popular vo:te: the con-
vention method is nothing but a step in that direction, and 
if the convention merely follows the popular will, it is but a 
futile ceremony. I 
On the other hand, there are a number of outstanding 
merits in the convention method, at least in compari~on with 
the legislative method. It is more likely to represent the 
popular will, 40 since conventions are selected subsequent · to 
submission of an amendment while frequently legislatures 
are not. It is also more likely to represent the popular will 
since it is selected for only one issue, while a legislature, even 
though selected after submission, is likely to be selected for its 
views on several and unrelated issues. The members of a con-
vention are likely to vote more independently of wrongful 
influences since they do not face the temptation of legislators 
to vote with an eye to reelection. An abler group of persons is 
likely to be chosen as members of the convention than of the 
legislature, particularly if the convention is small in number. 
Since a convention is unicameral, it may proceed more quickly 
than the legislatures, which are bicameral except in Nebraska. 
The convention method is deemed preferable to a popular 
referendum by those who distrust the intelligence of the 
masses, particularly if the popular referendum occurred at a 
general election so as to confuse the voter, or if the referendum 
were hastily taken after submission so that there was no ade-
quate time for deliberation. On the other hand, where speed 
was desirable a convention might be quickly summoned, 
whereas many proposals for popular referenda contemplate 
action only at general elections. 
It has sometimes been argued that the present mode of rati-
fication is entirely satisfactory because of the possibility that 
40 Brown, "The People Should be Consulted as to Constitutional Changes," 
(1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 404; Needham, "Changing the Fun~amental I.aw1" 
(t9z1) 69 U. PA. L. REv. :u3 at :u8ff. 
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the convention mode may be used.41 Experience thus far 
scarcely justifies this belief since Congress has but once re-
sorted to its use even though efforts were made both as to the 
Civil War Amendments and the most recent amendments.42 
Because Congress itself is a legislative body, because of the 
expenses and delay of using the convention mode, and be-
cause of the inertia due to usage, it seems unlikely that Con-
gress will often resort to the use of conventions of its own free 
will. If the convention mode is to be frequently used it will 
probably be necessary to amend the Constitution so as to pro-
vide that Congress may submit amendments only to conven-
tions. Burgess, who is opposed to the use of the regular 
governmental machinery in the amending process, favors 
such a rule.43 Each convention under his plan would have the 
relative weight that the population of the state bears to the 
population of the nation. 
2. Ratification by State Legislatures 
It is at the legislative mode of ratification that most pro-
posals for the reform of the amending process have been 
directed in recent years. The reasons for this are interesting. 
The fatal step in the amending process for most propositions 
has been that of proposal, a fact which is easily demonstrable 
when it is realized that twenty-one of the twenty-six amend-
ments which have been submitted by Congress have been 
ratified, with the status of the child labor amendment still 
"Ames, "The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice." 
(1924) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc. PROC. 62 at 74· 
.. Senator Dixon, CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. (1869) 1040 • 
.. BuRGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
(1923) 107, 112ff. See proposal of Senator Wadsworth, of New York, S. J. R. 
109, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1924), for ratification by conventions chosen by 
the people or by popular vote; Senator Shields of Tennessee, 65 CoNG. REc. 
(1924) 4801-4802; Rep. Garrett of Tennessee, 66 CoNG. REC. (1924) 2160. 
See also Williams, "The Popular Mandate on Constitutional Amendments," 
(1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 280 at 298. 
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in doubt. The proponents of an easier amending process are 
scarcely pursuing the logical course of action, therefore, when 
they urge the alteration of the ratifying process rather than 
that of the process of proposal. The real reasons, however, 
are not far to seek. Many of these proposals are for a direct 
popular referendum on amendments. They are based on 
the notion that the people should participate directly in 
fundamental changes in law and government, both because 
it is the truly democratic method and because measures thus 
ratified are more likely to be enforced. Many of the pro-
ponents of this change have a more selfish motive, however. 
They favor a popular referendum because they believe that 
it will make the Constitution more difficult to amend. The 
enemies of the Eighteenth Amendment, for instance, argued 
that that amendment was railroaded through the legislatures 
by the well organized propaganda of a minority. This pres-
sure, it is argued, cannot in the nature of things be brought 
to bear on the people themselves. It should be observed that 
the most strenuous opponents of making amendment easier 
have generally coupled their proposals for popular ratifica-
tion with clauses providing for legislative participation as 
well, thus really adding another step to the existing amend-
ing process. Manifestly the prime motive of such a scheme is 
to impede the process rather than to consult the wishes of the 
people. 
One of the changes suggested in the legislative mode is to 
require something less than the legislatures of three-fourths 
of the states. Two out of five amendments submitted by Con-
gress which failed of ratification failed by the vote of a single 
state. One of the chief defects of the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the requirement of unanimity of the states in the 
adoption of amendments. A single state could therefore veto 
the wishes of all the other states and so the amending process 
was rendered well nigh useless. The adoption of the Consti-
tution hence became a revolutionary act, since it was made to 
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go into effect when ratified by three-fourths of the states. The 
present requirement of a three-fourths majority was one of 
the compromises of the Constitutional Convention. Sherman 
proposed that every state must concur in the ratification of 
amendments. 44 James Wilson proposed ratification by two-
thirds of the states.45 It is significant that Wilson's proposal 
failed by a five to six vote. His later motion providing for a 
three-fourths majority was then accepted. Patrick Henry, 
in opposing the ratification of the Constitution by the Vir-
ginia Convention, argued that the negative power given to 
one-fourth of the states made amendment impossible.46 The 
first proposal for altering the method of amendment was 
made by the Rhode Island Convention when it ratified the 
Constitution on May 29, I 790. The proposition was that after 
the year I793 no amendment to the Constitution should be 
made "without the consent of eleven of the states heretofore 
united under the Confederation."47 There seem to have been 
two motives behind the proposals: to make it more difficult 
to amend, and to insure the preponderance of the original 
thirteen colonies. 
The Rhode Island proposal seems to have been the only 
one looking in the direction of increasing the majority of 
states required. Subsequent proposals have all gone in the 
other direction. On January II, I 8 64, in connection with 
the resolution for the abolition of slavery, Senator Hender-
son of Missouri introduced a resolution allowing ratification 
by two-thirds of the states.48 The constitution of the Con-
federate States provided for a similar majority. 49 In I 873, 
"5 ELLIOT, DEBATES, zd ed. (1836). 
'"Ibid • 
.. 3 ibid. 49· 
•• FosTER, MINUTES OF THE RHoDE IsLAND CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTION 
OF 1790 (1929) 96-97• 
'"S. J. R. 16, 38th Cong., ISt sess. (1864). 
48 Article V, § 1. Similar proposals were made by Rep. Crumpacker of 
Indiana, H. J. R. 375, 6zd Cong., 3d sess. (1913), and Senator Cummins of 
Iowa, S. J. R. 26, 63d Cong., ISt sess. (1913). 
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Mr. Porter of Virginia proposed that amendments were to be 
valid, "when approved and ratified by a majority of the elec-
tors in the several states voting thereon and qualified to vote 
for representatives in Congress." 5° 
A number of proposals have suggested ratification by 
simple majority of the states. 51 Such proposals, however, are 
almost invariably accompanied by a provision for submission 
of amendments to direct popular vote. In addition, it is gen-
erally provided that there be both a majority of the states 
and a majority of the votes of the entire nation in favor of 
the amendment. 52 That is the rule in both Switzerland and 
Australia. Were only a majority of the popular vote in the 
entire country required, less than a majority of the states 
might approve.53 This could scarcely be acceptable except to 
those who are prepared to cast aside the federal concept of 
governmental relations. On the other hand, to permit rati-
fication by a mere majority of states might easily result in the 
passage of an amendment contrary to the wishes of a majority 
of the electors. 54 Indeed, even under the present system it 
.. H. J. R. I8o, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (I87J). 
01 Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, S. J. R. IJI, 62d Con g., 2d sess. ( I9 I 2) and 
S. J. R. 24, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I9I3); Senator Thompson of Kansas, S. J. R. 
9, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I9IJ); Rep. Lafferty of Oregon, H. J. R. 6o, 63d 
Cong., Ist sess. (I9I3) (or majority vote of electors in the several states). 
"'Rep. Igoe of Missouri, H. J. R. 3I9, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (1914); Smith, 
"Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (I911) '94 No. AM. REv. 
657 at 668; Johnstone, "An Eighteenth Century Constitution," (1912) 7 ILL. 
L. REv. 265. 
""For such proposals, see that of Senator Owen of Oklahoma, S. J. R. 20, 63d 
Cong., Ist sess. (19I3); Rep. Lafferty of Oregon, H. J. R. 6o, 63d Cong., Ist 
sess. (19I3) (or majority of state legislatures); Senator Pomerene of Ohio, 
S. J. R. 22, 66th Cong., Ist sess. (I9I9); Rep. Emerson of Ohio, H. J. R. 123, 
66th Cong., Ist sess. (1920); Rep. Morin of Pennsylvania, H. J. R. I 10, 67th 
Cong., Ist sess. (192I); Rep. Boylan of New York, H. J. R. 133, 68th Cong., 
xst sess. (1924); Rep. Dyer of Missouri, H. J. R. 229, 7oth Cong., xst sess. 
(1928); Professor EdwardS. Corwin, letter of May 27, 193I, to the author 
of this book. 
"'For such proposals, see Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin, S. ]". R. 24, 63d 
Cong., Ist sess. (I 92 I) ; Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 3 I 5, 64th 
Cong., 2d sess. (I 9 I 6). 
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has been pointed out that it is possible to secure ratification by 
the less populous states representing an actual minority of 
the population. On the other hand, it is to be remembered 
that an amendment may be defeated by the twelve least 
populous states, and that the concurrence of such twelve, 
while not likely, is fully as probable as the concurrence of the 
thirty-six least populous states in ratifying. Moreover, the 
amendment must have been previously concurred in by two-
thirds of Congress, the lower house of which is elected on 
the basis of population. Senator Owen has proposed ratifica-
tion by a majority of congressional districts and a majority of 
the aggregate vote. 55 Most of the state constitutions provided 
for ratification by a majority of the popular vote. Both of 
these two last proposals would be out of harmony with the 
federal principle, so that the farthest an adherent of the latter 
principle could go in the direction of majority rule is to ac-
cept the Swiss and Australian plan of accepting a majority 
of the states plus a majority of the electors of the entire 
country. 
Perhaps a more conservative plan would be to permit 
ratification by two-thirds of the states. 56 It is noteworthy that 
55 S. J. R. 9, 64th Con g., I st sess. (I 9 I 5). See also his other proposals: 
S. J. R. 42, 62d Cong., ISt sess. (I9II) (acceptance by a majority of congres-
sional districts and a majority of the states); S. J. R. 8, 65th Cong., Ist sess. 
(I9I7), (majority vote in majority of congressional districts); S. J. R. I4, 
67th Cong., Ist sess. (I 92 I) (majority vote in majority of congressional 
districts) . 
06 Senator Cummins of Iowa, S. J. R. 26, 63d Cong., Ist sess. (I9IJ), pro-
posed adoption by two-thirds of state legislatures or by majority vote in two-
thirds of states; Rep. Bryan of Washington, H. J. R. 422, 63d Cong., 3d sess. 
(I9I5); Senator Cummins, S. J. R. 33, 64th Cong., ISt sess. (I9I5) (same as 
earlier proposal, supra); Rep. Lea of California, H. J. R. I68, 7ISt Cong., 2d 
sess. (I929) (majority of people of the nation and a majority of the people in 
two-thirds of the states ratifying); Senator Norris of Nebraska, S. J. R. I 34, 
75th Cong., 3d sess. (I937). 
"It seems evident, then, that where the check is sought in numbers, a majority 
is too small, and a unanimous vote too large, for either practicability or safety. 
A mean must be sought not liable to these objections, and that not from a priori 
considerations, but from experience." JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVEN-
TIONS, 4th ed, (I887) 553• 
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the more recent proposals, except that of Senator Norris in 
1937/n have accepted the existing rule requiring the approval 
of three-fourths of the states, and have stressed rather the 
idea of a popular referendum. 58 In fact, under the Wads-
worth-Garrett amendment an amendment might have to 
be ratified not only by the legislatures of three-fourths of 
the states but also by the popular vote of three-fourths of the 
states. 59 And even under the Jones amendment to the latter 
amendment the legislatures would still act as advisory bodies, 
and would have to vote on an amendment before the popular 
vote was taken.60 In view of the comparative ease of securing 
ratification after an amendment has been submitted, espe-
cially as seen in the cases of the last stx amendments, it is 
•• S. J. R. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1937 ) . 
.. Rep. Chandler of New York, H. J. R. 95, 63d Cong., 1st sess. (1913); 
Rep. Gray of Indiana, H. J. R. 294, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916) (majority of 
electors in three-fourths of states or by legislatures in three-fourths of states) ; 
Senator Fletcher of Florida, S. J. R. 182, 65th Cong., 2d sess. (1918); Rep. 
LaGuardia of New York, H. J. R. 430, 65th Cong., 3d sess. (1919), and 
H. J. R. 12, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Griffin of New York, H. J. R. 
35, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Siegel of New York, H. J. R. 36, 66th 
Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Senator Harrison of Mississippi, S. J. R. 48, 66th 
Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, S. J. R. 126, 
66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Johnston of New York, H. J. R. 306, 66th 
Cong., 2d sess. (1920); Rep. MacGregor of New York, H. J. R. 332, 66th 
Cong., 2d sess. (1920); Rep. Griffin of New York, H. J. R. 12, 67th Cong., 
1st sess. (1921); Rep. MacGregor, H. J. R. 21, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921); 
Rep. Siegel of New York, H. J. R. 29, 67th Cong., 1st sess. ( 1921); Rep. Kissel 
of New York, H. J. R. II8, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921); Rep. Cullen of 
New York, H. J. R. 162, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (1921); Rep. Vare of Pennsyl-
vania, H. J. R. 34, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1923); Rep. Griffin of New York, 
H. J. R. 37, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1923); Senator Ashurst of Arizona, S. J. R. 
17, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1923); Rep. Griffin of New York, H. J. R. 18, 69th 
Cong., 1st sess. (1924); Rep. Griffin, H. J. R. 68, 7oth Cong., 1st sess. (1927); 
Rep. Lea of California, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929); Rep. 
Andresen of Minnesota, H. J. R. 348, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1930) (popular vote 
or conventions as Congress shall prescribe) [and see 72 CoNG. REc. (1930) 
10,930]; Rep. Griffin, H. J. R. 362, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1930); see article 
by Senator Ashurst, "Making Amendments," SATURDAY EvENING PosT, 
April 25, 1929, reprinted in 72 CoNG. REc. 3066 (1930); Senator Norris, 
in a letter of June 10, 1 9 31, to the author of this book. 
•• See citations in note 72, infra. 
80 65 CONG. REc. ( 1 924) 4802. Argument of Senator Dixon of Connecticut, 
CoNG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. (1869) 706. 
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doubtful that there will be any reduction in the number of 
states required to concur, however desirable that may be 
theoretically. 
Another change which has frequently been suggested in 
the legislative mode is that ratification be only by legislatures 
the more numerous branch of which have been elected after 
the submission of the amendment. 61 Since state senators are 
frequently elected for a longer term than state representa-
tives, the principle of subsequent election is generally con-
fined in the proposals to the House of Representatives. In 
the case of some of the Civil War Amendments, it was sug-
gested that Congress provide in its resolution of proposal and 
submission that the amendment be submitted only to subse-
quently elected legislatures. Four or five states have consti-
tutional or statutory provisions providing for ratification of 
federal amendments only by such legislatures, but these pro-
visions have recently been held unconstitutional.62 All of the 
recent amendments have been ratified by legislatures which 
were in existence when they were proposed, and this was true 
even of the Bill of Rights. An existing legislature might of 
course of its own accord by a sort of self-denying ordinance 
fail to act on an amendment. The pressure is generally so 
61 Senator Buckalew of -Pennsylvania, CoNe. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. 
(I 869) 828 (as part of the Fifteenth Amendment); Senator Davis of Kentucky, 
CoNe. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. (I 869) 1309 (as part of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment) ; Senator Hendricks of Indiana, CoNe. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d sess. 
(I869) 543, IJII (as part of the Fifteenth Amendment); Rep. Woodward of 
Pennsylvania, CoNe. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d sess. (I869) 1226; Rep. Garrett 
of Tennessee, H. J. R. 69, 67th Cong., ISt sess. (I92I), and H. JR. 429, 67th 
Cong., 4th sess. (I923); Senator Wadsworth of New York, S. J. R. 4, 68th 
Cong., Ist sess. (I923)-; 65 CoNe. REc. 89, 3549, 3675, 3942, 4420, 4488, 
4556, 4717, 48oo, 4929, 4995, 5009, reported with amendments, debated and 
recommitted; Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. 68, 68th Cong., Ist sess. (I923), debated, 
reported back, 65 CoNe. REc. I0,4I4; Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. IS, 69th Cong., 
ISt sess. (I925); Senator Wadsworth, S. J. R. 8, 69th Cong., Ist sess. (1925); 
Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. I43, 7oth Cong., ISt sess. (I928); Ames, "The Amend-
ing Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice," (I924) 63 AM. PHIL. 
Soc. PROC. 62 at 74; Jacob Tanger, letter of June I7, I9JI, to author of this 
book . 
.. Leser v. Garnett, (I922), 258 U.S. I30, 42 S. Ct. 2I7. 
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great, however, for immediate action, often involving even 
special sessions, that the only way to secure ratification by a 
subsequent legislature is to provide for it in the federal Con-
stitution. 63 The chief argument of the proponents of this re-
form is that the sentiment of the people will be more directly 
reflected, since the legislators will be elected on the basis of 
their attitude towards the amendment. Moreover, greater 
time for deliberation will be provided. The arguments on the 
other side, however, seem more convincing. Doubtless to 
some extent a subsequently elected legislature will better re-
present popular opinion. The chances are, however, that the 
legislators are elected on their attitudes towards other issues. 
If the popular will is to be truly reflected, this can be much 
better accomplished by the use of conventions elected with 
reference to the single issue involved. Or even better, why 
not provide for a popular referendum if the real object is to 
consult the people? As the late Senator Borah said, "Let us 
not have homeopathic doses! " 64 The amending process is 
already difficult enough. To require ratification by later legis-
latures is simply to add one more obstacle, as a delay of at 
least one and generally two years will be required. Couple 
this delay with a provision for a popular referendum in addi-
tion to the action of the legislature, as did the Wadsworth-
Garrett amendment, and an almost insuperable barrier 
against amendments is set up. It is hard to escape the conclu-
sion that the proponents of action by subsequent legislatures 
63 Senator Morton of Indiana introduced a resolution, S. J. R. p, 41st 
Cong., 1st sess. ( 1869), prescribing the procedure to be followed by the legis-
latures in ratifying. See supra, chap. 3, note 86. And see AMES, THE PRo-
POSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (I 897) 
290. Mr. Shanks of Indiana introduced the same amendment in the House, 
H. J. R. 57, 41st Cong., 1st sess. (1869). Mr. Juul of Illinois, H. J. R. 242, 
66th Cong., 1st sess. ( 1919), introduced a resolution regulating voting strength 
in state legislatures when ratifying amendments. 
•• 65 CONG. REC. (1924) 4562. 
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are more interested in preventing amendment than they are in 
securing popular representation.65 
A problem that has arisen on several occasions is whether 
or not a state may rescind its action on an amendment. If three-
fourths of the states have ratified an amendment, it then 
seems clear that there can be no effective repudiation of prior 
action. On the other hand, at any time prior to such ratifica-
tion the rule is in greater doubt. 66 The Supreme Court has 
recently ruled that a political question is involved.67 Anum-
ber of proposals have been made that until the necessary ma-
jority of acceptances have been obtained, a state should be 
free to change its prior action whether such action was af-
firmative or negative. 68 This is one of the provisions of the 
Wadsworth-Garrett amendment. But that amendment goes a 
step further and provides that repudiation by more than one-
fourth of the states shall bar the further consideration of the 
amendment by the legislatures. The latter provision seems 
undesirable. It is designed to add to the difficulties of the 
already existing process. To allow thirteen states to kill an 
amendment will obviously mean that the opponents of an 
amendment will concentrate on a small number of states early 
in the fight and perhaps kill the amendment before it has had 
a chance for consideration.69 It is bad enough to allow thirteen 
legislatures to hold up an amendment under any conditions. 
It is simply making matters worse to let them destroy it at the 
outset. At least until some provision is made permitting rati-
.. Senator Norris, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4941, said: "Some people want 
to make it difficult to amend the Constitution. Others want to simplify it. 
There is argument on both sides. I concede absolutely that there is good argu-
ment each way, but I can not conceive of any argument that simply calls for 
delay, and that is what I think we have done with this amendment." 
66 See supra, chap. III. 
67 Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 453, 59 S. Ct. 972. 
68 Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. 143, 7oth Cong., xst sess. (1928). 
60 See the argument of Senator Heflin of Alabama, 6 5 CoNe. REc. ( 1924) 
4931· 
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fication by a lesser majority of the states, it would seem that 
the proposals should be rejected. 
3· Ratification by Popular Referendum 
The chief proposal for the alteration of the amending 
process to receive serious consideration in the past two decades 
has been that for a popular referendum.70 It is felt that the 
people themselves should participate at some stage in the 
amending process. Some of the proposals go so far as to say 
that the people should be allowed even to initiate amend-
ments, as is done in Switzerland and in some of our states. 
These proposals, however, have not been strongly pressed 
and attention has been increasingly centered on securing con-
firmation by the people. Popular suffrage has been vastly 
extended from what it was when the Constitution was drafted. 
Although popular referenda were unknown in 1787, the states 
have used the popular referendum as the exclusive mode of 
ratification of amendments to and revision of the state con-
stitutions ever since about r 830. The extension of suffrage to 
the negroes by the Fifteenth Amendment and to women by 
the Nineteenth Amendment, both under the federal Consti-
tution, has kept the idea of popular participation in govern-
ment in the public eye. The provision of the Seventeenth 
Amendment for the popular election of senators more than 
almost anything else has stimulated the demand for popular 
participation in the amending process. The suggestions for 
ratification only by subsequently elected legislatures is in-
dicative of the trend, as is that for the abolition of the electoral 
college. But perhaps the most immediate impetus which has 
been given to the movement came from the adoption of the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, particularly the 
70 The use of the popular referendum under the present terms of Article Five 
was held unconstitutional in Hawke v. Smith, (1920) 253 U. S. 221 1 40 
S. Ct. 495· See Taft, "Can Ratification of an Amendment to the Constitution 
Be Made to Depend on a Referendum?" (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 821. 
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Eighteenth. It is argued with enough plausibility to convince 
a great many people that the Eighteenth Amendment was 
railroaded through the legislatures by means of powerful 
lobbies and a species of intimidation. 71 It is asserted that, if the 
legislators had really voted as they felt, the amendment 
would never have been ratified. It is pointed out that anum-
ber of legislatures ignored previous popular referenda re-
jecting the amendment, and that in a number of cases subse-
quent popular votes under what the courts later found to be 
invalid or inapplicable provisions for referenda on federal 
amendments showed that the popular will was not in accord 
with that of the legislature. The Democratic party in I 924 
adopted a plank advocating a popular referendum on federal 
amendments. Certainly the tendency of the past century has 
been towards more democracy in government. It is the fre-
quently repeated doctrine of the Supreme Court that the 
people are sovereign, that they adopted the Constitution and 
may alter that document. If this doctrine is to be given any-
thing but lip service, it would seem _that the time has come 
when the people should be given the right to vote on whether 
an amendment should be adopted. 
In the effort to secure a popular referendum, one must be 
careful to see that something else is not foisted upon one. 
The substitute may be so bad as to make the continuance of 
the present clause preferable. The provision for a referendum 
may be so hedged about with clauses which clog the amend-
ing process as to merit the defeat of the entire proposaJ.72 
Such was the situation with respect to the Wadsworth-Garrett 
71 Senator Ashurst, 58 CONG. REC. (1919) 5694, said: "I believe that the 
two amendments which were last proposed for ratification, viz., the one providing 
for woman suffrage and the other for prohibition-and I am earnestly in favor 
of both those amendments-were not forced upon the people, but that they 
were submitted in response to a demand made by the people. At the same 
time I· am not oblivious to the fact that there are millions of citizens of high 
character who believe that lobbies intimidated the legislatures of the various 
States and even intimidated Congress into submitting those amendments." 
•• Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made 
More Difficult?" (x9z6) xo MINN. L. REV. 185. 
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amendment. 73 This proposal permitted in certain cases, but 
did not require that an amendment be subjected to a popular 
referendum. It provided "that any state may require that 
ratification by its legislature be subject to confirmation by 
popular vote." If the state failed to make such provision, there 
could be no popular referendum. It was argued that the 
states would immediately make such provision. This was ef-
fectively answered by pointing out that there was no good 
reason why the amendment should not directly provide for 
such ratification to make a popular referendum absolutely 
certain. The legislatures themselves would scarcely feel dis-
posed to give up their present exclusive right of ratification, 
and it might take a great deal of time and effort to incorporate 
such a provision into the state constitution. Moreover, there 
was only to be a referendum if the legislature ratified the 
amendment. If the legislature rejected, that ended the issue, 
and the people were left entirely without voice in the matter. 
Such a provision naturally made rejection very easy and ac-
ceptance even more difficult than it already is. Furthermore, 
the then existing legislature might reject, but could not ac-
cept.74 
A number of senators of more liberal views perceived these 
objections to the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, and in 
fact the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a revised 
proposal by Senator Walsh of Montana, popularly referred 
'"Rep. Garrett of Tennessee, H. J. R. 69, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (19z1); 
Senator Wadsworth of New York, S. ]. R. 40, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (19z1); 
Senator Wadsworth, S. ]. R. z71, 67th Cong., 4th sess. (19z3); Rep. Gar~ett, 
H. J. R. 4z9, 67th Cong., 4th sess. ( 19z3}; Senator Wadsworth, S. ]. R. 4, 
68th Cong., 1st sess. (19z3); Rep. Garrett, H. J. R. 143, 7oth Cong., rst sess. 
(19z8). See speech by Senator Wadsworth, 65 CONG. REc. (19z4) 4491 1 
4495, and S. ]. R. z1, 67th Cong., rst sess. (19zt) 1 making both legislative 
and popular vote mandatory. 
"These arguments were very clearly brought out by Mr. Huddleston of 
Alabama, 67 CoNG. REc. (19z6) 7zo3, who advocated ratification by popular 
vote. See also Rep. Griffin of New York, 66 CoNG. REC. (r9z5) 4zo5. 
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to as the Walsh substitute. 75 The principal feature of Walsh's 
proposal was that amendments should be referred directly 
to the people for ratification. The long delays and the in-
creased difficulties of amendment under the Wadsworth-
Garrett amendment were pointed out. Senator Jones of 
Washington then offered an amendment to the Walsh sub-
stitute, taking a position intermediate between that of Sen-
ators Wadsworth and Walsh. 76 Unlike Wadsworth's pro-
posal it provided for a referendum when the legislature 
rejected an amendment as well as when it ratified. Also unlike 
Wadsworth's proposal, this plan contemplated the mandatory 
use of the popular referendum in all cases. It did agree with 
Wadsworth's proposal, however, in the fact that the legis-
lature still remained a part of the amending procedure. But 
it became a purely advisory body. That is to say, no matter 
how the legislature voted, a popular referendum automati-
cally followed; the result of the legislative vote, whether 
for or against the amendment, was immaterial. 
The proponents of the Jones amendment argued that the 
people would receive the benefits of the legislative discus-
sions. If a popular vote alone were taken, such a vote might 
come so soon after proposal by Congress that there would be 
no time for deliberation. On the other hand, it was argued 
that this plan turned the legislature into a mere debating so-
ciety, and that since its action was mere brutum fulmen it 
would not take its function seriously enough to make its dis-
cussions of any value to the people. In fact, it would strip 
the legislature of its dignity to make it a mere advisory body. 
There would be unnecessary delay involved since the people 
•• S. Rep. 202 on S. J. R. 4, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (1924), 65 CoNG. REc. 
(1924) 3675. For defenses of Walsh's substitute, see Adams, 65 CoNG. REc. 
(1924) 4497, 4802, 4804, 4998; Brandegee, ibid. 4497, 4565, 4931; Borah, 
ibid. 4561, 4563, 4564; Robinson, ibid. 48oo; Walsh, ibid. 4931; Gerry, 
ibid. 4935; Norris, ibid. 4941. 
'"'65 CONG. REC. (1924) 4802, 4929. 
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could act only after the legislature had acted, and moreover 
only a subsequently elected legislature itself could act. As to 
the possibility of undue haste and lack of knowledge on the 
part of the voters, it was pointed out that it is virtually impos-
sible to secure the proposal by Congress by the necessary two-
thirds vote without long preliminary popular agitation and 
discussion. Senator Walsh and a number of other senators 
who favored a popular referendum objected vigorously to the 
Jones amendment, and declared they preferred the existing 
system to it. 
It is true that the Jones amendment did present a rather 
evenly balanced proposal, on the one hand making a consider-
able delay necessary and yet on the other hand providing for 
a popular referendum in all cases, such referendum to be ab-
solutely decisive irrespective of the action of the legislature. 
It was subject to the further·objection that in case the legis-
lature took no action at all then no referendum could occur. 
The Senate at first accepted the amendment,77 only shortly 
later to reject it.78 The Walsh substitute finally died on the 
calendar. The House Judiciary Committee twice reported 
favorably on the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, but no 
vote was ever taken on it. Senator Brandegee twice proposed 
that Congress should have the option of submitting amend-
ments to be ratified according to either of the present modes 
or by a popular referendum. 79 
Assuming that there is to be a popular referendum, there 
is still the question of when it should be held. The most usual 
proposal is that it shall be held at the next general federal 
election, in other words at the next election of members of 
77 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 49401 by a vote of 34 to 29. 
78 Ibid. 5003 1 by a vote of 39 to 35· 
•• S. J. R. 90, 65th Cong., 1st sess. (1917), and S. J. R. 41 1 66th Cong., 1st 
sess. (1919), twice reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 58 
CoNe. REc. (1919) 42651 5694-5700. See also Smith, "Shall We Make Our 
Constitution Flexible?" (1911) 194 No. AM. REV. 657. 
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the House of Representatives. 80 This means that the amend-
ment will be voted on by the people at some time less than 
two years after it was submitted by Congress. It also means 
that all of the states would be passing on the amendment on 
one uniform date, excepting, of course, Maine, which votes 
earlier. If the amendment were rejected, that would seem 
to cut off another referendum without a new submission by 
Congress. Hence we would dispose of the problem whether 
or not a given amendment is still pending. Other proposals 
have been that it shall be voted on at the next general state 
election held within the state. 81 General state elections are 
held usually every two years, and in some states annually, 
so that amendments would be voted on at approximately the 
same time. A third conceivable plan would be to allow each 
state to hold its election when it chose.82 This, however, would 
do away with uniformity of time of ratification and still leave 
unsolved the problem of whether or not a given amendment 
is still pending. Perhaps the most satisfactory stipulation is 
that first mentioned, providing for a vote at the same time 
that the lower house of Congress is being elected. 
It has been suggested that to permit a popular vote at so 
early a date may result in action on the amendment before 
there has been an opportunity for public discussion and de-
liberation on the amendment. Congress might submit an 
amendment only a few months before the election. Doubt-
less there is some force in this objection. Possibly it might 
be well to prescribe a minimum period, such as one year or 
80 Senator Pomerene of Ohio, S. J. R. 22, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. 
Emerson of Ohio, H. J. R. 6o and 123, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Rep. Lea 
of California, H. J. R. 168, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1929). In Australia an 
amendment is submitted to popular vote within not less than two or more than 
six months after it has been proposed. Constitution of Commonwealth of 
Australia, § 128. 
81 Senator Norris, in a letter of June 10, 1931, to the author of this book. 
82 Speech by Senator Wadsworth, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4495; S. J. R. 134, 
75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938). 
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six months, between the date of submission and that of the 
popular referendum. 83 The present amendments have been 
ratified in most cases by the then existing legislatures, in 
some cases on receipt of telegraphic information of the ap-
proval by Congress. No amendment has taken as much as 
three years to ratify, and the tremendous pressure brought 
to bear on the legislatures has been such as to induce prompt 
action, in some cases through special sessions. Moreover, as 
Senator Walsh has pointed out, the bare fact of approval by 
Congress in itself indicates that a measure has received long 
. prior discussion, so that the populace does not need a long 
period of time in which to make up its mind. 84 
If Article Five be amended to provide for ratification of 
amendments by a popular referendum, questions may arise 
concerning what majority shall be necessary to carry an amend-
ment and who shall be the judge of whether or not an amend-
ment has been adopted by the requisite majority. By a 
majority do we mean a majority of the qualified electors of 
the state, or a majority of the electors voting on the amend-
ment? The same doubt has arisen as to similarly phrased 
clauses in state constitutions. Perhaps the sounder legal view 
is that simply a majority of the electors voting on the amend-
ment is sufficient, yet the adjudicated cases split about evenly 
on the matter. To prevent any controversy it seems best to 
provide expressly that ratification be by a majority of the 
qualified electors voting on the proposed amendment. 85 The 
88 Carman, "Why and How the Present Method of Amending the Federal 
Constitution Should be Changed," (I938) I7 ORE. L. REv. I02, 
.. 65 CONG. REc. (I924) 4558; Borah, ibid. 4564; Norris, ibid. 5002, 
.. Mr. Porter of Virginia, H. J. R. I8o, 42d Cong., 3d sess. (I87J); Senator 
Owen of Oklahoma, 58 CoN G. REC. (I 9I9) 5700. See speech by Senator 
· Robinson of Arkansas, 6 5 CoN G. REc. (I 9 24) 3 6 7 6 ; speeches by Senators 
Harrison and George, ibid. 4999; proposal by Senator Reed of Missouri, sup-
ported by Norris, ibid. 5003, soo6; letter of June Io, I93I, by Senator Norris 
to author of this book. Professor Edwar.d S. Corwin, in a letter of May 27, 
193I 1 to the author of this book suggests ratification by an absolute majority 
of the number voting in the most recent presidential election. 
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Wadsworth-Garrett amendment is doubly ambiguous in pro-
viding simply for "confirmation by popular vote." Usage, 
however, would seem to indicate that by this is meant a simple 
majority rather than a two-thirds or a three-fourths or some 
other majority. 
In the recent congressional debates argument arose over 
which was to control the matter of whether or not an amend-
ment has been adopted,-the federal government or the 
states. Under the present legislative mode, the courts will not 
look behind the legislative rolls to decide whether an amend-
ment has been adopted after it has been certified to the secre-
tary of state by the state officials. But ratification by popular 
vote does not involve a precisely analogous situation, and so 
question might arise as to whether or not the federal govern-
ment might attempt to regulate the conduct of the election, 
the qualifications of voters, and the counting of the ballots, 
etc. It was after some acrimonious debate on this as well as 
other controversial issues that the Walsh substitute was re-
committed to committee for clarification. 86 
Another point which has frequently been raised is that of 
how long an amendment remains open for ratification after it 
has been submitted by Congress. As a matter of common 
sense, an amendment proposed a generation or more pre-
viously should not remain open to ratification. 57 A time limit 
set out in an amendment on a specific subject would govern 
the ratification of that amendment. But the Supreme Court 
has gone even further and said that Congress has the implied 
power to prescribe a reasonable time limit for ratification, 88 
and that the question of time is a political one. 89 A number of 
86 Senator Swanson of Virginia, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) soo7-soo9. 
"'Senator Ashurst of Arizona, 55 CoNG. REC. (1917) sss6-sssH Senator 
Norris, letter of June 10, 1931, to the author of this book; BuRDICK, THE 
LAw oF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION (1922) 39· 
88 Dillon v. Gloss, (1921) zs6 U.S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 51o. 
80 Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. 
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proposals have therefore been made for specific time limits, 
such as five/0 six,91 seven,92 or eight 93 years. Where action by 
both the legislatures and the voters is contemplated, naturally 
a longer period should be provided, and such changes were 
offered when the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment was dis-
cussed in Congress. If ratification were to be exclusively by a 
popular referendum, especially if the vote were taken at a 
uniform date, there would seem to be no need for providing 
a limitation, unless the referendum provision be construed to 
permit another referendum without another submission by 
Congress. In connection with time limitations, perhaps it 
might be well to limit the time during which an application 
by a legislature for a national constitutional convention is ef-
fectual. 
One of the latest proposals to receive attention was Senate 
Joint Resolution 134 introduced by Senator Norris in 1937.94 
Under this proposed amendment there would be ratification 
by popular vote, the vote of only two-thirds of the states 
would be required, and the states would be deprived of their 
present right to propose amendments. Amendments would 
be submitted by each state to the electors thereof at the next 
90 Senator Chilton of West Virginia, S. J. R. I26, 6Jrd Cong., 2d sess. 
(19I4); Mr. Igoe of Missouri, H. J. R. I37> 65th Cong., 1st sess. (I9I7). 
91 Senator Wadsworth of New York, S. J. R. 207, 64th Cong., 2d sess. 
(19I7), and S. J. R. 88, 65th Cong., Ist sess. (I9I7); Senator Brandegee of 
Connecticut, S. J. R. go, 65th Cong., Ist sess. (I917 ), and S. J. R. 4I, 66th 
Cong., Ist sess. (I9I9); speech by Senator Ashurst of Arizona, 55 CoNG. REc. 
(I9I7) sss6-sss8; Senator Fletcher of Florida, S. J. R. 182, 65th Cong., 
2d sess. (I 9 I 8). 
92 Mr. Cullen of New York, H. J. R. I62, 67th Cong., ISt sess. (I92I). 
See article by Senator Ashurst, "Making Amendments," SATURDAY EVENING 
PosT, April 25, I929, reprinted in 72 CONG. REc. (I93o) 3066. 
93 Senator Wadsworth, S. J. R. Iog, 68th Cong., Ist sess. (I924). Though 
advocating a time limit, no specific time is suggested by Platz, "Article Five of 
the Federal Constitution," (I934) 3 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17 at 48. 
•• See "Ratification of Constitutional Amendments by Popular Vote," HEAR-
INGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE }UDICIARY OF 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ON S. }. RES. IJ4, 75th Cong. 3d sess. (I938). 
See criticism of the proposal in editorial, (I938) 24 A. B. A. J. 298; Thom-
son, "Amending the Constitution," (I938) 42 LAW NOTES No. x, p. 9· 
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general election held in the state after the date of proposal; 
but if a general election was to be held within sixty days after 
the date an amendment is proposed, it is to be submitted at 
the next succeeding general election. The electors were to 
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the state legis-
lature. Each state was to conduct the election and determine 
the result thereof as the state law provided, or in the absence 
of such state law as the Congress shall provide. Congress was 
to have power to prescribe by a uniform law the form in 
which the question of the ratification should be submitted to 
the electors in the several states. The amendment was to be 
submitted to state conventions for ratification. 
Beginning January 18, 1938, a subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Judiciary of the Senate, consisting of George W. 
Norris of Nebraska, Chairman, Carl A. Hatch of New 
Mexico, Key Pittman of Nevada, Tom Connally of Texas 
and Warren R. Austin of Vermont conducted hearings on the 
proposal. 
Federal Judge William Clark of New Jersey pointed out 
to the committee that in most of the countries of the world 
having a federal government, amendment involves action on 
the part of the federal legislature only and that the federal 
principle is preserved only by the requirement that the alter-
ing action be taken in a special manner, such as by a special 
majority of two-thirds or three-fourths, with or without a 
period of reflection, that is, repassage after a year. 95 Only the 
United States, Switzerland, Australia, and Germany insist on 
action elsewhere than in the federal legislature. Furthermore, 
in all these latter countries except the United States, the action 
is by popular vote and only in Australia is the vote by states. 
Senator Norris' amendment approximated that of the next 
most rigid amending process, that of Australia. Judge Clark 
argued that ratification by legislatures was objectionable for 
.. HEARINGs, supra, note 94, at p. I I, 
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three reasons: 96 (r) the ratifying legislature may have been 
elected before submission, hence may not be representative of 
the people's wishes; ( 2) the legislature, even if subsequently 
elected, may have been elected for their views on other issues; 
and (3) legislators vote with an eye to reelection. In his opin-
ion, a convention was subject to none of these three objections, 
but a convention was still not as democratic a procedure as a 
popular referendum. Moreover, the experience with the 
Twenty-First Amendment showed that a convention was not 
deliberative and merely followed the people's instructions; 
it was simply an expensive form of referendum. He also ad-
vocated that ratification should be by only two-thirds of the 
states. 
Most of the witnesses appearing objected to the proposed 
amendment. It was felt that the states should still retain the 
right to request Congress to call a national convention to 
amend the Constitution, since Congress might refuse to do so 
in defiance of public sentiment. It was thought that the voter 
was not competent to pass on the soundness of amendments. 
It was argued that a vote at a general election would be con-
fusing because of the numerous and unrelated questions to 
be voted on. It was argued that there would not be sufficient 
time for deliberation if amendments could be voted on only 
sixty days after proposal. 
The proposed amendment was also objected to on the 
ground that it did not correct the difficulties in securing pro-
posals of amendments by Congress.97 Mr. Bainbridge Colby, 
former Secretary of State, took exception on a number of 
grounds. 98 He pointed out that delay occurred at the stage of 
proposal rather than in ratification, that ratification by popular 
referenda was proposed as early as I 873, that many propo-
06 Ibid. 12. 
97 Ibid. 481 53· 
.. Ibid. SI-66. 
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nents of a popular referendum wished to retard the amending 
process, that the people are not fitted to pass on many possible 
amendments, that there will be too many other issues to vote 
on at general elections, that many people will fail to vote 
on amendments, that popular referenda would result in delay 
in ratifying amendments since dissimilar to legislatures they 
are limited to certain fixed time periods, and that to allow 
ratification by only two-thirds of the states would result in 
political and geographical cleavages. 
C. SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS 
Virtually all the changes which have been suggested in the 
amending process have been as to procedure. Although in the 
last decade numerous assertions have been made that there 
are certain implied limitations on the content of amendments, 99 
few suggestions have been made that express limitations be 
inserted in the amending clause.100 It is of course true that the 
Constitutional Convention inserted three such limitations and 
that a fourth limitation was suggested but rejected. Two of 
these limitations, couched in absolute terms, so that appar-
ently a unanimous vote of all the states could not destroy 
them, expired in I 808. The first forbade Congress from pro-
hibiting the importation of slaves until I 808. Apparently, 
however, an amendment forbidding such importation without 
mention of Congress, in other words an amendment of a legis-
lative nature such as the Eighteenth Amendment, would have 
been valid. The second limitation expiring in I 8o8 was that 
99 See chap. IV, supra, pp. 87-u6, for full discussion. 
100 But such a suggestion is made by Butler, "The Constitution One Hundred 
and Forty Years After," (1928) 12 CoNST. REv. 121 at 126. Westervelt, 
"Amend Article V," (1931) 24 LAWY. & BANKER 166 at 169, would amend 
Article Five so as to provide "that amendments dealing strictly with the organi-
zation of government might be submitted to the legislatures of the several 
states for ratification and adoption, and that those dealing in any way with 
the mass of governmental powers must be submitted to conventions of the 
people." 
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no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid except in pro-
portion to population. Although more doubtful, this too was 
only a limitation on Congress, so that an amendment legislat-
ing on the subject might have been adopted. Thus these limi-
tations were such only on the powers that could be given to 
Congress. Nevertheless the principle remains clear that there 
were certain things that could not be done directly by the 
amending power, although very much the same result might 
be accomplished indirectly. The third limitation, and the only 
one now in existence, is that no state shall be deprived of its 
equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent. Hence, even 
though an amendment is adopted according to the regular 
procedure, it is invalid if it deprives a state of its equal suffrage 
unless the state affected consents. An amendment adopted by 
all the states, however, would wipe out even this clause. 
Although some of the proponents of limitations on the amend-
ing power have drawn a great deal of comfort from the equal 
suffrage clause, it would seem that the limitation is more 
nominal than real in its practical effect.101 
A proposal which would have resulted in a substantial re-
striction on the amending power was that offered by Sherman 
at the Convention "that no state should be affected in its in-
ternal police." 102 Madison objected that this would pave the 
way for special provisos in behalf of the individual states, and 
Sherman's motion was lost. The last serious attempt to limit 
the content of amendments was made just prior to the Civil 
War when numerous proposals were made forbidding Con-
gress to adopt any amendment abolishing slavery.103 Congress 
actually submitted an amendment to this effect, known as the 
Corwin amendment, which was ratified by two states and by 
101 See supra, chap. IV, pp. 83-87; 96-99. 
102 See supra, chap. IV, pp. 86-87. 
""'Fourteen such proposals were made between Dec. 12.1 186o, and April 81 
1864. See the list in AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1897) JS6-J68. 
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an Illinois constitutional convention which happened to be in 
· session.104 It should be observed, in passing, that this amend-
ment would have restricted only Congress and not the amend-
ing power itself, so that an amendment directly abolishing 
slavery would have been valid. Only two state constitutions 
contain express limitations on the content of amendments.105 
It would seem that the present federal amending power is 
practically unlimited in its scope. No question could arise over 
the validity of changes in the amending procedure itself, and 
none as to changes in content, provided that the equal suffrage 
clause is observed. Amendments limiting the substance of 
future amendments would possibly be valid under the Amer-
ican conception of the powers of the sovereign, though in Eng-
land it has been asserted that one Parliament is not bound 
by the acts of another. Yet it would seem extremely unfor-
tunate to impose any limitations on content, both because one 
generation cannot foresee the needs of another and because 
such restrictions make a revolution necessary to accomplish 
the change which is forbidden. Fortunately the proponents of 
a more difficult amending process have concentrated on 
changes in procedure, so that there is little prospect at the 
present time that any limitations on content will be added to 
Article Five. 
D. POLICY FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED 
Iu concluding this study of the reform of the federal 
amending power, it seems not only proper but essential to 
summarize the underlying factors which are to be considered 
when amendment or revision of the Constitution is sought. 
One must beware of making an absolute of any one element, 
since here as in most other situations it is unlikely that there 
10< Ibid. 1961 z86, 363. 
""'See chap. II, p. 2.41 note 65. 
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fs any one fundamental principle entitled to exclusive em-
phasis.106 
Before considering these various factors one must carefully 
distinguish between the policy and the legality of changes 
in the amending process. As has been seen, it is unquestion-
ably legal to make any change that is desired in the amend-
ing procedure provided of course that the existing rules are 
followed in making that change. But it by no means follows 
that merely because a change can legally be made and is made 
that such a change is a desirable one. By the policy of a change, 
on the other hand, is meant the practical operation of the 
machinery in its effect on the life of the nation. In considering 
the reform of the federal amending power, it is the policy 
we are interested in rather than the legality. 
First to be considered in examining the policy of a change 
suggested in the amending procedure is its effect on the main-
tenance of the federal system.107 Will the change so operate 
as to bring about the destruction of the states, or substantially 
..,. }AMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS, 4th ed. ( 1887) 549, says: 
"Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in 
the nature of safety-valves,-they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their 
peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-
pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with 
such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient to explode 
the machine. Hence the problem of the Constitution-maker is, in this par-
ticular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites 
for progress with the requisites for safety.'' 
Mr. Huddleston of Alabama, 67 CoNG. REc. (1926) 7203, stated that "the 
clause which lies nearest to its heart is the clause which permits a change in 
the Constitution. It is more vital and more fundamental than any other pro-
vision of the Constitution. For, by dealing with that clause, we may fix it so 
that the Constitution is absolutely rigid and may never be amended, or we 
may fix it so that it may be amended lightly and without sufficient thought. In 
other words, through that clause we reach toward every other clause in the 
whole Constitution, and that can not be said about any other clause of the 
Constitution. 
"I can not go into that in detail. I merely want to bring the thought that 
unnecessary meddling with the Constitution becomes a more serious offense 
when we deal with an amendment to the particular clause, than if we were 
undertaking to deal with any other section." 
""Martig, "Amending the Constitution," (1937) 35 MJcH L. REV. IZ53 
at n8s. 
REFORM OF THE AMENDING CLAUSE 207 
to weaken them? It should be clear, however, that there is 
nothing sacrosanct in the maintenance of the federal system 
per se. The federal system is defensible only when it conduces 
to the greatest good of the nation and the states.108 As soon 
as it becomes evident that the nation would be better off as a 
unitary state, such as France or Italy, then let it become such, 
and let the principle of the general welfare supersede that of 
states' rights. Similarly if a division of the nation into its 
component elements would operate for the general welfare 
of those concerned, let the union be dissolved. That either one 
of these situations now exists in the United States can scarcely 
be seriously asserted. We are still strongly committed to the 
notion of an "indestructible Union, composed of indestructible 
States." 109 There is little question that the trend in recent 
years has been toward centralization. The increasingly indus-
trial character of the nation, the improvement of the means of 
communication, the disappearance of the frontier, and the 
past feeling of confidence which the federal government has 
inspired in the people have all combined with an irresistible 
force to strengthen the feeling of unity.110 Yet one cannot 
deny the need of local self government, based on a real popu-
lar interest and popular knowledge of the local situation. The 
1ll8 Cf., however, the statement as to the intent of the framers of the Con-
stitution, in Goodnow, "Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions," 
(I 9 I 2) 3 A cAD. PoL. Sci. PROC. 49 at 52: "Finally, the confidence of the 
fathers in the existence of eternal political verities and the possibility that 
fallible humanity might ascertain and formulate them is seen in the difficulty 
if not impossibility of amending the constitution which resulted from the 
processes of amendment provided." 
109 Senator Reed of Pennsylvania, 65 CoNG. REc. (I924) 4496; Frierson, 
"Amending the Constitution of the United States," (192o) 33 HARV. L. REv. 
659; Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I921) 30 YALE L. J. 32I 
at 348, 354; Ames, "The Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in 
Practice," (1924) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc. PRoc. 62 at 74; HoRWILL, THE USAGES 
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (I925) 220; Moschzisker, "Dangers in 
Disregarding Fundamental Conceptions When Amending the Federal Consti-
tution," (I92S) I I CoRN. L. Q. I; Garrett, "Amending the Federal Constitu-
tion," (1929) 7 TENN. L. REV, 286 at 288. 
uo BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 4th ed. (I9Io) 403; THOMPSON, 
FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION (I!l2l) l0.5-l27. 
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Eighteenth Amendment has demonstrated that there are 
limitations on what can be accomplished by the federal gov-
ernment. The import of this is clear: since the federal prin-
ciple is a valuable one, care must be taken that the states are 
consulted as such in the ratification of amendments and pos-
sibly in their proposal as well. When the states ratify as such, 
it is obvious that under the natural law of self-preservation 
they will safeguard their own interests. In view of the seem-
ingly inevitable trend towards centralization, however, they 
must not be given an absolute veto, and the requirement of 
adoption by an excessive majority of states might well be 
somewhat relaxed. That is to say, the federal principle must 
be harmonized with the general welfare, since in the last an-
alysis it is defensible only as conducing to the general wel-
fare.111 
A second factor of importance is that of the wisdom and 
efficiency of the amendments secured through the change in 
the amending process. Will the change be of such kind as to 
result in the adoption of amendments which will prove harm-
ful to the country? Can a lesser majority than is now re-
quired be trusted to adopt amendments which may injure 
not only themselves, but the dissenting majority? Will the 
constitution not become unduly prolix and cluttered up with 
legislative provisions? 112 The mere fact that a simple major-
ity, or even an extraordinary majority, desire a change by 
111 Possibly the doctrine of political questions laid down in Coleman v. Miller, 
( 1 939) 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 572., leaving the ultimate decision to Congress 
as to certain phases of amending procedure violates the federal principle. It 
may be argued, however, that it does not since the Senate is peculiarly repre-
sentative of the states. 
112 Freund, "Legislative Problems and Solutions," (192.1) 7 A. B. A.]. 656 
at 658, says that "when the people desire to accomplish through the constitution 
a direct result independent of legislative assistance, they overlook the fact 
. • • that there are few propositions of law that can be made sufficiently 
brief for constitutional formulation, and at the same time self-executing." See 
also BURGESS, RECENT CHANGES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
(192.3) 114; BuRDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 
(192.2.) 49· 
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no means demonstrates that the change will prove bene-
ficial.113 King Mob may be just as much a despot as a single 
dictator. The discussions at the Constitutional Convention 
show that the framers of the Constitution were frankly aristo-
cratic in their views and deliberately set up a framework of 
government and a charter to protect the rights of minorities.114 
This is quite clearly shown in Article Five, which permits 
amendment not by a majority of the states or a majority of the 
people, but only by three-fourths of the states without any 
direct popular participation in any stage of the amending 
process. This made it certain that the rights given to mi-
m Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made 
More Difficult?" (I9z6) IO MINN. L. REv. I85 at I88-I9o, says: "Generally 
the votes which have been cast in state elections, and particularly in referendums 
upon proposed constitutional amendments, have indicated an unwillingness 
upon the part of the people to concern themselves with such questions. The 
slogan, 'When in doubt, vote no!' has been applied with particular emphasis, 
and from the evidence available it appears that usually the number and per-
centage of votes cast upon proposals for amendments have been the lowest cast 
for any propositions or candidates on the ballot. The reason is that the voters 
are unable or unwilling to give proper consideration to such questions. They 
elect lawmakers for that purpose and have a right to expect that their repre-
sentatives will take testimony, consider all of the evidence and, after due and 
proper deliberation, render a reasoned decision. Many voters are not properly 
trained to understand questions of the import involved in proposed constitu-
tional amendments. • " · 
Walter F. Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I92o) 30 YALE 
L. J. 32I at 354, says: "A serious question presents itself as to whether the 
federal amending process should be so easy as to permit the introduction into 
the Constitution of provisions which involve distinctly sectional or political 
issues. Clearly the federal Constitution performs a function different from that 
of the state constitution, and should be less flexible than the state constitutions 
may properly be." See also JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, 4th ed. 
(I 8 8 7) 55 z-5 53 ; Long, "Tinkering with the Constitution," ( I9I5) z4 YALE 
L. J. 57 3 at 58 6; Brown, "Irresponsible Government by Constitutional Amend-
ments," (I9ZZ) 8 VA. L. REV. I57; Butler, "The Constitution One Hundred 
and Forty Years After," (I9z8) rz CoNST. REv. IZI at rz3. Cf., however, 
the view of Smith, "Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" ( I9 I I) I94 
No. AM. REv. 657 at 669-6701 that the dominating political party should be 
able to introduce amendments. 
n• Senator Bruce of Maryland, 65 CoNG. REc. (I924) 4557, says that 
"they kept their eyes no more on the possibility of oppression in high places 
than they did upon what they conceived to be the caprices, the passions, the 
sudden gusts of impulse in one form or another to which men en masse are 
subject. They believed in representative government rather than in pure 
democracy." 
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norities under the Constitution would be taken from them only 
after the majority had made itself overwhelmingly strong. 
In other words, the theory is that a constitutional amend-
ment is of much greater significance than a statute, and that 
it is much more likely to be a wise amendment when a large 
majority concur in it. The Eighteenth Amendment is ·fre-
quently cited to show that even a large majority can make a 
mistake. 
There is, however, another side of the picture. The amend-
ing process may be made so difficult as to prevent the adop-
tion of amendments which are unquestionably sound. One 
must balance against the undesirable amendments checked by 
a difficult amending process the desirable ones not adopted 
because of such process.115 It has been asserted that a more 
flexible amending process might have averted the Civil War. 
The enemies of the Eighteenth Amendment also appear to 
forget that a difficult amending process makes it almost im-
possible to repeal an unsatisfactory amendment. Making it 
easier to amend might result in the adoption of a number of 
undesirable proposals, yet such amendments might be re-
pealed with the same ease. The doctrine of political questions 
may be regarded as a method of making the amending process 
easier. Moreover, it does so by placing authority in Congress 
instead of the people, thus assuring some deliberation. 
A third factor, and one closely related to that just discussed 
is that of proper deliberation. The amending process should 
not be so changed that amendments can be adopted without 
an opportunity to discuss the arguments pro and con.116 An 
Ull Ernest C. Carman denies that it is better to do without good amendments 
rather than allow bad ones to be adopted. Carman, "Why and How the 
Present Method of Amending the Federal Constitution Should Be Changed," 
(1938) 17 ORE. L. REV. 102 at 104. 
116 "The great principle to be sought is to make the changes practicable, but 
not too easy; to secure due deliberation, and caution; and to follow experience, 
rather than to open a way for experiments, suggested by mere speculation or 
theory." 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 3d ed. (x8s8) 634. See also Senator Wadsworth, 65 CoNG. REc. 
(1924) 4495· 
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amendment should receive at least as much consideration as 
a statute. Under the present system, due deliberation is more 
than amply secured. The two-thirds majority required in 
Congress and the three-fourths required among the states in-
sure adequate deliberation. A measure which must pass the 
scrutiny of thirty-seven legislative bodies, each in turn (ex-
cept in Nebraska) divided into an upper and a lower house, 
can scarcely be said to have been rushed through. In fact, the 
agitation for some of the most recent amendments, such as the 
income tax and woman suffrage amendments, began seventy-
five and fifty years ago, so that the process if anything must be 
said to be too slow. For this last reason it would seem that the 
proposals for ratification only by subsequently elected legis-
latures and permitting of a confirmation by popular vote of 
the legislative ratification should both be defeated.117 The 
present provisions for securing deliberation are entirely ade-
quate. In fact, some of the more recent proposals call for a less-
ening of the majorities required both for proposal and rati-
fication. The proposal for a popular referendum also looks in 
the direction of less deliberation, since the amendment would 
be voted on conclusively by the people within one or two years 
after discussion. 
The framers of the Constitution anticipated a frequent use 
of the amending power.118 Practically all the critics of the 
present amending process, at least until the last two decades, 
nT In I 826 Rep. Herrick of Maine introduced a resolution to regulate the 
time for introducing amendments, proposal to be allowed only every tenth 
year. CoNGRESSIONAL DEBATES, 19th Cong., 1st sess. (I 8z6) I 554· Chief 
Justice Von Moschzisker of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suggested that 
if a popular referendum is to be provided for, only a limited number of amend-
ments should be voted on at the same election. Moschzisker, "Dangers in Dis-
regarding Fundamental Conceptions when Amending the Federal Constitu-
tion," (1925) I I CORN. L. Q. I at s-6. Senator Owen, 58 CoNG. REC. (1919) 
57001 proposed that there be mailed to each voter a copy of the proposals and 
a copy of the arguments, for and against, prepared by two committees composed 
of leading representatives of the opposing sides. 
llB Hamilton's remarks at the Constitutional Convention, 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES 
(1836) 530 and Madison in THE FEDERALIST, No. 43• 
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have agreed that the process should be made easier.119 No 
amendments were adopted between I 804 and I 8 6 5, or be-
tween I 8 70 and I 9 I 3. The Progressive Party in I 9 I 2 adopted 
a plank favoring easier amendment. The adoption of the last 
six amendments has resulted in a reversal of opinion on the 
part of many, so that such proposals as the Wadsworth-
UDMarshall C. J., in Barron v. Baltimore, (I833) 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 24 at 
249-250; Brown, J., in Holden v. Hardy, (I898) I69 U.S. 336 at 387, I8 
S. Ct. 3 8 3 ; WILSON, CoNGRESSIONAL GovERNMENT (I 8 8 5) 242; I BuRGEss, 
PoLITICAL SCIENCE AND CoMPARATIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (I89I) ISO; 
Potter, "The Method of Amending the Federal Constitution," (I 909) 57 
U. PA. L. REv. 589 at 592; THOMPSON, "The Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution," (I912) 3 AcAD. PoL. Sci. PRoc. 65 at 69; BRYCE, AMERICAN 
CoMMONWEALTH, 4th ed. (I9IO) 359; Smith, "Shall We Make Our Con-
stitution Flexible?" (I 9I I) I 94 No. AM. REv. 6 57; Johnstone, "An Eight-
eenth Century Constitution," (I912) 7 ILL. L. REV. 265; BEARD, AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (I9I4) 62; DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITU-
TION, 8th ed. (I9I5) I45; John W. Davis, "Present Day Problems," (I923) 
48 A. B. A. REP. I93 at 20I; Senator Brookhart of Iowa, 65 CoNG. REc. 
(1924) 4564, 4566; Rep. Huddleston of Alabama, 66 CONG. REc. (I925) 
4572; Arneson, "Is It Easy to Amend the Constitution?" (1926) 6o AM. L. 
REv. 6oo; Miller, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be 
Made More Difficult?" (I926) IO MINN. L. REv. I85. 
Ames seems at first to have thought the amending process too difficult. 
AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (I 887) 300 ff. But more recently he has changed his opinion. "Although 
the speaker some years ago held the view that the amending process was too 
difficult, he has been led, in common with others, as a result of recent expe-
rience, to a modification of that opinion. He believes that a radical change in 
the method of amendment is neither necessary nor desirable." Ames, "The 
Amending Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice," (1924) 63 
AM. PHIL. Soc. PRoc. 62 at 74· 
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (I 9 I o) 
I4I, note, states that "it seems to be the general view that our federal consti-
tution cannot be amended except in times of national crises." In "Amending 
the Federal Constitution," (I92I) 30 YALE L. J. 32I at 348-354, he concludes 
that the present process is substantially satisfactory. 
See also Maggs, "The Constitution and Recovery Legislation: The Roles of 
Document, Doctrine and Judges," LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN K. 
McMURRAY ( I935) 399 at 40I; Dodd, "Adjustment of the Constitution to 
New Needs," (I936) 22 A. B. A. J. n6; Garrison, "The Constitution and 
Social Progress," (I936) IO TuLANE L. REV. 33; Howard, "Is Our Consti-
tution Adequate for Present Day Needs?" (I937) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 47 at 75; 
Clark, "Some Recent Proposals for Constitutional Amendment," (I 9 3 7) I 2 
Wis. L. REV. 3 I 3 at 3 I 5; Fraenkel, "What Can Be Done About the Constitu-
tion and the Supreme Court?" (I937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 212; Cummings, "The 
Nature of the Amending Process," (I938) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 247 at 252; 
Powell, "Changing Constitutional Phases," (I939) I9 BosT. U. L. REv. 509 
at sr 8. 
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Garrett amendment are designed to make it more difficult.120 
The weight of opinion, however, probably is that the present 
process is difficult enough, perhaps exactly to the proper de-
gree.121 
The controversy over adding members to the Supreme 
Court in 1937 raised the question as to the adequacy of the 
amending process to secure needed reforms. Many felt that 
it was too difficult to secure necessary amendments.122 The 
recently enunciated doctrine of political questions may be in 
part a consequence of the difficulty of amendment.123 Strange 
as it may seem, the first definite proposal to make the amend-
ing process easier did not come until the Civil War period. 
Up to 1911 approximately twenty-five amendments to the 
120 Brown, "The 'New Bill of Rights' Amendment," (I922) 9 VA. L. REv. 
I 4; Lanier, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I 9 2 3) 9 VA. L. REG. 
(N. S.) 8I; Mussman, "Is the Amending Process too Difficult?" (I923) 57 
AM. L. REV. 694, and "The Difficulty of Amending our Federal Constitution: 
Defect or Asset?" (I929) IS A. B. A. J. 505; Senator Edge of New Jersey, 65 
CoNG. REc. (I924) 4497, 4938; Klinglesmith, "Amending the Constitution 
of the United States," (I925) 73 U. PA. L. REV. 355 at 368; Cadwalader, 
"Amendment of the Federal Constitution," (I926) 6o AM. L. REv. 389; 
Butler, "The Constitution One Hundred and Forty Years After," (I928) 
I2 CoNST. REv. I2I; Garrett, "Amending the Federal Constitution," (I929) 
7 TENN. L. REV. 286. 
121 Senator Bursum of New Mexico, 65 CoNG. REc. (I924) 4420, stated: "It 
seems to me that consideration of amendments to the Constitution ought not 
to be considered the first business to take up. We have gotten along pretty 
well during the last I 50 years without those amendments, and we might get 
along perhaps a few days longer." 
Senator Walsh, in attacking the Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, ibid. 456I, 
stated: "I do not think there is any occasion for any amendment to the Con-
stitution on this subject; but, if there is, I think that the obvious tendency of 
the times and the wisdom of our age suggests that the matter be submitted to 
the people of the State." 
Cf. the view of Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania, ibid. 4569: "I am unable 
to share the view of the Senator from Montana [Mr. Walsh] that this subject 
is one unworthy of consideration at the present time. It seems to me that 
while the experiences incident to the adoption of recent amendments are fresh 
in our minds, and at a time when we are not distracted by the pendency of any 
great amendment involving a question of policy upon which the country is 
divided, is the ideal time to propose for consideration a measure designed to 
prevent in the future evils which have been incident to the process of amendment 
in the past." 
122 See note I I 8, supra. 
lliiiColeman v. Miller, (1939) 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972. 
214 AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
amending process were offered, while since that time seventy-
five proposals have been made, making a total of about one 
hundred amendments offered in Congress to Article Five. 
The fact that the last seventy-five proposals have been made 
in the last two decades possibly foreshadows a change. The 
writer predicts that with the defeat of the child labor amend-
ment and an interval during which no amendments are 
adopted, the view that the process is too difficult will gain 
strength. 
The need for an easier amending process can easily be over-
stated, however. The Constitution is of so elastic a nature that 
on many subjects the desired ends can be achieved without 
altering the Constitution.124 The language of the Constitu-
tion is brief and couched in general terms. Moreover the 
liberal construction school of interpretation has triumphed 
over the strict constructionists, so that by a process of inter-
pretation the terms of the Constitution may be made to cover 
m AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (I887) 302; BRYCE, THE AMERICAN CoMMONWEALTH, 4th 
ed. (I9Io) 37I; Goodnow, "Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Pro-
visions," (I 9 12) 3 A cAD. PoL. Sci. PROC. 49; Hall, " 'An Eighteenth Century 
Constitution'-A Comment," (I912) 7 ILL. L. REv. 285; Llewellyn, "The 
Constitution as an Institution," (I 934) 34 CoL. L. REv. I at 4, 2 I; Dodd, 
"Adjustment of the Constitution to New Needs," (I936) 22 A. B. A. J. u6; 
Coudert, "Judicial Constitutional Amendment," (I904) I3 YALE L. J. 33I; 
Brandeis, J., quoted by Mason, "Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Student of Social and 
Economic Science," (I93I) 79 U. PA. L. REv. 665 at 693; and Corwin, "Social 
Planning under the Constitution," (I932) 26 AM. PoL. Scr. REv. I at 26. 
Senator Walsh of Montana, 65 CoNG. REC. (I924) 4494, has stated: "Of 
course, many features of this Constitution of ours are of doubtful wisdom 
theoretically. We can easily conceive that a whole flood of evils might possibly 
ensue by reason of extraordinary powers granted here, but some way or other, 
they never do." 
Thayer, "Our New Possessions," (I 899) 12 HARV. L. REv. 464 at 468, 
said: "That instrument, astonishingly well adapted for the purposes of a great, 
developing nation, shows its wisdom mainly in the shortness and generality 
of its provisions, in it silence, and its abstinence from petty limitations. As it 
survives :fierce controversies from age to age, it is forever silently bearing 
witness to the wisdom that went into its composition, by showing itself suited 
to the purposes of a great people under circumstances that no one of its makers 
could have foreseen. Men have found, as they are finding now, when new 
and unlooked-for situations have presented themselves, that they were left with 
liberty to handle them." 
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most problems that arise. There are limits, however, on what 
can be accomplished by interpretation. The commerce clause, 
the war power, and the Fourteenth Amendment all admit of 
interpretation. But such provisions as those for the electoral 
college and the time of meeting of Congress itself do not. 
The amendment process should not be so difficult that strained 
interpretations causing loss of confidence in the judiciary 
must be resorted to.125 Nor should it be so difficult that the 
federal judicial veto of legislation cannot be overcome.126 
A fourth factor is that of popular democracy.127 The nation 
has been a republic since it broke away from England. Be-
ginning with the Jacksonian era the electorate has grown by 
leaps and bounds, so that there is almost universal manhood 
suffrage except in the South. The Fifteenth Amendment, 
nominally at least, increased the votes of the nation. Within 
our own times suffrage has been conferred on women. The 
Seventeenth Amendment provided for popular election of 
Senators, and very largely paved the way for agitation in 
behalf of popular participation in the amending process. The 
average of popular education is surely higher than it ever 
was, and should become even higher with the gradual as-
similation of our immigrants. The Supreme Court, the com-
mentators on the Constitution and our political orators make 
frequent reference to the sovereignty of the people. Yet the 
people do not participate in a single stage of the amending 
process. The Constitution was not directly adopted by the 
1211 Potter, "The Method of Amending the Federal Constitution," (1909) 
57 U. PA. L. REV. 589 at 595· 
lJl6 Smith, "Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (1911) 194 No. 
AM. REv. 657 at 66z. 
127 BORGEAUD, ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE 
AND AMERICA (1 895) 337; SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
(1907) 40; MACY and GANNAWAY, COMPARATIVE FREE GOVERNMENT (1915) 
z91; Eldridge, ''Need for a More Democratic Procedure of Amending the 
Constitution," (1916) 10 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 683; Ames, "The Amending 
Provision of the Federal Constitution in Practice," (19z4) 63 AM. PHIL. Soc. 
PRoc. 6z at 70. 
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people, nor is it amendable directly by them. 128 The framers 
of the Constitution distrusted democracy.129 The optional 
convention plan provided for in Article Five is never resorted 
to, and if it were it would not so accurately reflect the wishes 
of the people as a popular vote. It is indeed an anomalous situ-
ation where the people are given no participation in the most 
important of political matters-that of altering the Consti-
tution. Even the indirect participation presented through the 
use of the legislatures can scarcely be called representative 
because of the excessive majorities required both for proposal 
and for adoption. Ordinarily one conceives of democracy as 
acting through simple majorities. Under the present system 
the representatives of thirteen states can check the wishes of 
both the people and the representatives of the other thirty-
five. 
Before we can correctly speak of the people as being sover-
eign in the United States, we must amend the Constitution 
so as to permit a majority of the electorate of the entire coun-
try to amend the Constitution. There would, however, be but 
a slight departure from this principle if we permitted rati-
fication by a majority of voters in each of a majority of states, 
thus making the state still the unit of ratification, or if the 
provision were for ratification by a majority of the voters 
in each state as well as a majority of the electorate of the en-
tire nation. The advocates of the democratic principle must 
bear in mind the other factors which have been previously 
""' BORGEAUD, ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF CoNSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE 
AND AMERICA (r895) 333, in contrasting governmental with popular ratifica-
tion, said: "The former springs historically from a semi-mediaeval conception 
of the state, by which sovereignty is divided between the prince and the repre-
sentatives of the nation, and under the influence of which the constitutions have 
taken on the character of compacts between two parties. The latter is the one 
whose foundations were laid by the Revolution, and which has been developed 
in the democratic spirit of our time." 
129 Cummings, "The Nature of the Amending Process," ( r 9 3 8) 6 GEo. 
WASH. L. REV. 247 at 249, citing passages from the debates in the Constitutional 
Convention. 
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discussed. Obviously the maintenance of the federal principle 
will necessitate the preservation of the states as units in the 
amending process. Moreover, to permit amendment by a 
simple majority may result in the adoption of undesirable and 
excessive constitutional changes, without adequate deliber-
ation. Events in Europe cast doubt on too sweeping an exten-
sion of the democratic principle. An amendment reflecting 
only the wishes of a majority may also encounter difficulties 
in enforcement. 
It is of course easy to make a fetish of democracy. To a great 
many people Wilson's epigram about "making the world 
safe for democracy" has taken on a sardonic meaning. It is 
sun clear that political democracy is not a panacea for the ills 
of the nation. The dictatorships in Europe and elsewhere in-
dicate a lapse back to more aristocratic forms of government 
and, according to some, a failure of democracy. Perhaps the 
use of the referendam will now and then result in the adop-
tion of unwise changes. The experience of the states of this 
country has on the whole been favorable.130 The electorate 
is on the whole as conservative or more conservative than 
the legislatures, so that possibly there would be fewer changes 
than previously if the popular referendum were adopted. 
At least, many of the proponents of a more difficult amend-
ing process will also often be found recommending ratifica-
tion by popular vote. If mistakes are made, the people will 
recognize that the mistakes are their own. They will natu-
rally take more interest in a document which is their own.131 
1liO DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910) 
270-292; Radin, "Popular Legislation in California," (1939) 23 MINN. L. 
REv. 559· 
w Senator Borah, 65 CoNG. REc. (1924) 4562-4563 said: "The Constitution 
ought to be regarded as the people's law, the people's charter. I think just so 
nearly as is practicable and possible the judgment of the people, direct and im-
mediate, should be taken as to what should be found in their Constitution. 
Certainly, if we were making a constitution or rewriting the Constitution and 
resubmitting it, we would feel under obligation to submit it as directly to the 
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Perhaps they will also be more willing to comply with the 
laws laid down by themselves. The demand for popular de-
mocracy should be heeded to the extent of allowing partici-
pation in the ratification of amendments and possibly even 
in initiation.132 
A fifth factor is that of securing clarity and certainty in the 
amending process.133 The doctrine of political questions laid 
down in Coleman v. Miller 134 leaves in doubt the line be-
tween political and justiciable questions. It leaves in doubt 
the procedure in Congress in deciding political questions and 
the effect of nonaction by Congress. It leaves open to argu-
ment whether a decision by Congress in a particular case will 
be a binding precedent in later similar situations. Orderly 
procedure in the adoption of important and often permanent 
people as practicable, and I feel that in incorporating amendments we should 
observe the same rule. 
"There are a number of reasons for this, but one of the reasons is largely 
what you might call a sentimental or psychological reason, that is, I feel that 
people ought to be permitted to feel that when the Constitution is completed 
from time to time, and as it stands, it is their expression, an instrument which 
they have made; that it is their charter, that upon them it depends largely for 
its existence, and I should therefore want to bring home to them as nearly as 
possible the changing of it or the amending of it or the modifying of it in any 
respect .••• 
"I was at one time very much disturbed over the question of the initiative and 
referendum, but as I have observed its working in Switzerland and elsewhere, I 
find, instead of its being a radical proposition, it is an extremely safe and con-
servative proposition." 
""'BoRGEAUD, ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE 
AND AMERICA (r895) 337, states that "it appears possible, after the comparative 
study we have just made, to determine precisely the principle which governs 
contemporary democracy in the exercise of its constituent powers. This principle 
is proclaimed in the immense majority of constitutional texts we have had 
occasion to examine, and dominates the entire development of the public law of 
those nations whose constitutional history has been the chief object of our 
investigation. It may be formulated as follows: The constituent power is 
wielded directly by the people for purposes of sanction; directly or indirectly 
through its representatives for purposes of initiation. In other words--consider-
ing sanction alone, which shows the essential characteristic--the imperative act 
which gives being to the fundamental law proceeds directly from the body of 
qualified voters, sole possessors of the sovereign rights of the nation." 
,..(1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 393 at 406. 
]U(I939) 307 u.s. 433> 59 s. Ct. 972· 
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amendments is not as well assured as when decisions are by 
the courts. Therefore, provided that an easier method of 
amending the Constitution is substituted for the existing 
methods provided in Article Five, it might be well also ex-
pressly to provide in Article Five that all questions arising 
under Article Five are to be regarded as justiciable. 
A sixth and last factor to be considered is that of enforce-
ment. This factor has been almost entirely overlooked 135 until 
recently, not only in connection with amendments but also 
as to statutes in general. The Fifteenth Amendment and 
more recently the Eighteenth have very forcibly brought 
this question to the front. It is an unfortunate situation to have 
a law passed which is not enforced. It is a great deal more 
unfortunate to adopt an amendment to the national constitu-
tion which in large part remains a dead letter on the books.136 
In considering changes of the amending process, one is there-
fore by no means raising an academic question when one asks 
185 Arnold, "Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection," (I9JZ) 
42 YALE L. J. I-24· 
1116Moschzisker, "Dangers in Disregarding Fundamental Conceptions When 
Amending the Federal Constitution," (I925) I I CoRN. L. Q. I; Brown, "The 
People Should Be Consulted as to Constitutional Changes," ( 19 30) I 6 A. B. 
A.]. 404. 
Senator· Underwood of Alabama pointed out in the Senate debate on the 
adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, 55 CoN G. REc. (I 9 I 7) 55 54: "The 
sound and underlying theory of democracy 'that a just form of government 
requires the consent of the governed' is often subject to perversion. President 
Hadley of Yale University says: 'Not content with saying that all just govern-
ment is based on the consent of the governed, the enthusiastic advocates of 
democracy hold that if you could only find what a majority of the governed 
wanted you could easily incorporate it into law. Never was there a greater 
practical error. Public law, to be effective, requires much more than the 
majority to support it. It requires general acquiescence. To leave the minority 
at the mercy of the whims of the majority does not conduce to law or good 
government or justice between man and man. Even Rousseau, the leading 
apostle of modern democracy, saw this most clearly. He said in substance: "A 
majority of the people is not the people and never can be. We take a majority 
vote simply as the ·best available means of ascertaining the real wishes of the 
people in cases when it becomes necessary to do so." ' • • • 
"It does not forgive the error of government to be able to command majorities 
in legislative bodies when a vast number of people stand in opposition to statutes 
which they feel and believe trench on their personal rights and endanger their 
personal liberty." 
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whether it will make likely the adoption of amendments which 
will not be enforced. Because of the difficulties · of en-
forcement, it may be desirable to require that something more 
than a simple majority of the legislatures or of the people 
must favor a change. While a simple majority may be ade-
quate for a statutory change, a constitutional change should 
have something more substantial behind it. A simple ma-
jority may by changes in popular sentiment become a minor-
ity. Sumptuary legislation, even when favored by considerably 
more than a majority, may encounter such opposition as to 
breed a feeling of disrespect for law in general. The violation 
of the federal principle may also result in a falling down of 
enforcement because of the jealousy of the states. Altering 
the amending process in such a way as to permit of unwise 
or hasty changes also contributes to a failure of the law. The 
passage of amendments without consulting the people by a 
popular referendum may result in charges that the amend-
ment was railroaded through the legislatures and is not repre-
sentative of the real wishes of the people. It is evident, then, 
that the factor of enforcement is subject to the interaction of 
the other factors. 
Great caution must be exercised, however, with respect to 
the conclusions one draws concerning the element of enforce-
ment. Most amendments would not be so difficult to enforce 
as the Eighteenth Amendment. It has been pointed out that 
it is undesirable to alter the amending process in such a way 
that unenforceable or unenforced amendments will be 
adopted. On the other hand, an even worse situation devel-
ops when an amendment is adopted which it is practically im-
possible to repeal chiefly because of difficulties in the amend-
ing process. It seems that Fils are bound to arise under either 
a facile or a difficult amending process. The reformer is seem-
ingly between Scylla and Charybdis. Balancing the evils in-
volved, is it not perhaps saner in the long run to make the 
amending process sufficiently easy so that an occasional mis-
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take is made which may be corrected in the same easy fashion, 
rather than to make it so difficult that when a mistake is made 
such mistakes cannot be corrected except by revolution? 137 
After all, the people or some large part of them must be per-
mitted to make their mistakes and to do so within the limits 
of the Constitution. It would therefore seem undesirable to 
write into the Constitution limitations on the content of 
amendments, or to alter the procedure in such a way as to 
make amendment almost impossible. There is no scientific 
method of ascertaining beforehand whether or not an amend-
ment can or will be enforced, and even after its adoption state-
ments alleging nonenforcement may be hard to prove. As 
Thomas Jefferson has said, each generation must be permitted 
to make its own laws. It may be well to guard the people 
against themselves as to ordinary matters, but it is possible 
to go too far when it is sought to do this with respect to alter-
ing the Constitution. Society cannot go on without taking 
some chances. The interests of progress as well as order must 
be consulted, otherwise order itself will perish.138 
137 Arneson, "A More Flexible Constitution," (1927) 61 AM. L. REv. 99· 
Lunt, "Amending the Constitution," (1930) 23 LAWY. & BANKER 252 at 254 
(summarized from the AMERICAN MERCuRY), stated: "The problem is far from 
simple. It is doubtful if any workable system could be devised, based directly 
or indirectly upon popular acclaim, which would prevent the perpetration of 
such sumptuary errors as the Eighteenth Amendment and yet permit of the cor-
rection of the defects discovered in the functioning of the organic law and the 
inevitable adjustment to wholly unforeseen conditions." 
See also the speeches of Mr. Huddleston of Alabama, 66 CoNe. REc. (1925) 
4573 and 67 CoNe. REc. (1926) 7203. In the former speech he said: "But 
assuming that some one of the amendments which have been adopted is objection-
able and should be repealed, those who advocate making it harder to amend the 
Constitution take an illogical position. They advocate making it harder to 
repeal an objectionable amendment than it was to secure its adoption." 
"'!Professor Munroe Smith has said: "Sooner or later, however, it will be 
generally realized that the first article in any sincerely intended progressive 
programme must be the amendment of the amending clause of the Federal 
Constitution." Smith, "Shall We Make Our Constitution Flexible?" (1911) 
194 No. AM. REV. 657 at 673. 
Mr. Osmond K. Fraenkel stated .during the Supreme Court controversy of 
19 3 7: "The . . • most desirable choice would be to make easier the method of 
amendment itself." Fraenkel, "What Can Be Done About the Constitution and 
the Supreme Court?" (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. zrz at 226. 
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Australian amending procedure, 
176, 186, 187, 201. 
authorization to states of power to 
rescind prior action until three~ 
fourths ratify, 191-192. 
call of national convention by sim-
ple majority of states, 170. 
clarity in procedure, 2 I 8-2 I 9· 
Congress as proposing body, I 7 2-
177. 
date for popular referendum, 
196-198, 20Q-201. 
defeat of amendment when more 
than one-fourth of states have 
rejected, 191-192. 
difficulty of securing amendments, 
170,190,202, 2JQ-2I5, 22Q-
221. 
doctrine of political questions, 
2 I O, 2 I 8-2 I 9· 
elasticity of Constitution as mak-
ing amendment less necessary, 
214-215. 
enforceability as limitation on 
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Reform (continued) 
amending process, 2I7, 2I9-
22I. 
federal principle as limitation on 
reform, I75• I7S, IS7, zoi, 
zo6-zoS, 2I7. 
limitations on scope of amend· 
ment, 203-205. 
national convention as method of 
proposal, I6S-I72. 
need for deliberation as limitation 
on reform, 6o, I79, ISI, I90, 
I97-I9S, 202, 2IQ-2I I. 
Norris proposed amendment of 
I937> I72, I73· ISS, 200-
203. 
periodic national conventions, 
I7I. 
policy factors to be considered, 
205-22I. 
popular democracy as factor in 
amending process, I 79, IS I-
IS2, IS4, I90, I92, 2I5-2IS. 
popular initiative in proposal of 
amendments, I 77-I So, I 92. 
popular referendum on amend· 
ments, IS4, I92-203, 2II, 
2I7. 
proposal as ~cial stage in amend-
ing process, 172, 1S3, 202. 
proposal by joint session of Con· 
gress, 174-17 5· 
proposal by one house of Con-
gress, 17 5-176. 
proposal by simple majority of 
Congress, 1 73-1 7 4· 
proposal of amendments by na-
tional convention only, 17 I, 
176. 
proposal procedure, 16S-1 So. 
ratification by legislatures elected 
after proposal, 1S9-191, 211. 
ratification by less than three-
fourths of states, I S4-1S9, zoo, 
202. 
ratification procedure, 1So-zo3. 
state conventions as exclusive 
method of ratification, 1 S 3. 
state conventions as ratifying 
agencies, ISo-IS3, 202. 
state legislatures as ratifying agen· 
cies, 1S 3-192. 
Swiss amending procedure, I 7S, 
IS6, IS7, 192, 201, 2IS. 
time limit for ratification, I 76-
I 77, I 99-200. 
Wadsworth-Garrett amendment, 
I7I, ISS, 190, I9I, I93-I96, 
I9S-I99, 200, 2II. 
wisdom of amendments as limita-
tion on reform, 203, zoS-2IO. 
Scope of Amending Power 
"abuse" of amending power an 
anomalous term, I22-I25. 
application of maxim expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, I I 5-
II6, 
Article Five as sui generis, I IS-
II9. 
Bill of Rights not a limitation, 
99-IOO. 
danger of limiting the scope, I I 9-
I 21. 
doctrine of political question as ap-
plicable to scope, 12 5-126. 
equal suffrage in Senate provision, 
zs, 84-S7, 96-99· 
express limitations, S 3-S 7. 
Fourteenth Amendment not a 
limitation, 99-IOO. 
germane character of amendment 
immaterial, 106-I07. 
implied limitations, S7-126. 
justiciability, 22-26. 
legislative character of amend-
ment immaterial, I03-I06. 
limitation on scope of amend-
ments ratifiable by legislature, 
54-55, I }3-II4. 
no guarantee of continued exist-
ence of states, 5, 8S-93. 
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Scope of Amending Power 
(continued) 
no guarantee of police power of 
states, s-6, 86-87, 93-96. 
no law above amending power, 
IOCJ-113. 
obsolete express limitations, 8 3-
84, 162-I63, 203-204. 
pluralism and amending power, 
110-113. 
power to add as well as alter by 
amendment, I08-I09. 
proposal of new constitution, 44-
45> 5 I. 
proposed limitation at Constitu-
tional Convention, 4-6. 
reform, 203, 205. 
rejection of implied limitations 
by the courts, 12I-I22. 
sovereignty, I3C}-I67. 
Tenth Amendment not a limita-
tion, IOQ-I03. 
view of framers of Constitution as 
to its imperfect nature, 107, 
116-118, 211. 
Sovereignty 
absolute character, I 33-134. 
abstract "state" not sovereign, 
I5I-153· 
adoption of Constitution, 146-
148. 
Austin's theory, I 34-I 35, I47> 
151, 153> 157> 163. 
Bentham's theory, 156. 
Blackstone's theory, I29, I37· 
Bliss's theory, I 3 7, I 58. 
Bodin's theory, I27. 
Brown's theory, 151, 163-164. 
Bryce's theory, 128, 163. 
Burgess's theory, I 52. 
Calhoun's theory, 140. 
characteristics of legal sovereignty, 
133-136, 16I-162. 
Congress not sovereign, 141. 
Constitution not sovereign, I so-
l 5 I. 
definition, I 27-1 39· 
determinate character, I3S-I37· 
Dewey's theory, I35> 137, I60. 
Dicey's theory, I30, 145, I48, 
I 53> I6I, I67 .. 
Dickinson's theory, I35, 137, 
149, IS8. 
distinction between legal and po-
litical sovereignty, 130-1 3 1. 
effect of doctrine of political ques-
tions on sovereignty, I28, 141, 
I s6, 163. 
effect of inactivity by sovereign, 
16I-I62. 
electorate not sovereign, 144-
146. 
Emerson's theory, 140, 167. 
equal suffrage in Senate provision 
as affecting sovereignty, 84-86, 
I57> 162-I63. 
external sovereignty, 131-132. 
factual character, I 3 3. 
federal amending power as sov-
ereign, I 54-I 63. 
futility of concept of sovereignty, 
I65-166. 
Garner's theory, I 32. 
German view of sovereignty, I 55· 
Gray's theory, I37, I52, 159· 
Harrison's theory, 135-I36. 
Hobbes's theory, ISS· 
Holdsworth's theory, I66-167. 
Hurd's theory, 153· 
importance, 127, I63-164, I66-
I67. 
indivisible character, I 34· 
in international law, I32-I33· 
internal sovereignty, I IO, I 3 I-
I32. 
Jameson's theory, 143, I 59· 
Jellinek's theory, I31-132. 
Laski's theory, 136. 
location of sovereignty in the 
United States, 131}-167. 
McGovney's theory, 145· 
Mcilwain's theory, I 29, 13 5. 




occasional violation of law not de-
structive of sovereignty, I 34--
135, I58. 
Oppenheim's theory, I 3 2. 
people not sovereign, 37-39, 89, 
I4-I-I 4-8. 
Radin's theory, q6, I64-. 
revolution and sovereignty, 3 7-
39· 
right to bind future generations, 
157· 205. 
Rottschaefer's theory, I 4-6, I 57. 
Salmond's theory, I33· 
sovereign not necessary, I 3 7- I 3 9· 
sovereignty in England, I 31, 
I36-I37> I57· 
sovereignty not in federal govern-
ment, I4-I. 
sovereignty not in states, 89, I4-o-
I4-I. 
states united not sovereign, I 53-
I 54-· 
Stephen's theory, I64-. 
Supreme Court not sovereign, 
11 I-112, I4-8-I5o. 
value of determinate legal sov-
ereign, I63-I67. 
Ward's theory, I4-5· 
Willoughby's theory, I32, I34-, 
I39· I52, I54--I55· I63-I64-. 
State Constitutional Amendments 
acquiescence, 8o-8 I. 
amending process prior to I 787, 
I, 39· 
Bill of Rights as limitation on 
scope, IOO. 
chief prerequisites in state amend-
ing process, 62. 
exclusiveness of constitutional 
modes, 3 7-3 9· 
governor's veto, 66. 
justiciability of amendments, I4--
I5. 
legislative character, I06. 
powers of state constitutional con-
vention, 45-47. 
ratification as cure to defect in 
proposal, 53. 
scope of amending power, 23-25. 
State Conventions 
arguments for and against conven-
tion method, I8I-I82, 
discussion at Constitutional Con-
vention, 4--6. 
lack of deliberation, 6o, I 8 I. 
popular democracy as a factor, 
I8I-I82. 
powers of Congress over state con-
ventions, 56-59. 
powers of state conventions, 54-, 
scr-6I, I I 3-I If. 
ratification of Civil War Amend-
ments by state conventions 
sought, 53-54. 
ratification of Twenty-First 
Amendment, 6o, I 8 I. 
ratification through state conven-
tions, 5 3-6 I. . 
reform of ratification by state con-
ventions, I8o-I83. 
scope of ratifying power, 54--55, 
113-114-. 
validity of state referendum in re-
lation to state convention, 6o-
6I. 
State Legislatures 
application for national conven-
tion, 4-o-44-. 
deliberation, 2 I o-2 I 5. 
discussion at Constitutional Con-
vention, 2-6. 
effect of prior adoption, 67. 
effect of prior rejection, I 8-20, 
67, 7o-73· 
federal principle, 206-208. 
inclusion of lieutenant governor 
in state senate, I9. 
meaning of "state legislature," I 7. 
meaning of "three-fourths" of 
states, 74· 
nonlegislative character of ratify-
ing process, 62-63. 
political question, I6-zz. 
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State Legislatures (continued) 
powers of Congress over state leg· 
islatures, 63-66. 
promulgation by Secretary of 
State, I 8, 76-78. 
ratification through state legisla· 
tures, 6I-78. 
reform of ratification by legisla-
tures, 183-I92. 
scope of ratifying power, 54-55, 
I I3-II.f.. 
sovereignty, 89, I4Q-I . p, IS 3-
IS.j.. 
subsequently elected legislature, 
I8<)-I9I. 
time limit for ratification, I 9-20, 
74-76. 
validity of state referendum in ad-
dition to legislative ratification, 
68-70. 
veto by governor, 66. 
withdrawal of proposal by Con· 
gress, SI-52. 
Time Limit for Ratification 
political question, I 9-20. 
procedure, 74-76. 
Time of Attack on Amendment 
acquiescence, 78-8 I. 
right to attack before ratification 
by three-fourths of states, 28-
32. 
right to attack subsequent to rati-
fication by three-fourths of 
states, 2 8-3 I. 
separation of powers theory, 29-
30. 
stages for attack, 30. 
Wisdom of Amendments 
policy factor in reform of amend· 
ing clause, 203, zo8-2IO. 
